Sir Douglas Haig reckoned that sixty-four German divisions took part in the operations on the first day of the battle; “the majority of these divisions had spent many weeks and even months in concentrated training for offensive operations and had reached a high pitch of technical excellence in the attack.” To meet the enemy’s assault the 3rd Army had eight divisions in line with seven in reserve. The 5th had eleven divisions in line with six divisions (three being cavalry divisions) in reserve. Later on, when it was found the enemy was using his whole strength in the battle, Haig was able to bring eight more divisions from north to south, and by the end of March the supreme German effort was broken. This, however, did not result until after a terrible period of danger had been passed through.
On the 21st March the attack opened after a short but very violent bombardment and, owing to dense fog, the Germans were able to penetrate the British front and force the 5th Army to retreat precipitately. On the 25th of the month the enemy reached Albert, and this day was perhaps one of the most important in history because Marshal Foch, by agreement between the Allies, was appointed to the supreme command of the armies of the West; and from that time onward final victory was secure, whatever troubles might intervene. On the 27th March the Germans took Montdidier.
To meet the crisis all the available reserves, totalling 350,000 men, were hurried to France from England, Palestine and the East, and this brought the 10th Battalion The Buffs on the scene. The despatch of American troops was greatly accelerated, so that between 200,000 and 300,000 men a month were embarked for France. The Germans were stopped before they could reach Amiens by the united efforts of English, French and American troops, yet another offensive south of Ypres developed on the 9th April which was only really stayed three weeks later. During these offensives the German casualties were enormous, but so were ours; and our loss in guns, aerodromes, ammunition, machine guns, trench mortars, tanks and rolling stock was stupendous.
It will be convenient now to trace the history of the 1st, 6th, 10th and 7th Battalions of the Buffs one by one from the 21st March till the 8th August, the date usually ascribed to the commencement of the Allies’ great counter-offensive, which, once started, was maintained without intermission till the end of the war. It may be as well to take the 7th Battalion last, for it was heavily engaged on the 6th August, and the 8th of the month found it practically in the midst of a great battle.
II. 1st Battalion
The 6th Division, in the middle of March, held the ground opposite the villages of Queant and Pronville. The country consists of alternate long spurs and narrow valleys of down-like country, stretching from the high land on the west of our forces down to the valley in which Cambrai stands, and our position was at right angles to or astride these spurs and re-entrants. There were trenches in a state of readiness, but the entire scheme of fortification had not been completed, chiefly owing to a month’s hard frost in January. Still, the front and reserve trenches were in good order, and there was an excellent Corps trench called the Vaulx-Morchies line, a little over a mile in rear of the reserve system. There were, however, hardly any support trenches and no dug-outs. The 16th Brigade was on the left of the division. The distance from the front or outpost zone to the battle line was about two thousand yards on the day of the battle, the York and Lancaster, on the right, and the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, on the left, were in front line, and it happened to be the turn of the Buffs to be in reserve, where the men were hard at work as usual.
At 2 a.m. on the 21st the latter got the order to take up their battle positions and to be in the Vaulx-Morchies work by 5.30 o’clock, so off the battalion marched, leaving no one behind at Favreuil except the company quartermaster-sergeants and spare drummers and bandsmen, who were detailed as extra runners and stretcher-bearers. While still on the march, at 5 a.m., the battle opened by a tremendous bombardment directed on the front system and Lagnicourt trench, and also on the village of Vaulx. The Buffs were, of course, in ignorance of what was occurring on their front, but they recognized from the continuous and tremendous roar that the bombardment was terribly severe, and themselves suffered casualties. Indeed, the operation of getting into place was attended with great difficulty, as it was dark and gas masks had to be worn on the march. By 5.45 all the forward wires were cut and there was no more telephonic communication. Gas shells were intermingled with the others, and as the Buffs approached the scene they found it more and more difficult to get into position, particularly as it was still dark. However, by 6 o’clock D Company had got to its place on the Noreuil-Morchies road, A Company to posts 21 to 24 in the Vaulx-Morchies lines, B Company to Macauley Avenue, while C, the reserve company, filled gaps between post 22 (battalion headquarters) and the Vaulx-Lagnicourt road. All kits, drums, documents and such-like possessions had been left behind in camp, and subsequent efforts to regain possession of these were almost entirely unavailing.
