All reports agree in stating that our barrage was not a success; it was erratic and not heavy enough, and when the infantry attack was getting into difficulties it passed too far ahead. The officer commanding C Company (Captain Nicholson) reported that the guns opened thirty seconds too late on his front, that the barrage commenced very thinly and thickened right on top of the leading troops. D Company got caught by the enemy’s gun fire as it was waiting for ours to lift and the whole front line came immediately under very heavy fire, particularly C, which suffered much from machine guns from the neighbourhood of Gloster House and from point “37.” D Company got through the houses and enclosures which were on its front, but, on emerging, met heavy cross machine-gun fire from Meunier House and the Brewery, and thus our attack was checked throughout our line. A and B, moving up in rear so as to keep close, came in their turn under intense machine-gun fire, B Company especially suffering very severely. These supports were eventually merged into the leading line and every effort was made to struggle forward, but the heavy ground prevented anything but laborious movement which was ill suited to a rain of bullets, and at last things came to a standstill.
C Company managed to rush one hostile post, where the men captured a machine gun and turned it very effectually on its late owners. Captain Nicholson, M.C., who commanded C Company, tried to dig in where he was, but the ground was terribly swampy for this; however, he was, about noon, able to report a perceptible slackening of the enemy’s fire. About this time he noticed 2nd Lieut. Knight with the elements of A Company about four hundred yards to his right, and he sent off 2nd Lieut. H. M. Spencer to get touch with him with a view to together making an attempt to gain ground; Spencer, on his way, fell, mortally wounded, and Nicholson went out to help him. As he was doing so he heard a shout and saw that Knight and about thirty men had been overwhelmed and made prisoners. He could not get back to his men in time to order them to open fire. This affair caused a gap on Nicholson’s left and he directed his remaining officer, 2nd Lieut. Tupper, to form three posts to protect that flank while he himself established five others on his front. He then attempted to consolidate these, but the state of the ground prohibited digging. About 2 p.m. a party of Germans was observed near the Brewery advancing down the main street of Poelcappelle which had every appearance of a counter-attack and preparations were made accordingly, but the enemy was successfully stopped by parties of the West Kent and of the Suffolk Regiment which were in the village. About 5.30 the enemy shelled our lines and the village, but defensive posts were established and all was well, though the bombardment continued during the next day, the 13th, and at dusk the remnant of the Buffs withdrew to Counter Farm on relief by the 7th Battalion of the Queen’s.
It is worthy of note that on the 12th and 13th both the Germans and ourselves were able to attend the wounded by flying a white or Red Cross flag, white handkerchief or rag. The enemy never fired on a wounded man. It is eloquent of the state of things during a war between so-called civilized nations that such should be considered as exceptional.
POELCAPELLE
The Buffs’ casualties in this action were: killed, Captain E. B. C. Burnside, 2nd Lieuts. R. W. Bone, H. M. Spencer and H. Thomas and 52 other ranks; wounded, Captains Blood-Smyth and West, Lieut. Boner, 2nd Lieuts. Amos and Bull, and 178 men; missing, 2nd Lieut. Knight and 145 men. A Company had left at duty one sergeant and one corporal; B, one corporal; C, two sergeants and four corporals; and D, one sergeant and one corporal—no less than 62 N.C.O.’s being amongst the casualties. As has been seen, several circumstances contributed to prevent this action from being an entire success, but the chief was the deplorable state of the ground, which prevented movement and consolidation and which, worst of all, prevented fire, by clogging up the men’s rifles with mud.
On the 24th of the month the battalion went into billets at Poperinghe, where nine men got M.M.’s. On the 1st November it moved, by means of lorries, to Parroy Camp, where it worked on the roads. On that day a second bar to Captain C. D. Hayfield’s M.C. was announced, as well as one to Captain A. C. L. Nicholson’s. The M.C. was awarded to 2nd Lieut. Tupper, the D.C.M. to C.Q.M.S. Burt and Sgt. Pellandine, and the M.M. to ten more of the men.
A long spell of quiet at Emile Camp now ensued, the battalion being very weak as regards numbers. It moved up into the forward area, however, on the 9th December, occupying small posts till the 17th, when it entrained at Boesinghe for Bayenghem and went into billets. There the battalion remained till over Christmas, after which it led a somewhat nomadic life—that is, it wandered a good deal about the region west and north of Ypres. Proven perhaps might be taken as a centre of the country visited, but early January found the men in the trenches again near Boesinghe for a few days. There was always a New Year list of honours during the war, and the commencement of 1918 gave Lt.-Colonel Ransome, already an M.C., the coveted D.S.O. as well. Captain Clapperton got the M.C., and Captains Fine and Hallinan (the battalion doctor), together with Sgt. L. G. Moon,[24] who had died of wounds, were mentioned in despatches. Further, C.Q.M.S. Wickington got the D.C.M., he having already received the M.M.
The last day of January the battalion went into billets at Herzeele, some ten miles west of Poperinghe; and the 11th of February found it in billets in the back area at Viry Noureuil, where it worked hard on defensive preparations in the area of the expected battle, for ten days or so. Then came a very long journey and complete change of scene.
Sir Douglas Haig foresaw that the enemy was likely to throw his principal weight south of Arras, and most likely about the point of juncture of the French and English forces, which at this time was about the River Oise. He therefore very greatly strengthened this threatened area, and so it came about that the 7th Battalion with its comrades were carried off in haste to the Liez area on the 26th February, and set energetically to work in what was termed the battle zone, in contradistinction to the forward zone, in which the first shock of the oncoming Teuton armies was to be received.