Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic medicine and Toxicology. Vol. 1

by R. A. Witthaus; Tracy C. Becker

[560] People v. Willett, 92 N. Y., 29. In this case upon the trial of an indictment for murder, evidence was received on the part of the prosecution, under objection and exception, to the effect that upon the coroner’s inquest a witness testified that shortly after the murder a stranger called at her house and asked the way to Sandy Hill, and also for a drink of water; that the prisoner with a number of others was placed around a room, and the witness pointed out the prisoner as the one who so called; also that a number of persons, including the prisoner passed behind her, each one repeating the question asked her by the stranger, and she identified the prisoner by his voice, and that the prisoner on that occasion did not Footnote: deny that he was such stranger. It was held that the prisoner was not bound to speak and his silence could not be regarded as an evidence of guilt, and that the evidence was improperly received. The Court said: “The question whether the defendant was bound to speak, and understood that he was at liberty to speak, if he chose, was submitted to the jury by the Court in his charge, and an exception taken thereto. The doctrine as to silence being taken as an implied admission of the truth of allegations spoken or uttered in the presence of a person, does not apply to silence at a judicial proceeding or hearing. And if the proceedings before the coroner were of a judicial character the evidence was erroneously received. It is very apparent that the examination before the coroner partook of a judicial character, and what then transpired must be considered as a part of the proceedings; the coroner was there, a jury had been empanelled, and witnesses were examined whose testimony was returned as a portion of the coroner’s proceedings. It is difficult to see upon what ground it can be claimed that the experiments which were made were not in connection with the proceedings before the coroner and a part thereof.”

[561] Hendrickson v. People, 10 N. Y., 13.

[562] People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y., 384.

[563] Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y., 7.

[564] People v. Mondon, 103 N. Y., 211.

[565] People v. McGloin, 91 N. Y., 241.

[566] Williams v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St., 102. In this case the prosecution was permitted to prove upon the trial that a justice of the peace had held an inquest on the body of a dead person, and appointed another person foreman of the inquest, and directed him to swear witnesses; and while the inquest was still sitting, the foreman called upon and requested the defendant to be sworn and give evidence as a witness, and he was duly sworn and was examined by the foreman, in presence of the inquest. It was held on appeal that his evidence was admissible. On this point the Court said: “If the defendant had been awakened out of sleep, charged with crime, and then, in the necessary confusion of his faculties sworn to testify, I should have steadfastly resisted the subsequent introduction of the testimony against him. The common law, which justifies an accused man in entire silence, appears in beautiful contrast to the continental systems, which permit the criminal to be racked by inquisitorial skill, until something be wrung from him which may be patched up into proof of guilt. This case shows nothing of the kind. The phrase ‘called up’ commented on by the counsel, does not appear in the record, and if employed by the witnesses related doubtless to the ordinary case of calling forth a witness, and not awakening him from slumber. When the defendant was sworn before the inquest, he had neither been charged with nor suspected of crime. He might have declined to testify, and this would have pointed suspicion directly to him. He took the risk of a statement, and cannot complain that he met the legitimate consequences of the act. In the eye of all the authorities, it was a voluntary statement.”

[567] Clough v. The State, 7 Neb., 320.

[568] The facts upon which the following statements are based have been largely drawn from Taylor. See Stevenson’s Taylor, vol. i., p. 204 et seq.

[569] Recent attention to such subjects by Italian writers places them in the foremost rank. Although their system of judicature differs from our own, this fact does not lessen the value of their medico-forensic literature.