At 9.35 p.m. on the 30th June the Queen’s and West Kent, with the Buffs in support, under cover of heavy artillery, trench mortar and machine-gun barrage, attacked the front-line system of the enemy 1,000 yards north-west of Albert on a frontage of about 1,100 yards with a view to destroying or capturing the garrisons of the first three lines of trenches and holding the front line. Practically the Buffs this day had only to stand to all the time of and after the operation, because it was completely successful with very little help from them, though five men were killed and 2nd Lieut. Symonds and thirty men wounded. The Queen’s, who were on the right, met with a stubborn resistance and suffered many casualties, and C Company the Buffs went forward to their immediate support. Notwithstanding these casualties, both the forward battalions were able at 11.40 to report to the brigadier that they were consolidating; but at 1.23 on the morning of the 1st July the Queen’s, who had sent the message earlier that the Bedfords on their right had been repulsed, reported that they could not hold on without support, and at 2.10 a.m. the S.O.S. signal was up along the line and the Royal Engineers acknowledged that they could not do the wiring satisfactorily on account of casualties. However, the day proved fairly quiet and the Queen’s and West Kents were reinforced by C Company The Buffs, while the remainder were in readiness to move forward, and very early in the morning of the 2nd the battalion relieved the Queen’s in the right half of the brigade front line. The Germans were now taking the offensive and towards nightfall very notably so, though they had been fairly quiet during daylight. At 9.35 p.m. a very intense barrage was put down along the whole brigade front, followed by a counter-attack which caused the West Kent on our left to withdraw to the old British line. Soon afterwards a report was received that the 18th Division on the right had also withdrawn to the old British line, leaving A, B and D Companies of the Buffs still occupying the German front line. The battalion’s casualties this day were 2nd Lieut. Harvey slightly wounded, two men killed and forty-one wounded.
At 6 o’clock on the morning of the 3rd, whilst the Buffs were still holding on and defending, in particular, two blocks which they had made during the night, orders came to withdraw and join the others. This movement was rendered very difficult owing to the clear visibility of that particular morning, which caused our men to be observed when about two-thirds of them had got back into the new or rather into the old position. Thus the Germans sent up a strong bombing party to destroy 2nd Lieut. Hobbs and the small party with him that had been left behind to cover the retreat, but the stubborn resistance of this detachment resulted in there being only two more casualties on account of this move. In fact, the bravery and devotion of Hobbs was beyond all praise: entirely regardless of his personal safety, he not only handled his men to perfection, but himself carried a wounded soldier to safety under heavy fire and persistent bombing. Lieut. Dudeney also showed his manhood by his defence of one of the posts against overwhelming odds. The whole of the battalion’s front was in order by 7.45 a.m., though the condition of the line was now, it is true, far from satisfactory owing to the intense bombardment and other causes. That day the 37th Brigade was relieved by the 36th and the Buffs went into divisional reserve at Senlis and so remained till the 10th July without any further incident.
The brigade was now in G.H.Q. reserve in tents south-east of Harponville and under orders to join the 22nd Corps of the 4th Army. In consequence of this order it marched to Rubempre on the 13th, and next day proceeded by bus to Quevanvillers and marched to Rumatsnil and afterwards to Plachy Buyon, remaining in this district, about ten miles south-west of Amiens, up to the end of July, or rather until the 30th, on which date a movement was made by train to Canaples and thence by route march to Berleaucourt (about twelve miles north-west of Amiens). On the 2nd August the 12th Division relieved the 58th in the centre section of the 3rd Corps front, the 37th Brigade being in divisional reserve. The Buffs, going by bus to a wood on the Behencourt-Franvillers road, thus came into the neighbourhood of Warloy once more; but the next day they proceeded to Dernancourt on the Ancre, and on the 4th relieved a battalion of the United States Army in the front line. There they remained for three days, when, on relief by another American unit, they became part of the Corps Reserve at Franvillers. On the 8th August the battalion moved into trenches south of Morlancourt with orders to attack at 3 a.m., but this was postponed. When the second order came the companies told off for the job were already in No Man’s Land and had to be recalled. The withdrawal was a very difficult business, and one platoon of D Company, under 2nd Lieut. Hearson, could not be got back and had to remain where it was till dusk. Unfortunately the enemy was quite aware of this and opened machine-gun fire on the party, wounding Lieut. Le May, 2nd Lieuts. Gray, M.C., and Thornley, and twenty-four men and killing two. Next day came our British attack.
IV. 10th Battalion
In comparison with the other battalions of the Buffs in France the doings of the 10th during the momentous period between the 21st March and the 8th August, 1918, were uneventful as, naturally, units which came from overseas were chiefly used as reliefs and not pushed at once into the fighting line.
