Osborne, 11th August 1848.
The Queen has to acknowledge Lord Palmerston's letter of yesterday. The Queen was quite surprised to hear from Lord Palmerston in his last communication that he had written to Lord Normanby to offer him to stay as Minister at Paris, after his having before stated to the Queen that this would never do and could not be expected from Lord Normanby; Lord Normanby's answer declining this offer therefore does in no way alter the matter, and must have been foreseen by Lord Palmerston. By the delay and Lord Normanby's various conversations with M. Bastide36 and General Cavaignac it has now become difficult to depart from the precedent of the Belgian and Sardinian Missions without giving offence at Paris. The Queen must, however, insist upon this precedent being fully adhered to. She accordingly sanctions Lord Normanby's appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary, on the distinct understanding that there is to be no Ambassador sent in return to London now, and that a Minister is to be appointed to Paris when the diplomatic intercourse is permanently to be settled. The Queen wishes Lord Palmerston to bear this in mind, and to submit to her the arrangement which he thinks will be best calculated to carry this into effect.
Footnote 36: Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell.
LORD NORMANBY'S APPOINTMENT
Osborne, 11th August 1848.
The Queen has to acknowledge Lord John Russell's letter of to-day. The Queen is highly indignant at Lord Palmerston's behaviour now again with respect to Lord Normanby's appointment; he knew perfectly well that Lord Normanby could not accept the post of Minister, and had written to the Queen before that such an offer could not be made, and has now made it after all, knowing that, by wasting time and getting the matter entangled at Paris, he would carry his point. If the French are so anxious to keep Lord Normanby as to make any sacrifice for that object, it ought to make us cautious, as it can only be on account of the ease with which they can make him serve their purposes. They, of course, like an entente cordiale with us at the expense of Austria;... but this can be no consideration for us....
Threatening the Austrians with war, or making war upon them in case they should not be inclined to surrender their provinces at his bidding [Lord Palmerston] knows to be impossible; therefore the entente with the Republic is of the greatest value to him, enabling him to threaten the Austrians at any time with the French intervention which he can have at command if he agrees to it.37 The Queen has read the leading articles of the Times of yesterday and to-day on this subject with the greatest satisfaction as they express almost entirely the same views and feelings which she entertains. The Queen hopes that Lord John Russell will read them; indeed, the whole of the Press seem to be unanimous on this subject, and she can hardly understand how there can be two opinions upon it....
Footnote 37: The success of the Piedmontese in Northern Italy had not continued through the summer, and the States whose assistance they had hitherto received began to fall away from them. The King of Naples, successful within his own dominions, had withdrawn his troops; the Pope hesitated to attack Austria; even undivided support from Venetia could no longer be counted upon. After several reverses, Charles Albert, now left virtually alone in the contest, was decisively defeated by Radetzky, at Custozza, and retreated across the Mincio. With what was left of his troops he entered Milan, which he was eventually forced to surrender, being unable to maintain himself there. Italy now turned to France for assistance, but Cavaignac, virtually Dictator in Paris, would not go further than combining with England to effect a peaceful mediation. Austria was not in a frame of mind to relinquish any part of the provinces she had had so severe a struggle to retain.