As a thief in the night

by R. Austin Freeman

“Yes. An inquest in the face of a regular death certificate suggested some pretty definite information; and then your own account of the illness told one what to expect.”

“And yet,” said I, “neither of the doctors suspected anything while the man was alive.”

“No; but that is not very remarkable. I had the advantage over them of knowing that a death certificate had been challenged. It is always easier to be wise after than before the event.”

“And now that you have read the depositions, what do you think of the case? Do you think, for instance, that the verdict was justified?”

“Undoubtedly,” he replied. “What other verdict was possible on the evidence that was before the court? The medical witness swore that deceased died from the effects of arsenic poisoning. That is an inference, it is true. The facts are that the man died and that a poisonous quantity of arsenic was found in the body. But it is the only reasonable inference and we cannot doubt that it is the true one. Then again as to the question of murder as against accident or suicide, it is one of probabilities. But the probabilities are so overwhelmingly in favour of murder that no others are worth considering. No, Mayfield, on the evidence before us, we have to accept the verdict as expressing the obvious truth.”

“You think it impossible that there can be any error or fallacy in the case?”

“I don’t say that,” he replied. “I am referring exclusively to the evidence which is set forth in these depositions. That is all the evidence that we possess. Apart from the depositions we have no knowledge of the case at all; at least I have none, and I don’t suppose you have any.”

“I have not. But I understand that you think it at least conceivable that there may be, after all, some fallacy in the evidence of wilful murder?”

“A fallacy,” he replied, “is always conceivable. As you know, Mayfield, complete certainty, in the most rigorous sense, is hardly ever attainable in legal practice. But we must be reasonable. The law has to be administered; and if certainty, in the most extreme, academic sense, is unattainable, we must be guided in our action by the highest degree of probability that is within our reach.”

“Yes, I realize that. But still you admit that a fallacy is conceivable. Can you, just for the sake of illustration, suggest any such possibility in the evidence that you have read?”