Hendrickson Case.—In the first case the wife of the defendant died suddenly in the morning, and in the evening of the same day a coroner’s inquest was held. The defendant was called and sworn as a witness upon the inquest. At that time it did not appear that any crime had been committed, or that the defendant had been charged with any crime, or even suspected, except so far as the nature of some of the questions asked of him might indicate such a suspicion. On his subsequent trial on an indictment for the murder of his wife, the statements made by him at the coroner’s inquest were held admissible, on the ground that he was not examined as a party charged with the crime, that it had not appeared even that a crime had been committed, and that he had simply testified as a witness on the inquiry as to the cause of the death.[561]
McMahon Case.—Following this came the McMahon Case, in which it appeared that the defendant was arrested by a constable, without warrant, on a charge of having murdered his wife. The constable took him before the coroner, who was holding an inquest on the body, by whom he was sworn and examined as a witness. It was held that the evidence thus given was not admissible on the prisoner’s trial for the murder, and his conviction was reversed upon that ground.[562]
Teachout Case.—The doctrine of this case was more clearly defined and somewhat limited in a later case, the Teachout Case. In that case the defendant appeared at the coroner’s inquest in pursuance of a sub-pœna to testify, and voluntarily attended; he was not under arrest, but was informed by some one that it was charged that his wife had been poisoned and that he would be arrested for the crime. Before he was sworn he was informed by the coroner that there were rumors that his wife came to her death by foul means and that some of those rumors implicated him, and that he was not obliged to testify unless he chose. He said he had no objection to telling all he knew. The Court in delivering its opinion preludes it by a reference to these facts as showing that the statements made were voluntary in every legal sense, and held that a mere consciousness of being suspected of a crime did not so disqualify him that his testimony, in other respects freely and voluntarily given before the coroner, could not be used against him on his trial on a charge subsequently made of such crime. On that ground it held the evidence properly admitted, at the same time referring with approval to the McMahon Case, and distinctly limiting the rule of exclusion to cases within its bounds.[563]
Mondon Case.—Then followed the Mondon Case, where on the finding of the body of the deceased, the defendant was arrested without warrant as the suspected murderer. While he was thus in custody the coroner empanelled a jury and held an inquest, and the defendant was called as a witness before the inquest and was examined by the district attorney and by the coroner. The prisoner was an ignorant Italian laborer unfamiliar with the English language. He was unattended by counsel, and it did not appear that he was in any manner informed of his rights, or that he was not bound to answer questions tending to criminate him He was twice examined; on the first occasion the examination was taken by questions put either by the district attorney or by the coroner, and the result written down by the coroner, who then read the evidence over to him, line by line, and asked him if he understood it and if it was the truth, and he said it was, and the coroner then reswore him to the deposition. The coroner, after taking the defendant’s testimony on the first day, came to the conclusion that the defendant did not understand English well enough to be examined, and that it ought to be taken through an interpreter, which was done, in order that they might get it a little better and a little fuller. It was held that the defendant’s testimony was not admissible upon his trial on the indictment.[564] It will be seen that this latter case follows in direct line with the rule announced in the McMahon Case and clearly distinguishes another case, the McGloin Case, upon the authority of which the trial court held the testimony of the prisoner in the Mondon Case admissible.
McGloin Case.—The case of McGloin was not that of the examination of a prisoner on oath before a magistrate before whom he was taken involuntarily, while in custody, and interrogated by the magistrate, who to all appearance had power to require him to answer, but while under arrest the prisoner said to the inspector of police who had him in charge that he would make a statement. The inspector then said that he would send for a coroner to take it. The coroner was then sent for and came to police headquarters and took down in writing the confession dictated by the prisoner, the coroner asking no questions and not acting in any official capacity, but as a mere amanuensis to take down the confession and prove the contents. It was held that the confession of the prisoner was admissible in evidence upon his trial for murder.[565]
Rule in Pennsylvania.—The rule in Pennsylvania is substantially that when the testimony given by the prisoner under oath before a coroner’s inquest, previous to him being charged or suspected of the murder of the individual upon whose body the inquest was sitting, may afterward be given in evidence against him, on his trial for the murder of such person.[566]
Rule in Nebraska.—The statements of a prisoner to be competent evidence must have been voluntarily made. In cases of declaration made on an examination before a coroner’s inquest by a person under arrest or charged with the crime and also under oath, they are not admissible. But when the person, although he be subsequently charged with the offence, appears voluntarily, and gives testimony, before any accusation has been made against him, his statements are admissible in evidence against him on the trial of an indictment for the crime.[567]
MEDICO-LEGAL AUTOPSIES.