“Exactly, but according to Dr. Clarke’s view, if His career was foreordained, He could not be a free agent; that is the difference. These men, Herod, Pilate, and the others, carried out their own will and the Divine will at the same time, and I see no difficulty in it. That is the great advantage the predestinarian has. When he meets with a passage that teaches predestination, he admits it; and when he meets with another that teaches free agency, he admits it. He makes no pause to try to reconcile them, because he sees no inconsistency. But when Dr. Clarke, and those who believe like him, come to one of these passages, ‘hard to be understood,’ as Peter says, they halt and endeavor to harmonize it with their belief. When the Bible, in speaking of Pharaoh, says, “For this purpose have I raised thee up,” we predestinarians at once acknowledge God’s hand, and we read on without stopping to explain. But Dr. Clarke comes to it and finds an obstacle. He must pause and try to determine what is meant by ‘raising up,’ and must explain it so as not to interfere with man’s free agency. We read that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart and in the next passage we read that Pharaoh hardened his own heart. We predestinarians find no difficulty here, for we see the two doctrines working together in perfect harmony, but Dr. Clarke becomes puzzled. ‘How is this?’ he says. ‘If God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, how could Pharaoh have hardened his own heart?’ So the good Doctor must enter into a long explanation of this hardening process.”
“One of the passages you have quoted,” said Ernest, who appeared to be confused by perplexing thoughts, “says, ‘according to the fore-knowledge.’ Could it not have been that God merely fore-saw what Judas and others would do and based the prophecy upon foreknowledge?”
“That only removes the difficulty one step,” replied Mr. Hillston. “For whatever God fore-saw, must take place. But the passage says also ‘determinate counsels.’ What does that mean?”
“I know you think it means predestination.”
“I certainly do,” replied Mr. Hillston. “But I think we have found predestination in at least two instances which prove that there is no conflict between the two principles we are discussing. If fore-ordination and free agency could work in harmony in the case of Judas, why not in the case of every human being. I want to ask you a question right here.”
“I will answer it, if I can,” said Ernest.
“You have already acknowledged that God fore-knows all things, ‘every deed which men will perform and even every thought which will pass through their minds’. Now suppose God should order some Jeremiah to write out the history of every human being: we would have a tremendous book of prophecy which would include every individual of the human race. You will admit that all these prophecies would have to be accomplished or God’s word would be falsified. You will admit, also, that if no one knew anything about this great and enormous book except the writer, men would be free agents? How could merely recording their actions without their knowledge affect their conduct?”
“It could not,” said Ernest.
“Well, then, are men’s actions any the less uncertain because they are not written out in a book? The history of every human being is written out in the Divine Mind. Is that history any the less uncertain because it is not published in a tangible volume? God’s not fore-telling what He fore-knows, does not leave men at liberty to change their conduct. If it did, the Lord could fore-know nothing with certainty. If then God could write out the history of every human being without doing the least violence to his free agency, how can you object to predestination? My history is fixed, and so is yours and every other man’s, and that is predestination.”
Ernest said nothing, and Mr. Hillston continued: