3. In order to deceive the enemy up to the last moment as to the real point of our main attack, to pin him to his positions, and to draw reinforcements away from his left flank, an attack, preceded by a week's bombardment, was to be launched on the Gaza defences twenty-four to forty-eight hours previous to 2.

As the attack on Beersheba necessitated a march of some seventy miles on the part of the cavalry, who were to attack from the east, and of about twenty for the infantry, over unknown country, a great deal of preliminary work was required. The water supply had to be developed, tracks and the crossing places of wadis improved and marked on the maps, and the enemy positions south and west of Beersheba most carefully reconnoitred. It was also very desirable that all commanders should gain some knowledge of the country over which they were to lead their troops.

To these ends our line was organised as follows:—

A permanent position, strongly entrenched and wired, was constructed from the sea at Gaza to Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzze, and held by infantry. From Shellal a lightly entrenched line extended to El Gamli, and this was held by one cavalry division, which also supplied the outposts and patrols in the wide 'no man's land' at this end of the line. A second cavalry division was held in support in the neighbourhood of Abasan el Kebir, and the third was in reserve, resting, on the seashore near Tel el Marrakeb. These divisions relieved one another every month.

The cavalry divisions in the line and at Abasan lived in bivouacs made of light, wooden hurdles, covered with grass mats, and erected over rectangular pits dug in the ground. These bivouac shelters gave fair cover from the sun, and the pits afforded some protection from enemy bombs. The division on the seashore was accommodated in tents.

The two former divisions had to be ready at all times to move out to battle at half an hour's notice, and much of the training was directed towards cutting down the time taken to turn out in 'marching order.' The division in the line had plenty of work to do, with daily outposts, extended patrol work, and the long reconnaissances undertaken every fortnight, so that the training was confined to the periods spent at Abasan.

As the operations were to take place in the late summer, and, it was hoped, would be concluded before the winter rains set in, no great provision against cold and wet was called for. Blankets and greatcoats were, therefore, not to be carried. Each man was provided with a pair of officers' pattern saddle-wallets, in which he carried three days' rations (including the iron ration) of bully beef, biscuit, and groceries, besides the few articles of clothing he was allowed to take. Two nose-bags on each saddle carried 19 lb. of grain (two days' forage on the marching scale). A third day's forage was carried in limbered G.S. wagons, three to each regiment. The divisions were, therefore, self-supporting for three days, without recourse to their divisional trains. The latter, during the subsequent operations, did not accompany their divisions, but acted as carriers between them and the advanced ration dumps established by the corps' lorry column each day. One other L.G.S. wagon was allowed per regiment for technical stores, cooking utensils, etc. All entrenching tools were carried on pack animals.

In order to test the mobility of the troops, it was the custom for each divisional commander, during the period when his division was in the Abasan area, to issue from time to time a surprise order for the troops to turn out ready for operations, and rendezvous by brigades or regiments in stated places, where they were carefully inspected. These orders were generally issued in the early morning, and, as no hint of them was ever given beforehand, even to the Staff, they constituted a real test of mobility. The time taken by each unit to turn out was noted by Staff officers, and the keenest rivalry sprang up between the divisions and the different units of each division to make the best showing. Ration and store wagons were packed each night, nose-bags filled after the last feed and tied on the saddles, and all harness and saddlery laid out in order behind the horses. The men's wallets were kept packed permanently, the rations in them being renewed from time to time, when the old ones were consumed. The record ultimately went to one of the Horse Artillery batteries, which turned out complete in full marching order, with all its ammunition, rations, and stores correct, in eleven minutes from the receipt of the order.

About once a fortnight the cavalry division that was in the line made a reconnaissance towards Beersheba, the other two divisions closing up to Shellal and Abasan respectively. Moving out in the afternoon, the division would march all night, and occupy a line of posts on the high ground west of Beersheba by dawn next morning. Behind this line of protecting posts the infantry corps and divisional commanders, and innumerable lesser fry, disported themselves in motor cars and on horseback. The senior corps commander and his staff used to be irreverently referred to as the 'Royal Party,' a flippant term which may be excused by the tedium and discomfort of the operations.