The 10th landed at Marseilles from Palestine on the 7th May and entrained two days later for Noyelles, near Abbeville, where it went into billets and instantly began training to fit itself for the methods of warfare in vogue in the western theatre of war. On the 22nd it proceeded to Buneville and on the 25th to Izellez Hameau, in the Arras district, where it was billeted for a month and where it lost its commanding officer, Lt.-Colonel Lord Sackville, who was sent to do special work at French G.H.Q. On the 25th June the next move came, this time to Enguin les Mines, which is about ten miles south of St. Omer; but on the 10th July the General Headquarters were left behind and the 10th moved by motor bus into divisional reserve at Ham en Artois, then into brigade reserve at La Perriere. Here the first losses in France occurred, two men being killed and seven wounded when on a working party. Finally, till the 4th August, Miquellerie was the home of the unit. All these above-mentioned places are fairly close together, being south of the town of Hazebrouck, south-west of Merville and not far from the River Lys. On the 4th August the right sub-section of the left sector of the Adjusovres-Averskerque line near St. Floris was taken over, and now the time was rapidly approaching for the Allies to assume their turn for offensive work, work which was only to cease with the complete subjection of all our enemies.
On the 5th August the division on the right of the 230th Brigade had advanced its line and the Buffs were warned to be ready to do the same should the trenches in front be found to be evacuated as they had been on the right. There was no doubt at all at this time that the enemy was showing every sign of nervousness, but what follows belongs to the story of the final victorious advance and must be reserved for another chapter.
V. 7th Battalion
Without a doubt the most smashing blow that was dealt during the great German offensive fell upon the British 5th Army, in the very forefront of which stood the 7th Battalion of the Buffs. On the night of the 20th/21st March the 55th Brigade was at Liez holding, as its forward zone, from the village of Travecy, exclusive, up to a point about a mile north of Vendeuil, which sector was garrisoned by the 7th Buffs, eleven machine guns, four Stokes mortars, two six-inch trench mortars, one section of a field company of Royal Engineers, with two infantry platoons attached. Fort Vendeuil held as a garrison one platoon of the Buffs’ support company, the section of Royal Engineers, the two attached platoons and the two trench mortars. These attached platoons were a divisional idea and were No. 17 or extra platoons of the Buffs and the Queen’s. They were composed of men who were bad marchers and were usually employed with the Engineers as unskilled labourers. The Buffs’ headquarters were at a quarry called “Clarence Keep,” though it was only protected by a very light trench. It was close to the Vendeuil-Remigny road and about three-quarters of a mile from the fort. The two forward companies were: B to the northward, holding the main St. Quentin road, about half-way to Le Vert Chasseur, down to the railway station at Vendeuil, with headquarters in the middle of the village; A carrying on towards the south, holding part of Vendeuil, the quarry, which overlooked the river, and a post some nine hundred yards to the south-west of it, which was the company headquarters. C Company was immediately behind A and B, from near Vendeuil Fort to a post some fourteen hundred yards behind A’s headquarters. D Company was further west again and just in front of Poplar and Rouquenet Woods. Thus the battalion front was enormously extended, there being about four thousand yards between the right and the left platoons, and the nearest West Kent post (Le Vert Chasseur) being another twelve hundred yards away. The fighting strength of the Buffs was only 550, many of the men being recently taken over from the late 8th Battalion. The chief unit in the battle zone behind was the 7th Queen’s, and there was no brigade reserve because the 8th East Surrey happened to be in divisional reserve. The 4th Dismounted Brigade was attached to the 55th for the day.
At 4.45 a.m. on the 21st March the enemy’s artillery fire commenced, and almost immediately afterwards the order to man battle positions was sent out, but the Buffs were, of course, already in their places. The hostile shelling was intense and at first many of the shells were gas-laden. When day dawned it was found that the country was wrapped in so dense a fog that a man could not see twenty yards in front of him. It was a misty morning everywhere along our lines on this fateful 21st March, but perhaps in no part lay a thicker blanket of fog than in the valley of the Oise with its neighbouring canals. It was not long before the shelling began to cut, as was often the case, the telephone wires which connected the various distant posts, the first to go being that which connected “Clarence Keep” with B Company (Captain Chant), and soon afterwards Captain Fine, who commanded in Fort Vendeuil, failed to answer calls. Therefore in the morning the situation was very far from pleasant. Little isolated parties of Buffs were scattered about the countryside, blinded by fog, deprived of communication with their neighbours and with the suspicion, which amounted almost to a certainty, that silently closing in upon them were unknown numbers of the enemy intent on their destruction. The mist began to clear about noon, and it was only then that the defenders were able to gain some notion of the hostile movements which up till then had been screened. In the meantime the battalion signal sergeant, Browne, with three men[30] were working desperately to repair the line between “Clarence” and the Fort, and after four hours’ hard labour communication was re-established and Captain Fine reported “all correct.”