The French had found it impossible to enter the neglected and ruined port of Alexandria. Admiral Brueys had, by command of Napoleon, offered a reward of 10,000 livres to any native pilot who would safely convey the squadron in, but not one was found who would venture to take charge of a single vessel that drew more than twenty feet. The gallant admiral was compelled, therefore, to anchor in Aboukir Bay, and chose the strongest position that was possible in the circumstances. He ranged his ships in a compact line of battle, in such a manner that the leading vessel lay close to a shoal, while the remainder of the fleet formed a curve along the line of deep water so that it was thought to be impossible to turn it by any means in a South Westerly direction, and some of the French, who were best able to judge, said that they held a position so strong that they could bid defiance to a force more than double their own. The presumption was not unreasonable, for the French had the advantage of the English in ships, guns, and men, but they had omitted to take into their calculations the fact that the English fleet was commanded by one whose promptitude in action, readiness and eccentricity of resource, and utter disregard of consequences when what he deemed the path to victory lay before him, might have been equalled; but certainly could not have been surpassed, by Bonaparte himself.

The French force consisted of thirteen ships of the line and four frigates, carrying in all 1196 guns and 11,230 men. The English had thirteen ships of the line and a fifty-gun ship, carrying in all 1012 guns and 8068 men. All the English line-of-battle ships were seventy-fours. Three of the French ships carried eighty-eight guns, and one, L’Orient, was a monster three-decker with 120 guns.

In order to give the reader a better idea of the forces engaged on both sides, we give the following list of ships. It is right, however, to add that one of those belonging to the English (the Culloden) ran aground on a shoal when about to go into action, and took no part in the fight.

English Ships.

Names Commanders Guns Men
1. Vanguard Admiral Nelson, Captain Berry 74 595
2. Minotaur Thos. Louis 74 640
3. Theseus R.W. Millar 74 590
4. Alexander A.J. Ball 74 590
5. Swiftsure B Hallowell 74 590
6. Audacious D Gould 74 590
7. Defence J Peyton 74 590
8. Zealous S Hood 74 590
9. Orion Sir James Saumarez 74 590
10. Goliath Thomas Foley 74 590
11. Majestic G.B. Westcott 74 590
12. Bellerophon H.D.E. Darby 74 590
13. Culloden T Trowbridge 74 590 Not engaged
14. Leander T.B. Thomson 50 343
15. La Mutine, Brig

French Ships.

Names Commanders Guns Men
1. L'Orient Admiral Brueys 120 1010 Burnt
2. Le Franklin 80 800 Taken
3. Le Tonnant 80 800 Taken
4. Le Guillaume Tell 80 800 Escaped
5. Le Conquerant 74 700 Taken
6. Le Spartiate 74 700 Taken
7. L'Aquilon 74 700 Taken
8. Le Souverain Peuple 74 700 Taken
9. L'Heureux 74 700 Taken
10. Le Timoleon 74 700 Burnt
11. Le Mercure 74 700 Taken
12. Le Genereux 74 700 Escaped
13. Le Guerrier 74 600 Taken
14. La Diane (Frigate) 48 300 Escaped
15. La Justice (Frigate) 44 300 Escaped
16. L'Artemise (Frigate) 36 250 Burnt
17. La Serieux (Frigate) 36 250 Dismasted, sunk

Such were the forces that met to engage in deadly conflict on the 1st of August 1798, with not only national but world-wide interest pending on the issue, for the battle of the Nile was one of the leading battles of the world.

When Nelson perceived the position of the enemy, his fertile and active mind at once evolved a characteristic course of action. Where there was room, he said, for an enemy’s ship to swing, there was room for one of his to anchor. He therefore at once formed the plan of doubling on the French ships, stationing one of his ships on the bow and another on the quarter of each of the enemy.

Nelson immediately explained his intended course to his officers. It had been his custom during the whole time he was engaged in searching for the French fleet, to have his captains as frequently as possible on board the Vanguard, when he explained to them his opinions as to the best mode of attack in all the various positions in which it was possible or probable that the enemy might be found. Hence they knew their commander’s tactics so well, that when the hour for action arrived, no time was lost in the tedious operation of signalling orders. He had such confidence in all his officers, that after thoroughly explaining his intended plan of attack, he merely said to them, “Form as is most convenient for mutual support, and anchor by the stern. First gain the victory, and then make the best use of it you can.”