On the 25th the 18th Brigade made good the objectives before which they had at first failed. They took the Douai trench, and by midnight the 25th/26th the 16th and 18th, in co-operation, had completed the capture of the Quadrilateral, which the enemy had considered an impossibility. Two German counter-attacks on the 16th Brigade were repulsed, though the enemy managed to rush and to hold one of the forward posts; but the opposition was now obviously dying down and the German spirit sadly broken, and our patrols were able to gain further ground. On the 27th a prisoner was captured, who stated that he was the last patrol covering the withdrawal of the enemy, and this proved correct, for next day our people could by no means get touch of him.

The 6th Division was relieved during the 29th and 30th of September by the 4th French Division, and by this time our posts were round three sides of the village of Fayet, which was ultimately captured by a patrol under Lieut. Lushington, and Manchester Hill was in the hands of our allies. The Buffs went back to camp at Trefcon.

While the fighting recorded above had been in progress on the right of the British Army, the 47th Division, with the 1st protecting its right flank and an American force on its left, had by means of a magnificent attack on the 29th September broken the Hindenburg Line and crossed the canal, together with the 32nd Division, after which these units experienced very severe fighting about Ramicourt and Sequehart. It was therefore necessary that they should rest, and when the 6th Division had had four days in the back areas, which was largely utilized in absorbing reinforcements and generally reorganizing, it was ordered to relieve these others with a view to attacking, on the 8th October, in the direction of the little town of Bohain.

Therefore on the 4th October the Buffs marched, complete with transport and all else, to the Bellenglise area and billeted by the banks of the canal, and on the night of the 5th/6th the 16th Brigade relieved the 3rd Brigade about Preselles Farm, which is between Ramicourt and Sequehart and opposite the position to be attacked. This position was in a country of rolling downs, divided by a valley opening out towards the British and closed at the far end by a ridge on which stood the village of Mericourt. In the valley itself stood Mannikin Wood and other points suitable for hidden machine guns. The 6th Division was to attack up the left spur which bounded the valley, and the French up the right one; but our allies had been delayed in passing through St Quentin and by opposition on the way, and although the whole operation had been postponed for twenty-four hours, namely from the 7th to 8th October, it was pretty obvious that at first, at any rate, the British right flank would be exposed. A battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment and three whippet tanks had the task of clearing the valley, but, as a matter of fact, the tanks were knocked out almost immediately. The 16th Brigade was on the right next the valley, and the 71st on the left next the Americans.

ST. QUENTIN

On the night of the 7th/8th the Buffs moved up to their forming-up line for the second time, for when the operation was postponed the battalion had gone back to Bellenglise for a day, and the marching and counter-marching had proved a strain on the men. The hour was 5.10 a.m., at which time the Shropshire Light Infantry were to move off and secure the first objective, after which the Buffs, passing through, were to go on to the second, which was in front of Beauregard Farm. The men were not in position till a quarter of an hour before zero, on account of the darkness and the difficulty of guiding, and Lieut. H. H. Carter and his batman were killed on the way; but the attack started in good order, the Buffs having B and D Companies in front line, C and half A in support and the remainder of A in reserve. The first objective was soon in the hands of the Salopians and the Buffs quickly on the move for the second. The shelling was now, however, very heavy both from the other side of the valley, which had not yet been reached by the French, and also from Mannikin Wood, in the valley itself, which kept up fire for some time, in spite of some magnificent work done by the West Yorkshire Regiment. A counter-attack appeared to be likely, and Lieut. Stainforth, with the two reserve platoons, was ordered up to get touch with the front line and reinforce it, if necessary. At 11.45 battalion headquarters, moving forward, found the situation well in hand on the battalion front, though no reorganization was possible, as the slightest movement was observed by the enemy from the right. In fact, A and C Companies were harassed by ·77 guns all day. However, a defensive flank was formed later on. By 3 p.m. the French, too, began to advance and completely changed the situation. The West Yorks pushed up the valley and got touch with them, and so towards evening the companies were reorganized and patrols pushed forward through Beauregard Farm and Copse and the line established east of these. By nightfall Mericourt was taken and the 6th Division had done all it had set out to do. Captains Hamilton and Moss were both wounded early in the day, but remained with their companies until the objective was reached. The latter was again seriously wounded whilst waiting for a stretcher at battalion headquarters.