A most anxious and depressing morning followed the battalion’s arrival in position. Casualties were mounting up from distant shelling: Lieut. P. W. Newington and six men were killed by a shell which struck battalion headquarters, but no definite news was received till 10 o’clock. Then the enemy was seen slowly but steadily advancing under a creeping barrage: now they were moving up the Lagnicourt valley upon the village; then news came that they had broken through the right of the 71st Brigade and were approaching “Skipton Reserve”; again they were in the villages of Noreuil and Lagnicourt; and soon it became plain that the forward part of the battle zone was in the hands of the Germans. Moreover, it was equally certain that the troops of the 6th Division that had defended it had all been killed or captured, for none returned.
The Buffs, to avoid casualties, had moved into the Vraucourt Switch (as it was called), about post 7, and had been joined by D Company, who having got no call from the battalion it was out to support, and being quite exposed, withdrew when the position seemed hopeless. Two platoons of B Company were sent up, however, to the aid of the K.S.L.I., and these were absorbed into the general ruin of the forward troops. They were under the command of Lieut. T. L. V. Moody and 2nd Lieut. Wotton, and they never rejoined. A wounded man stated that he had seen Buffs in “Leeds Reserve,” and that a strong point there was still holding out. Colonel Smith, who commanded the K.S.L.I. and two platoons of the Buffs, showed the greatest gallantry and fought his battalion to the last: not one of his officers who were in the front line ever came back. Later on it was ascertained that Moody had been killed trying to lead a break-through instead of surrendering. With reference to this day’s work in the forward positions, Sir Douglas Haig writes: “The prolonged defence of these different localities, under conditions which left little hope of any relief, deserve to rank among the most heroic actions in the history of the British Army.”
At noon a message came from the brigadier that the enemy was in force east of Lagnicourt. In fact, he was advancing up both valleys and endeavouring to cut off those troops which were still holding the battle zone. The message directed the reserve company (C) to move to the Vaulx-Morchies line to garrison that part near the Bois de Vaulx. The move was successfully accomplished, and C Company’s place was taken by the York and Lancaster headquarters, which had withdrawn, by machine gunners, sappers and a mixed lot of men from various parts of the field. C Company patrolled to its right, but failed to find any friendly troops on its flank. There now came a lull, and it was not till later that the enemy’s advance recommenced. The orders from the brigadier were plain and simple: the flanks were to be watched and every foot of ground was to be disputed. From now onward the position, as far as the Buffs were concerned, became obscure, but the enemy, working up the valleys, was gradually outflanking position after position, causing the defenders to form defensive flanks whenever any line became threatened. Thus the reserve company of the K.S.L.I., leaving Lagnicourt trench, manned Macauley Avenue, and later in the day a message came from Lieut. Collison-Morley, of the Buffs, that the enemy was getting round his No. 24 post, and a defensive flank was formed there. However, the Germans got into the main trench at No. 24 post and for about five hundred yards to the north of it. It appeared later that the little garrison of No. 24 was safe, having withdrawn to a position in some shell holes across the valley, and having got touch of a battalion of Scots Fusiliers on their left. An attempt to eject the enemy from the Vaulx-Morchies line was made by Lieut. Spence, but he was wounded in the foot while reconnoitring. A counter-attack was, however, organized by 2nd Lieut. Rogers of the K.S.L.I., who, with thirty men belonging to the Brigade Grenade School, had come up as a reinforcement. Some progress down the trench was made, but it was found to be occupied for a long extent and so a block was established, for Rogers could get no further. Lieut. E. Foster Hall was holding the post on the extreme left and rendered distinguished service throughout.