Thus, to quote the Commander-in-Chiefs despatch:[22] 'Afule, Beisan, and Deraa were the vital points on the enemy's communications. If they could be seized, his retreat would be cut off. Deraa was beyond my reach, but not beyond that of mobile detachments of the Arab Army. It was not to be expected that these detachments could hold this junction, but it was within their power to dislocate all traffic.'
The coastal plain, consisting of rolling down-land, is about ten miles wide at Arsuf. From this point northwards it gradually narrows, till it is shut off altogether at Haifa, where the Mount of Carmel, an offshoot from the main Judæan range, falls in steep cliffs to the sea. The only track over the Carmel Range into the Plain of Esdraelon that is possible for wheeled traffic is by the famous Musmus Pass, from Kerkur to Lejjun on the river Kishon, over which Thothmes III. led his army, 'horse behind horse and man behind man,' to the great victory of Megiddo, in 1479 B.C.
The pass, which carries the age-old caravan road from Egypt to Mesopotamia, leads through a narrow, rocky defile, in steep and difficult mountain country, and, near the top of the range, is enclosed in places between sheer cliffs. Skilfully handled, a small body of troops could hold it for a long time against a greatly superior force.
The enemy VIIth and VIIIth Armies held the line from the sea to the Jordan Valley. His IVth Army was disposed in the valley and east of the Jordan. A fairly good, metalled road runs from Jiljulie, through Tul Keram, to Nablus. From here two bad mountain tracks lead down to the Jordan, one through Beit Dejan, and the other by Ain Shibleh and down the Wadi Farah. These two tracks join one another at El Makhruk, four miles west of the river, and then continue over the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh, and on to El Salt. This was the enemy's only lateral communication, and the portion between Nablus and El Salt was so difficult that the IVth Army was practically isolated from the rest of the force.
The Turkish armies opposed to us, including reserves and lines of communication troops, numbered some 90,000 men, of whom perhaps 5000 were cavalry, with about 400 guns. Their Commander-in-Chief was the German Marshal Liman von Sanders, who had his headquarters at Nazareth. Our own troops numbered about 120,000, including 25,000 cavalry, with 540 guns.
The morale of the enemy troops, both Turkish and German, was lower than it had been at any time since the beginning of the campaign. Many of the Turkish soldiers were ill-trained and of poor character. Disheartened by a long series of successful small raids, carried out by our infantry during the past two months, utterly weary of a war the objects of which they little understood, racked with disease, and imbued with a bitter hatred of their German masters, who despised and bullied them, they were in no state to withstand the onslaught that was preparing. The ill-feeling between Turks and Germans, which had existed from the very beginning of the war, had now reached an acute stage. The Germans, with characteristic stupidity, failed to do anything to allay the irritation caused by their overbearing manner, and openly expressed contempt for their allies.
Numerous documents, subsequently captured by us at the enemy G.H.Q., testified to the deplorable state of internal strife and suspicion to which the enemy army was now reduced. Indeed, with the exception of a few senior officers, the Germans seemed to take a delight in ill-treating and insulting the unhappy Turks.
These factors must be borne in mind in estimating the tactics adopted by the British Commander-in-Chief. His plan was one of the boldest and simplest ever conceived by a great captain, and will live in the text-books of the soldiers of all nations, as a model of the use of cavalry, as long as war is waged. Such risks as he took in the carrying out of that plan, and they were numerous, were justified by the state of the enemy armies opposed to us, and were, in every instance, triumphantly vindicated by the success of the operations.
In broad outline, the plan was to concentrate an overwhelming force of infantry and guns in the coastal sector, together with three divisions of cavalry: for the infantry to attack the enemy positions from Jiljulie to the sea, and, having captured them, to wheel to the right, pivoting on Jiljulie, and bend back the enemy's right wing into the hills, exactly like opening a door. Through this open door the cavalry were to dash, and ride up the coast and over the Musmus Pass into the Plain of Esdraelon. Once in the plain, their task was to seize Afule, and then ride down the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan and the Jordan, and cut the railways at these two places, while an Arab force cut it farther east at Deraa. Later on Haifa was to be occupied, and thus a net of cavalry would be drawn from the sea to the Jordan. As soon as the cavalry were well through the gap on the coastal plain, our infantry were to attack all along the line in the mountain sector, while the troops that had opened the door endeavoured to roll up the enemy line from his right flank. Our force in the Jordan Valley was to advance simultaneously, and seize the bridge over the Jordan at El Damieh. The two Turkish armies west of the Jordan would thus be caught in a trap, with the sea on their right and the Jordan on their left, and, with all their communications cut, would be forced back into the cavalry net behind them.