The work of the day had hardly been accomplished when orders came for the 6th Division to take over part of the American front on the left and hand over some of their own to the 46th Division on the right; in fact, to side-step to the left, as it was called. As far as the Buffs were concerned, their reorganization during the night was barely complete when, about 3 a.m., the 4th Battalion of the Leicestershire Regiment arrived in relief with orders that they were at once to move off to a position two miles away to support a new attack, this time on Bohain, timed for 5.30 a.m., which was to be made by the K.S.L.I. and York and Lancaster Battalions of the 16th Brigade. This meant, of course, that a brigade of very tired troops had to move off two miles to a new position, issue all detailed orders, make elaborate arrangements and take up position all in less than three hours in pitch darkness and over unreconnoitred country. It was a most extraordinary performance, but it was done and the 16th Brigade duly advanced at the correct zero hour, though the Buffs themselves were not called upon to take part. Both the 16th and 71st Brigades carried their first objectives successfully, and the whole operation ended during the following night by the capture of Bohain, the release of some four thousand French civilians and the acquisition of considerable war booty.

After returning to Doon Mill, from whence the start on the 9th had been made, coming back to the front line again and having Lieut. Lloyd wounded on the 15th, the Buffs on the 16th October were preparing for another battle. On that date A and C Companies were in billets and bivouacs east of Bohain, and B and D in the outskirts of Becquiguy, the battalion being under the temporary command of Major Lord Teynham. Orders were issued for an attack on the 17th from Vaux Audigny and the Buffs formed up to the north-west of that place. The objective, or Blue Line, was a trench system which included the Bois St Pierre and a level crossing on the railway and was in front of the village of Wassigny. Then the 1st Division was to pass through and take Wassigny. The Buffs attacked on a two-company frontage, A on the left, C with a platoon of B on the right, D in support, and B in reserve.

The morning proved to be one of the foggiest that had been experienced during the war. Nothing could be seen anywhere and direction was naturally extremely difficult to maintain. The Buffs had to pass the village of Vaux Audigny in fours and to deploy outside it. The advance was made by compass bearings, and more than one instance occurred of sergeants taking the compasses from their injured officers and leading their companies on, so that the battalion reached its objective correctly, which was more than all the troops contrived to do. The railway which runs from Vaux Audigny to Vaille Mulatre is not by any means a straight one, but it was of considerable assistance in keeping direction. With the exception of making it so difficult to keep the line, the fog was an advantage to the British advance, because parties of the enemy were come upon unseen and in one or two cases machine guns were outflanked unobserved. Both the leading companies reached their objective about 7.30 a.m. Lieut. Stainforth, who commanded C, found that his flank was exposed, so he at once established a post and pressed into the service of the defence certain stragglers of the 1st Division. He remained here himself for some hours and until a battalion of Cameron Highlanders arrived. Nothing could be found of the 11th Essex which should have been on the Buffs’ right. They had utterly lost their way in the fog, though it was afterwards discovered that the men had resorted to the expedient of attempting to advance arm in arm. Our artillery barrage was excellent and the enemy’s shelling somewhat light after leaving the railway station. The hostile machine guns were very active throughout the fight. At 11.45 a report came that the enemy had a division in reserve for a counter-attack and preparations were made to meet it, but nothing materialized; headquarters moved forward, and the battalion set to work to consolidate. The casualties, considering the nature of the operation, were slight, though four officers were killed and one wounded, five of the men killed and thirty-one were wounded.