It was now past the middle of November and the collapse of the Russians had already become so apparent that large bodies of Germans had been withdrawn from their Eastern front to swell the armies in France, and it was quite clear that more and more would be arriving shortly. Under these adverse circumstances Haig determined on a surprise attack on a considerable scale before more reinforcements could arrive, and so he directed General Byng to attack in front of Cambrai, reckoning that that portion of the German line was not quite so strongly held as some others and that it would take the enemy forty-eight hours to draw troops from other portions of his front to the rescue. Secrecy and despatch, therefore, were the main points to be considered, and it was for these reasons that the fight under notice differed from almost all others in so far that no artillery preparation was to take place, but the overcoming of wire and other obstacles was to be entrusted to the action of tanks, and careful arrangements were made for their initial employment and close co-operation with the infantry. It would occupy too much space to describe this battle in detail, but it must be understood that, though the British attack achieved considerable success at first, the enemy was able ultimately to increase his force about Cambrai, particularly in guns, and so he managed at last such a mighty counter-attack that about the last day of the month our original offensive was perforce changed into a somewhat anxious defensive operation.
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A NEW TRENCH
III. Cambrai
Now, on the 20th November and following days the Third Army Corps consisted of the 6th Division, which included the 1st Battalion of the Buffs, the 12th Division, with the 6th Battalion, and the 20th Division. This Corps attacked with the 12th Division on the right, the 20th in the centre and the 6th on the left, and the zero hour was 6.20 a.m. Thus it came about that the 1st Battalion moved out preceded by B Battalion of tanks and in artillery formation from the vicinity of Villers Plouich.
The first objective, the village of Ribecourt and the spur to the south-east of it, was soon taken, D Company, which formed the first wave, securing that portion which was entrusted to the 1st Battalion. The ground won was known as the Blue Line and was part of the main Hindenburg entrenchment.
The rest of the 1st Battalion co-operated with the divisional sniping section and then passed through and secured the second objective, the Brown or Hindenburg support line, one thousand yards further on.
These positions were taken with small loss, the Buffs only having eight men killed and thirty-three wounded. This was satisfactory enough, as the two points which had caused anxiety to the divisional commander were Couillet Wood and Ribecourt, whereas the first fell to the Buffs and the latter to the 71st Brigade. The formations adopted were suitable; the hostile artillery was weak; the enemy was late in opening fire and it was scattered and inaccurate when opened; the tanks had no difficulty in crossing the trenches; the enemy appeared to be surprised and demoralized; the positions were quickly consolidated because there was no hostile fire, and in fact all was very well. The 6th Division had a most successful day: the bridge at Marcoing had fallen, and everything had gone like clockwork; the artillery pushed forward to advanced positions, as did the machine guns which were brought up by pack animals. The next morning the Buffs, with the assistance of the tanks, completed the clearing of Noyelles. This was a creditable bit of initiative on the part of Captain Moss, who, finding the place but lightly held, collected a few men and with two tanks captured the village there and then.