The Queen must write to Lord Aberdeen on a subject which at this moment appears to her of paramount importance—viz., the augmentation of the Army. The ten thousand men by which it has been ordered to be augmented can hardly be considered to have brought it up to more than an improved Peace establishment, such as we have often had during profound peace in Europe; but even these ten thousand men are not yet obtained. We have nearly pledged ourselves to sending twenty-five thousand men to the East, and this pledge will have to be redeemed. To keep even such a force up in the field will require a strong, available reserve at home, of which we shall be quite denuded. But we are going to make war upon Russia! encouraging Austria and Prussia to do so likewise, whereby we assume a moral obligation not to leave them without assistance. We engage in a War which may assume in its course a totally different character from that of its beginning. Who can say it is impossible that our own shores may be threatened by powers now in alliance with us? We are powerless for offence or defence without a trained Army; to obtain this will require considerable time. The Queen must, therefore, urge Lord Aberdeen to consider with the Cabinet whether it will not be essential to augment the Army at once, and by at least thirty thousand men. Considerations of home policy make this also advisable; the country is eager for War at this moment, and ready to grant men and money. It will be a great facility hereafter to have obtained what is most needed at first. If the force should finally not be wanted, retrenchments may very easily be made. The Crown should at least have the power of raising the men without the necessity for further application to Parliament.
The Earl of Aberdeen to Queen Victoria.
THE BRITISH ULTIMATUM
London, 26th February 1854.
Lord Aberdeen, with his humble duty, begs to inform your Majesty that another Cabinet was held to-day, in order to consider the draft of a letter which it is proposed that Lord Clarendon should address to Count Nesselrode, and in which he should summon the Russian Government to evacuate the Principalities. The messenger will be directed to wait six days for an answer, and the British Government will consider the refusal or the silence of Count Nesselrode as equivalent to a declaration of War, and proceed to act accordingly.15
An assurance has been received, in general terms, of the intention of Austria to support this demand; and a telegraphic message has been sent to Vienna with a desire to know whether the Austrian Government will join in this summons, or in what manner support will be given.16 No answer has yet been received, and Lord Aberdeen would think it right not to make the summons until Austria has declared her intention; but the Cabinet appears to desire that the letter should be sent to-morrow evening.
The period fixed for the complete evacuation of the Principalities is the 30th of April.
As it cannot be supposed that the Emperor of Russia will listen to such a demand as this, immediate hostilities must be expected, with all their consequences.
Footnote 15: This summons to evacuate the Principalities, and an ultimatum to a similar purport from Paris, were delivered to the Czar on the 14th of March; on their receipt the Czar intimated that he did not think it fitting (convenable) that he should make any reply. His decision was known in London on the 24th.
Footnote 16: The attitude of Austria caused great perplexity. Count Orloff had gone to Vienna to obtain a pledge of neutrality in the event of war, but refused to give the Emperor Francis Joseph satisfactory assurances as to the Czar's future policy, and, in particular, as to the evacuation of the Principalities at the close of the war. The Austrian Government accordingly announced its intention of acting as circumstances might dictate, but subsequently limited the assistance which it now expressed itself willing to give to England and France in insisting upon the evacuation, to diplomatic support.