(c) Homicide, resulting from negligence or rashness in the performance of a lawful duty—e.g. a signalman on a railway forgetting to alter the points, and thus causing a collision, and loss of life. In England this would amount to manslaughter.
Justifiable Homicide.—Self-defence; hanging a prisoner properly sentenced to death; killing another to prevent murder, if prevention can avail in no other way. In self-defence, the person killing must be in reasonable dread of death at the hand of his adversary.
In England there is—1. Murder; 2. Manslaughter; 3. Justifiable Homicide.
Murder, according to Lord Coke (3 Inst. 47), is constituted “where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being, and under the King‘s peace, with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied.”
In England the killing must be committed with malice aforethought. Malice may be expressed or implied.
In Scotland malice aforethought is not necessary (5 Irv. 525, and 40 S.J. 92, and 5 S.L.R. 20).
The law in both countries appears to differ more in terms than in practice. In England, if an injured party live for one year and a day, and then die, death is not attributed to the injury; but in Scotland, although no definite time is fixed, yet no case would I believe be entertained at any lengthened period after the commission of a homicidal act. The longest interval, according to Taylor, at which conviction has taken place from indirectly fatal consequences was nine months.
In the United States, as a rule, the crime of murder admits of two degrees: in the first, where the act is intentional or is the result of an attempt at burglary, rape, arson, or by poison; otherwise the crime falls under the second degree.
WOUNDS
Legal Definition.—According to the statute (24 and 25 Vict. c. 100, sec. 18), the word “wound” includes incised, punctured, lacerated, contused, and gunshot wounds. But to constitute a wound within the meaning of the statute, the whole skin, not the mere cuticle, or upper skin, must be divided (R. v. M‘Laughlin, 8 C. & P. 635). But a division of the internal skin, e.g. within the cheek or lip, is sufficient to constitute a wound within the statute (R. v. Warman, 1 Den. C.C. 183). If the skin be broken, the nature of the instrument with which the injury is inflicted is immaterial, for the present statute extends to wounding, &c., “by any means whatsoever.” A wound from a kick with a boot is within the statute (R. v. Briggs, 1 Mood C.C. 318). Injuries, burns, and scalds—which, in accordance with the above definition of a wound, are not wounds—are provided for under the clause, “or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person.”