CONSCIOUSNESS AND EMOTION
Why should it be thought strange that monkeys talk? They see, hear, love, hate, think, and act by the same means and to the same end as man does. They experience pain and pleasure, to express which they cry and laugh just as man does. If the voluntary sounds they make do not mean something, why may those creatures not as well be dumb? If they do mean something, why may we not determine what that meaning is? It is true that their language is quite meagre and suited only to a low plane of life, but it may be the cytula from which all human speech proceeds, or it may be the inferior fruit borne upon the same great tree of speech. The organs of sensation in these creatures are modelled by the same design as those of man, are adapted to the same uses, and discharge the same functions. Then why should the vocal powers alone be abnormal, except in a degree measured by the difference of place which they occupy in the scale of Nature?
Social intercourse among men has been the chief means of developing human speech, and we find a true index to its condition in the social status of the different races of mankind; and by coming closer home, we find that even in different communities of the same race and within the limits of the same nation, a difference in the accuracy and volume of speech, which is measured by the difference of social culture. We find in rural districts, sparsely peopled and remote from the great centres of population, that speech is less polished and the number of words used greatly reduced in comparison to the same language used in the great cities and more populous communities, where, by reason of contact with each other and the constant use of speech, the vocal powers are much more developed and the command of language very much improved. This same law of development, inversely applied, would lead us in a direct line down through Nature, rank by rank, and we would find it a reliable unit of measure throughout the whole perspective of development. The faculties of music, taste, and reason are measured by a like unit. It is difficult to trace the musical powers of animals, since music does not contribute to the comfort or development of types and only affords pleasure to the intellectual being, and hence is only an accomplishment obeying no rule of normal growth.
THE FACULTY OF REASON
As the use of the natural sense of taste makes possible the choice of nourishment, and all forms of life are thus sustained, the natural taste becomes an important factor of their comfort, and upon this physical basis rests, perhaps, the whole superstructure of ethics. The first idea of ownership is doubtless found in the possession of food; and this right of property is protected by the unwritten laws of incipient life. The faculty of reason, which man has arrogated to himself, is only limited by that dim line which bounds the vital sphere and sheds its rays through all the kingdom of life, from that point where the vital spark first lights the monad, through all the labyrinths of change, to man in the full pride of his divinity, standing upon the threshold of the angelic state. It is not by the exercise of reason that water flows down hill, or that matter obeys the law of gravity; but in the exercise of autonomy, however feeble may be the motive, reason guides the act. The power of this faculty is measured by the development of others, and there is no point between the two extremes at which reason intercepts life. The degree in which all the powers of sense and faculty are developed determines the horizon of the thing which possesses them. The aggregation of powers to act constitutes life; and the aggregation of powers to guide the action constitutes reason.
ALL MAMMALS REASON
Leaving the realm of metaphysics and returning to the order of primates, to which we shall confine our present work, I shall resume by repeating that not only do primates have the faculty of speech, but the whole family of mammals have some form of speech which is in keeping with their conditions of life. In addition to this declaration, I assert that all mammals reason by the same means and to the same ends, but not to the same degree. The reason which controls the conduct of a man is just the same in kind as that which prompts the ape. The latter cannot carry the process to such a great extent, but microsophic pedants have not shown in what respect the methods differ only in degree. That same faculty which guided man to tame the winds of commerce, taught the nautilus to lift its tentacles and embrace the passing breeze. Yet we are told that reason guides the man and instinct guides the nautilus. These are but two names for light; the one is dawn, the other noon, but both are light. I cannot see in what respect the light of a lamp differs from that of a bonfire except in volume; they are the products of the same forces in Nature, acting through the same media, and, becoming causes, produce the same effects. That psychic spark which dimly glows in the animal bursts into a blaze of effulgence in man. The one differs from the other just as a single ray of sunlight differs from the glaring light of noon. EFFECTS OF ONE GREAT CAUSEIf man could disabuse his mind of that contempt for things below his plane of life, and hush the siren voice of self-conceit, his better senses might be touched by the eloquence of truth. But while the vassals of his empty pride control his mind, the plainest facts appeal to him in vain, and all the cogency of proof is lost. He is unwilling to forego that vain belief that he is Nature's idol, and that he is a duplicate of Deity. Held in check by the strong reins of theology and tradition, he has not dared to controvert those dogmas which bear the stamp of error on their face; he dares not turn away from the idols of his own conceit and read the rubrics written in the fossil rocks; he dares not take those proofs which none can counterfeit, and whose authority is not gainsaid; he dares not lay aside the yoke which galls the neck of patience, or breathe the air unblest by some mysterious rite performed in fear. By such restraints his ears are closed against those voices which appeal to him from without the temple gates of his belief. In what respect would man be less god-like if it be shown that monkeys talk? To elevate the humbler ranks could not degrade mankind. Whether man is the work of Deity or was evolved by laws of change from primal matter; whether he was made in one specific act or is the last amendment to a million prior types; whether he is the creature of design or accident, the authorship of his being and that of all the forms which roam the broad empire of life must be the same. We are all the effects of one Great Cause, whatever that may be, and that which gave to man the power of speech imparted it to apes; and I can see no reason why Nature should have drawn a line about this faculty, and made the rest a common heritage.
CHAPTER XXI.
Certain Marks which Characterise the Sounds of Monkeys as Speech—Sounds accompanied by Gestures—Certain Acts follow certain Sounds—They acquire new Sounds—Their Speech addressed to certain Individuals—Deliberation and Premeditation—They remember and anticipate Results—Thought and Reason.