Machine-Gun Tactics

by R. V. K. Applin

If it is decided to attack, the action will follow much the same lines as that of the contact squadrons, but on a larger scale and with the addition of artillery; and the machine guns will be used in much the same way to support the mounted attack up to the moment of the charge, for which purpose the machine guns working in pairs on the opposite flank to the artillery must be pushed forward to occupy positions from which to bring fire to bear on the hostile squadrons while manœuvring prior to the attack. The whole battery may be used for this purpose if the ground favours their action; or a single section only, while the remainder are held back as a reserve to complete a successful charge or to cover the retirement of the brigade in the event of failure.

The officer commanding the machine-gun battery will remain with the brigadier and must be perfectly acquainted with his plans, and will receive from him direct orders as to the way the guns are to be employed to support the attack. The details for carrying out these orders should be left to the battery commander, who will issue his own instructions to the section commanders, who should also be told the brigadier’s plans. The section commanders must be given a free hand in selecting fire positions and in all details relating to coming into action and opening and ceasing fire—the battery commander’s orders only indicating the flank and extent of the positions of observation for each section, the method of action and the object to be attained. Under special circumstances he may order certain specific action such as reservation of fire, simultaneous fire on a given signal, or concentration of fire of a certain target; but it must be remembered that definite orders of this nature tie the hands of section commanders, and tend to paralyse their action and destroy initiative, and can be justified on rare occasions only. Should the enemy take up a defensive position, the machine guns will be used to economise dismounted men and to bring a sudden and intense fire to bear on the defenders when they attempt to retire from the position. Cavalry will not “assault” a position, but rather try to compel the defender to retire from it by turning a flank and threatening his led horses or his line of retreat, while he is held to his ground by fire. Some guns should also be held in reserve to meet a counter-attack or to be launched in pursuit when the enemy attempts to retire. The machine guns with the contact squadrons will be available, as these squadrons become merged in the main guard, and they must now be used to hold tactical positions of importance and to hinder the march of the main body of the enemy by seizing all rising ground in front or to a flank of the approaching cavalry.

The Division will now have concentrated and joined the advanced guard, and will be manœuvring in anticipation of the cavalry combat. All the machine guns, except those holding positions in front, will now be concentrated under the Divisional General. They will be used at this stage in conjunction with the artillery—but not in their vicinity—to support the deployment of the Division by their fire, and they must necessarily be concentrated and employed as batteries in order not to hinder the deployment and free manœuvre of their own cavalry. The flank opposite to that of the artillery must be used, and “positions of observation” must be maintained where the guns are concealed from view and if possible from artillery fire.

The officer commanding the machine guns of the Division should remain with the G.O.C., and must be perfectly acquainted with his plans and intentions. As a rule fire will not be opened in the first instance except by his order. Officers commanding batteries must be where they can best direct their fire and at the same time be in signalling communication with their Chief. Ranges will be taken from the “position of observation,” but should the guns have to gallop to a fresh position and fire at once, the opportunity for using combined sights by the battery if the range be unknown and the time limited should not be neglected. Rising ground is very important at this stage, for it enables fire to be maintained until just before the collision.

Should the ground permit of the machine-gun batteries approaching the enemy unseen, and enable them to reserve their fire from a concealed position until the closed bodies of the enemy’s squadrons come within effective range, the result should be so decisive as to render the attack of the Division successful, even against greatly superior numbers. The machine guns should render the envelopment of a flank by a superior force impossible, and their great mobility will enable them to meet easily any movement of this kind.

They should avoid the enemy’s artillery, which alone can put them out of action, but they must boldly engage it within effective ranges should it open fire on the cavalry.

The defeat of the independent cavalry alone will be of little value, and it will be necessary to ensure their complete destruction to enable the exact situation of the enemy’s forces to be discovered. A close and relentless pursuit is therefore imperative, and it must be remembered that machine guns with cavalry are far more effective in the pursuit than cavalry alone, because they move with the same speed; but whereas cavalry can only use the sword or lance against others similarly armed and capable of defending themselves, and both men and horses are equally subject to exhaustion, the machine guns on overtaking the enemy are able to shoot down men and horses without any more effort than is needed to set up the guns and work the elevating and traversing gear. The exhaustion of men and horses has no effect upon the accuracy or intensity of the fire, while the result is further to scatter and disperse bodies that may still retain any cohesion.

IN THE PURSUIT

There are many instances in war when cavalry flushed with victory and exhausted in the pursuit have been themselves caught and ridden down by troops that have rallied or by fresh supports; but machine guns have nothing to fear from cavalry, and can confidently await their attack while covering the retirement of their own cavalry. The longer they are in action, the more time there is for their own horses to recover their “wind,” and be ready to carry their guns out of action at a speed which renders pursuit useless. It must be remembered also that the machine guns with cavalry cannot be distinguished from that arm at a distance even when moving alone, while it is impossible to do so when they are with their regiment or brigade.

The machine guns must anticipate the pursuit and race off to positions on the flanks and rear from which they can best cut off, and if possible annihilate, the retreating squadrons; no effort must be spared to inflict the maximum loss, and guns must be pushed up to close range even at the risk of being ridden down.