Artillery with Advance and Rearguards.—At the beginning of the campaign, most divisional commanders, when moving with one brigade as advance guard, allotted one battery to it. As the operations progressed, however, the view that a larger force of artillery might profitably accompany the advance guard began to gain ground. The experience of the whole campaign points to the conclusion that, in view of the small number of guns available in a cavalry division, two of the three batteries should normally accompany the advance guard brigade. The practice may be open to the objections that it makes the advance guard column unduly long, and that some risk is involved in leaving the main body so short of artillery. Both these objections appear, however, to be outweighed by the advantages of having a large proportion of the artillery in front. Whether the enemy's resistance is stubborn or feeble, artillery fire can assist in breaking it, and the greater the number of guns available, the quicker will that object be achieved, and the less delay will there be to the advance of the main body.
The battery or batteries with the advance guard should, of course, march as far forward as is compatible with safety. Guns must always take longer than cavalry to move a given distance, and, if they are well to the front, no time will be lost in getting them into the only formation in which they are of any use, i.e. in action.
The divisional artillery commander should accompany the vanguard commander. When contact is established with the enemy, he is then on the spot, and able to make a personal reconnaissance at once, and decide, subject to the orders of the advance guard commander, how his guns can best and most quickly assist the cavalry. No time will then be lost in getting the guns into action. In the final series of operations, the enemy was in too demoralised a state for his action to form a very reliable guide in future wars, but it was found that vigorous artillery fire, delivered immediately after the first contact of our cavalry with his rearguards, invariably exercised a powerfully adverse effect on his morale. The little action of Kaukab well exemplifies this fact.
The above remarks as to artillery with the advance guard apply with equal force, mutatis mutandis, to the artillery of a rearguard during a retirement.
Escorts.—The campaign afforded few opportunities on our side to test the efficacy of artillery escorts. The action at Huj, however, in November 1917, was an excellent example of bad escort work on the part of the enemy. Our gunners have always maintained that the rôle of an escort is to obtain information rather than to afford protection. Guns on the march are vulnerable to a sudden attack, especially from cavalry; in action they are, or should be, well able to take care of themselves. If this contention is right, it follows that escorts need not be large, and should not be kept near the guns, but should patrol the country in any quarter from which attack may be expected, search dead ground, woods, etc., and give early information to the guns of the approach of the enemy.
At Huj the enemy had two battalions of infantry and several machine guns disposed about his batteries, but he had not a single patrol pushed out to the east. Our cavalry were thus able to approach to within 800 yards of the position of the guns unseen and unsuspected. The result of the Turks' negligence was a severe disaster, and it is to be hoped that the lesson will not be thrown away on future commanders of artillery escorts in the British Army. The escort work in our cavalry in Palestine and Syria was almost invariably very good, especially amongst the Australians.
R.H.A. Howitzers.—Most officers, both of the R.H.A. and the cavalry, who served in Syria, agreed as to the desirability of having a few light howitzers attached to each cavalry division. Such a gun as the 3·7-inch mountain howitzer, if it could be mounted on a suitable field carriage, would be admirably adapted for use with cavalry. Had a few howitzers been available during the attack on Beersheba, the stone block-houses and the rocky sangars of Tel el Saba would soon have been rendered untenable by the enemy, and would not have delayed our advance as they did.
As to whether two guns in each six-gun battery should be replaced by howitzers, or a separate battery of four howitzers should be provided for each division, opinion varied amongst the gunners on the spot. The writer is strongly in favour of the latter alternative, as being simpler, and in conformity with the existing practice in field artillery.
Shrapnel and H.E.—The question of the best proportions of shrapnel and high explosive shell to be carried in a horse artillery battery came under discussion at various times during the campaign, and opinions varied according to the nature of fighting in progress at the time. Amongst the rocks of the hill country, most battery commanders preferred a large preponderance of H.E., while, in open country, they wanted more shrapnel. One thing certain is that the Turks themselves dreaded the former far more than the latter. On several occasions enemy officer prisoners told the writer that they always had greater difficulty in getting their men to attack through H.E. shell fire than through shrapnel, even though, as they averred, the latter invariably caused them more casualties than the former. As before remarked, the behaviour of the Turks was not a very reliable guide for future wars, but it is to be noted that the same aversion to H.E. shell was observed amongst the Germans, and even amongst our own troops.
There seems little doubt, therefore, that the moral effect of H.E. is much greater than that of shrapnel. If this be so, R.H.A. 13-pounder guns, whose lethal effect is so comparatively small, should be provided with a large proportion of it. The writer suggests, on the experience of this campaign, that the due proportion lies somewhere between 50 and 75 per cent. of the total ammunition carried.