Machine-Gun Tactics

by R. V. K. Applin

The positions for machine guns should not be in one and the same line, and they should be placed at wide intervals. At least two positions should be provided for each gun, and a second series of positions in rear, commanding those in front, should also be provided. The machine guns should be allotted to their positions by sections, each gun being so placed that its fire crosses that of the other when possible. Section commanders should be responsible for having all ranges from their respective positions taken and written up in each emplacement. They must arrange with the O.C. of that portion of the position to which they are allotted the time and signal (if any) for opening fire; the exact moment should be left to the discretion of the section commander as a rule, the O.C. merely indicating the stage of the attack up to which fire is to be reserved, and great care should be taken not to open fire before this stage has been reached. Every endeavour should be made to ensure co-operation between the machine-gun units in reserving fire till the shortest range has been reached by the attack and a really good target presented. Nothing can justify a machine gun opening fire from a concealed position until its fire will give the best results that can be expected from that place, and to ensure this it is necessary that the target is big and vulnerable, the range close, and the fire unexpected by the enemy. Captain von Beckmann, speaking of the Russo-Japanese War, says: “Premature fire upon unsuitable targets at long range is to be deprecated. The greater the surprise, and the shorter the time within which heavy loss is inflicted, the greater the morale effect produced. At the battle of Hai-kou-tai on January 27th, 1905, a Japanese company attacked Sha-shan. Four Russian machine guns opened fire at about 1,100 yards upon the extended firing line, without causing any serious loss or affecting its advance. On the other hand, the Japanese on March 1st had approached to within 200 or 300 yards of the Russian position at Wang-chia-wo-pang and were beginning the final assault. Two Russian machine guns suddenly came into action, and the Japanese assault was repulsed with heavy loss owing to the annihilating fire.”

These two instances well illustrate the right and wrong way of using machine guns in the defence. Where a battery is allotted to one section of the defence the guns should be distributed two or four along the front and one or more on each flank. Single guns may be used in the defence where a section cannot be spared, as the assistance of a supporting gun is not essential to its safety when behind entrenchments. In the first instance guns may be kept in rear of the position until the direction of the attack has been ascertained, provided they are able to occupy their positions unseen.

Machine guns at salients and on the flanks are of great value in defending a position.

If sufficient machine guns are available, one or two batteries should be reserved for the counter-attack. They should in this instance be pushed right into the firing line when necessary and used with the greatest boldness. It will be their duty to cover the retirement of the Infantry in the event of a repulse, and for this purpose positions in rear should have been selected beforehand.

Although the principle of reserving machine guns in the defence must be strictly adhered to, there may be occasions when the use of a battery or two well in front of the defensive position will compel the enemy to deploy prematurely, cause him loss, and delay his advance. Machine guns so used may also find opportunities for surprising artillery while unlimbering, and thus render great service to the defence. They should be withdrawn when their mission is accomplished, and be reserved for further use as already indicated. The following are examples from the Russo-Japanese War of the use of machine guns in the defence of a position.

General Nogi has written: “Our most formidable foes were wire entanglements placed 100 yards in front of the Russian trenches, well lit up by search-lights and covered by the murderous fire of machine guns. The defenders made use of them to flank dead ground in their front and also had them at other points, kept carefully in reserve and under good cover, to make use of continuous fire against the attackers at the moment of the assault.”

“On January 28th, 1905, near Lin-chin-pu at about 7 p.m. the Japanese attacked the forts of Vosnesenski and the trenches near by, in which were posted two machine guns. These latter opened fire at 200 or 300 yards on a Japanese company in line. In one or two minutes they fired about 1,000 rounds, and the Japanese company was annihilated.”[27]

“At Mukden on March 1st, the left of a Japanese Division being within 300 yards of the enemy’s position and about to assault, the Russians suddenly opened a very heavy machine-gun fire from cleverly concealed positions, causing such loss that the Japanese attack was temporarily suspended. On August 20th, 1904, the Japanese captured a lunette near the village of Shin-shi after severe fighting. The Russians made a counter-attack with three machine guns, and drove the Japanese out again with a loss of over 300. The three machine guns retired from the lunette before the attackers got home, and, taking up a position behind the open gorge of the work, showered such a hail of bullets on the victorious Japanese that they were compelled to retire.”[28]

“On February 27th, 1905, the Russians tried to surprise the railway bridge over the Sha-ho on a very clear night, when one could see as far as 500 yards. Four Japanese machine guns opened fire on a company of the 10th Light Infantry, which was almost wiped out.”[29]

At the battle of Hei-kow-tai, the Russians at Shen-tan-pu made no less than five determined attacks against the Japanese entrenchments, in which was a machine gun, but were repulsed each time. The machine gun is said to have done great execution, and one thousand dead Russians were reported to have been found before it.[30]