Machine-Gun Tactics

by R. V. K. Applin

In the cases where the infantry of the advanced guard forms the main guard, the battery of machine guns should march with the foremost body of troops and should never march in rear, where they are useless, and where, if on a road, they can only be moved up with difficulty. The battery commander should remain with the O.C. advanced guard until he is fully acquainted with the situation and his intentions. Should the situation be such as to enable the advanced guard to brush aside the opposition, the machine guns must be used vigorously to support the infantry attack, and should be pushed forward to seize positions before the infantry deploy, and cover their deployment by fire. In the preliminary stages these positions will probably be on the immediate front, and the four guns should be able to occupy a front roughly coinciding with the first deployment of the infantry. As soon as the infantry come into action the machine guns may be withdrawn and used on the flanks to bring a cross fire to bear, and to fire on any closed bodies, led horses, etc., that may offer a target. At this stage the guns should work in pairs in mutual support, and may be used on one or both flanks as the situation requires.

Machine guns should rarely be used in the firing line after the infantry deploy, as they offer a rather marked target and can be far more profitably employed in pressing the attack on the flanks.

There are several instances of the successful use of machine guns with the advanced guard in South Africa in 1900 to support the mounted vanguard, and on many occasions they were able to brush the enemy aside without deploying the main guard or delaying the march of the column.

THE ATTACK

Under cover of the advanced-guard action and the subsequent artillery duel the infantry will deploy for the attack. The first advance of the infantry will probably be covered and supported by the artillery, and they will generally be able to push forward to within long range of the enemy’s infantry, without the necessity of covering their advance by rifle fire. From here, however, the firing line will begin to suffer from rifle fire, and it will be necessary to reply to this fire in order to cover the further advance.

“To enable the attack to be prosecuted it is clear that from this moment the hostile fire must be met by fire of greater power, its intensity and duration being dependent on the effect produced. Moreover, from this point forward movement will as a rule be contingent on the mutual fire support afforded to one another by neighbouring bodies, and on the effects produced by the covering fire brought to bear on the enemy’s line wherever the ground admits of such action, by supports, reserves, and the troops specially told off for this purpose. Covering fire should be delivered so as to strike the enemy, disturb his aim, and compel him to seek shelter when the assailant is exposed or in difficulties. In such circumstances intensity of fire is of the first importance; but fire should be reserved when the assailants’ progress is satisfactory, or when he is under cover.”[17]

No one who has controlled the covering fire of infantry, even on manœuvres, will dispute the immense difficulty of timing the opening and ceasing of such a fire, with even a company, to coincide with the advance of the troops covered; while the necessity for observation of fire and its concentration on certain parts of the enemy’s position make it still more difficult effectively to cover the advance of troops with rifle fire at long range.

That machine guns will be able to perform this duty far more effectively and easily than infantry is manifest from the nature of the fire required, the features being intensity, control, and concentration, all of which are characteristic of machine guns. When required to cover the advance of infantry, machine guns should be used in batteries and must be so placed that they are able to see the infantry they are covering, and to sweep those portions of the enemy’s position from which fire can be brought to bear on the advancing troops. If the enemy’s artillery is not silenced or at least dominated by that of the attackers, it will be necessary to conceal the machine guns from view and provide cover from fire. That machine guns well concealed and provided with cover (pits) are able to remain in action under artillery fire for considerable periods, is proved by instances in the Russo-Japanese War (see [Chapter III. p. 28]). Major Kuhn, who was with the Japanese Army in Manchuria, in his report states: “Importance is laid on concealing the guns, and it was claimed that none had been knocked out by the Russian artillery.” Covering fire from the flanks is more likely to be effective than frontal fire, because it will enfilade entrenchments, reach men behind natural cover and have a more disconcerting morale effect than frontal fire. It will not always be possible to find suitable fire positions on the flanks for machine guns at this stage of the attack, and it will then be necessary to place them in rear of the attacking infantry and fire over their heads. This can be done with perfect safety—indeed, there is far less danger of accidentally hitting the attacking infantry with machine guns than with artillery fire. Direct fire should only be used when it is impossible to use indirect fire on account of the nature of the ground in the vicinity.

Indirect fire from the reverse slope of a hill has the advantage of concealing the guns and rendering them immune from artillery fire. The position must be carefully selected with due regard to the slope in its relation to fire from the enemy as laid down in chap. ii. p. 67, of Training Manuals Appendix, 1905. The best position is just below the crest of a steep slope, as observation of fire is rendered easier and the effect of shrapnel minimised. The safety of the infantry in front will depend entirely on the range, height of the guns above the infantry, and the position of the target (enemy). On level ground the range must not be less than 800 yards,[18] and the infantry will be perfectly safe at all distances between 200 yards from the guns and 200 yards from the enemy. (See table, Appendix A.) The methods of employing indirect fire have been given at the end of Chapter II., and its success will depend largely upon the careful observation of fire by the section commanders, who must concentrate their attention on this alone—the battery commander giving the signal for opening and ceasing fire, and the target or direction of fire for each section. Machine guns used as covering fire have ample time for preparation; and as ranges can be accurately taken, and great deliberation used in selecting positions, observing fire, and correcting errors, the maximum of accuracy should be attained. If the enemy is entrenched against frontal fire, good results may be expected from accurate distant fire, owing to the angle of descent of the bullet causing the low parapet or shallow trench to be no protection.