The Sword and Gun: A History of the 37th Wis. Volunteer Infantry

by R. C. Eden

Our loss in this day's battle, though not so severe as in the charge of the preceding day was, nevertheless, very heavy in proportion to the number of men engaged. In company A, Capt. Stevens was mortally, and 2d Lieut. D. A. Lowber, severely wounded, and company B lost its 2d Lieut. N. S. Davison, shot through the shoulder. Our total loss in killed and wounded was 103, of which number 20 were killed on the field or died of wounds, and 83 wounded, making with the casualties of yesterday, an aggregate of 64 killed and 186 wounded. Total loss 250 out of 400.

We remained in the position to which we retired on the night of the 18th June, till the evening of the 20th of the same month, when we again occupied the front line of works to the right of our previous position on an eminence known as Hare Hill, so called from the owner of the plantation on which it is situated, and which was afterwards chosen as the site for Fort Steadman.

We remained here till the morning of the 22d, when we returned to our old position, on the Norfolk and Petersburg R. R., where we remained doing picket and fatigue duty, exposed day and night to a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, till the 10th of July. On the 28th of June, Lieut. David Prutsman, of company D, was killed by one of the enemy's sharpshooters while sitting at breakfast, in the trenches, and our losses in all up to this period amounted to 286 rank and file. In addition to this the extreme heat of the weather and the confinement to which they were subjected in the trenches, had caused our previously well thinned ranks to be reduced still lower by sickness. The position of the regiment, all through the hot summer months was, indeed, anything but enjoyable, lying on the dusty, sandy ground, exposed to the full power of the sun's rays by day and the damp chilly dews by night; obliged to remain in a recumbent position, where to raise a cap above the breastwork was to make it the target for half a dozen sharpshooters; water, even for drinking purposes, hard to get and poor at that, so that when on the 10th of July we were ordered to the rear, it was hailed by all as a respite from prison.

After a week's rest, during which, for fear I suppose that the men might get lazy for want of work, they were kept busy cutting and carrying material for abattis, the 37th was, on the 17th July, again ordered into the trenches, where they remained till the morning of the 30th of July, the day of the battle of Cemetery Hill, or as it is generally called the "Mine Fort."

This Fort, which was one of the strongest of the enemy's works, was situated on a hill a little to the right, and in front of our position, immediately in front of the cemetery at Blandford, one of the suburbs of Petersburg. A mine had been driven under the direction of Colonel Pleasant of the 48th Penn. Vol. Inf., from the rear of the Horse-shoe, where our regiment lay, under this fort, had been charged and primed, and was to be exploded at daylight on the morning of the 30th. Immediately on the explosion of the mine, the 9th corps was to advance on the crater and, taking advantage of the confusion and consternation excited, endeavor to break and hold the enemy's line. On eminences to the right and left of Cemetery Hill were forts which commanded it, and from which a severe enfilading fire could be directed on the fort itself, and an error in the plan of attack seems to have been the neglect of having a force ready to attack and, if possible, capture these works simultaneously with the assault on the main work, for, had they been captured or their fire silenced, there is no doubt but that a permanent lodgment would have been effected in the main line of the defences of Petersburg.

From the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, the blame of the failure of the whole plan, in consequence of this blunder, seems to be attributed to General Meade, and it would certainly seem to be an act of negligence on his part, with the force he had at his disposal, to leave these important points unmolested.

The original arrangement had been to explode the mine at half past four A. M., and for the assaulting column to advance immediately, but, owing to a fault in the fuse, it was nearly 6 o'clock before the explosion took place. At that time a vast column of smoke mingled with earth, fragments of guns and platforms, logs, sand-bags, gabions and human beings shot towering into the air to an immense height, gradually subsiding again and followed immediately by a dull, smothered roar which shook the ground for miles round, and was said to have been felt even to City Point. A pause, in which one might count, perhaps a dozen beats at the wrist, and 85 pieces of heavy artillery opened almost simultaneously on the rebel lines. The enemy was not slow in replying, and soon the light artillery and musketry chimed in, making the noise completely deafening, and the very ground under our feet to vibrate. From 6 till 12 this hellish uproar continued unabated at which time it commenced to slacken, till, by four o'clock, it died away, and, as the last of our troops fell back from the crater, the battle of July 30th was at an end.

On the explosion of the mine, the rebels fled from their works on each side of it, panic stricken, but, owing to some unaccountable blunder, this panic was not taken advantage of, as it might, and should have been, and the word to advance not being given, for some minutes, time was given the rebels to recover from the consternation into which the explosion, thoroughly unlooked for by them, had thrown them.

The word was given, at last; the charge was made, and the crater of the exploded mine occupied by our troops at an inconsiderable loss. Col. Harriman, assisted by Adjutant C. I. Miltimore and men from different regiments, succeeded in extricating two of the rebel guns from the ruins of the fort, and turning them against their late possessors.