EXAMPLE FROM RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
On June 8th, 1905, at Wan-ching, General Samsonov had two cavalry regiments and a machine-gun section of four guns. During the dismounted action these machine guns were concealed in the firing line, two in the centre 100 yards apart, and one on each flank about 400 yards away. When the firing line retired, the machine guns opened fire and held the position alone; and so well had they been posted, that although attacked by infantry, which advanced to within 300 yards of the position, supported by artillery which brought a heavy fire to bear on the front occupied by the machine guns, they were able to hold their ground for nearly three hours, when the Japanese abandoned the attack and fell back. It would be interesting to know if this astonishing success of machine guns, enabling the cavalry to defeat infantry supported by artillery in a fight of several hours’ duration, without risking their personnel or abandoning their mobility, was due to the use of natural cover or, as seems more probable, to the use of pits which would have afforded protection from artillery fire as well as concealment.
IN THE BATTLE
The hostile columns having arrived within striking distance, the battle will now take place, during which the Independent Cavalry will usually occupy a position in front and on the flank of the main line of battle. From here they will be able to co-operate by attacking on the flank, from which they can bring fire to bear concentrically with the main attack, while such a position favours pursuit on parallel lines, and is also a suitable one from which to prevent pursuit in the event of a retreat.[9] The machine guns will now assemble in batteries under their G.O.C., who will use them, as the occasion may demand, to hold “positions of observation,” to protect his front and flank in the early stages of the battle, and later, in conjunction with a few dismounted squadrons, to envelop the enemy’s flank and bring a powerful volume of fire to assist the main infantry attack, or to draw troops away from the point selected for assault.
“The climax of the infantry attack is the assault which is made possible by superiority of fire,”[10] and the cavalry commander will be justified in using his 24 machine guns in assisting to attain this object, provided that in doing so they remain under his immediate orders and in a position from which they are instantly available for the pursuit.
We have already seen how machine guns should co-operate in the pursuit, and their mobility will render them even more effective when pursuing infantry. The following example from the Russo-Japanese War may be of interest in this connection.
EXAMPLE OF MACHINE GUNS USED IN PURSUIT
A Russian infantry battalion which was retreating by a pontoon bridge across the Taitzu River was almost annihilated by a Japanese cavalry regiment, accompanied by machine guns, which swept the bridge; “and for the first time in this war,” adds the Standard correspondent with Kuroki’s army, “a machine gun was used with decisive effect.”