Machine-Gun Tactics

by R. V. K. Applin

Here we see the importance of machine guns being able to command the parapet of neighbouring works, and the necessity of reserving fire until the best possible target is presented, even though the enemy is permitted actually to scale the parapet. The same thing occurred at the storming of Erh-lung Fort. At midnight on November 26th the Japanese “made a desperate attempt to storm the upper battery, but the assailants were mown down by machine guns, as soon as they appeared on the parapet.”[44]

This is a good illustration of the use of machine guns at night, and no doubt these guns had been trained by day to sweep the parapet in anticipation of an attack after dark. “On January 28th, 1905, near Linchinpan at about 7 p.m. the Japanese attacked the forts of Vosnesenski and the trenches near by in which were posted two machine guns. These latter opened fire at 200 or 300 yards on a Japanese company in line. In one or two minutes they fired about 1,000 rounds and the Japanese company was annihilated.”[45] During the attack on North Chi-kuan Fort on December 19th, by the 38th Regiment under General Samayeda, which took place at 5 p.m., the men were sent over the parapet man by man from different points, to make it more difficult for the Russian machine gunners. “As soon as there was a little interval in the rattling of the machine guns, a man would jump up and run for his life, and seek shelter behind the débris piled up in the terre-plein after the explosion, or in the holes which the big howitzer shells had made in the ground. Though many of the men were shot down in the short race, little by little a force of about 150 men were assembled in the front part of the fort, and the commander, Captain Iwamoto, then led them against the sandbag trenches at the rear.... The fighting was mostly hand-to-hand, but the Russian machine guns took an important part in the defence, their galling fire making fearful ravages amongst the attacking party. The Japanese, therefore, got a couple of mountain guns hauled up on the parapet, and with them succeeded in silencing the Maxims.”[46]

Speaking of the use of machine guns in the defence of Port Arthur, Norregaard says: “As an active means of defence the search-light and machine guns undoubtedly come in the first rank. The Japanese acknowledge the immense value of machine guns to the defence. The search-lights are stationary, they say, and the ground round Port Arthur is broken, so that they can avoid them; but the machine guns can be moved about anywhere and can easily be shifted from place to place by a couple of men. It is nearly impossible to detect them and put them out of action; their effect on the Japanese was most disastrous and time after time enabled the Russians to beat off their attacks, inflicting severe losses. Nothing can stand against them, and it is no wonder that the Japanese fear them and even the bravest have a chilly feeling creeping down their backs when the enemy’s machine guns beat their devil’s tattoo. They shoot with amazing precision even at very long range, and they were splendidly served.”

The U.S.A. Official Report on the siege of Port Arthur states: “Machine guns played an important part in the siege, being freely used by both sides.... The guns were used with telling effect against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults, being trained to cover all the approaches with murderous fire.” These last words condense into a single sentence their tactics in the defence of a fortress.

The Russians used the Maxim of ·312 calibre manufactured by Vickers, Sons & Maxim, of London, while the Japanese used the Hotchkiss of ·253 calibre made at the Arsenal at Tokyo. The Japanese had 72 of these weapons at Port Arthur, immediately under the command of the Divisional General, viz. 24 guns with each Division.

The use of machine guns in the siege of a fortress will cover a far wider field than in the defence, and much that has already been written of their employment both in the attack and defence, of positions will apply to the attack on a fortress. It cannot be claimed for machine guns that they are as vital to the success of the besiegers as they are to the garrison, but that they often afford material assistance during assaults, in holding sap-heads and repelling sorties, cannot be denied.

The details of their tactical employment with the besiegers will differ greatly in accordance with the nature of the operations, and particularly with the situation of the fortress and the surrounding country. In the case of Port Arthur the broken and mountainous nature of the terrain, the deep ravines, and rocky watercourses all lent themselves to the employment of machine guns, and consequently the Japanese were able to make greater use of them than would have been the case under less favourable conditions.

It will be impossible here to do more than briefly indicate how machine guns may be used to assist in siege operations generally, and then show how the Japanese used them before Port Arthur.

“When the enemy’s advanced troops have been driven in and the preliminary reconnaissance has enabled the line of investment to be fixed, this line will be divided into sections, to which commanders will be appointed and troops allotted.... Outposts will be established as closely as possible round the fortress in order to cut it off from outside communication and to protect the operations in rear.[47] Machine guns should be allotted to these sections in proportion to their importance in the line of investment. The commander of the section should use them according to the circumstances of the situation, but as a rule a large proportion of the guns should be distributed to the outposts.... The duties of outposts in siege operations are even more important and exacting than they are in the field operations; in the case both of an investment and of a regular siege the brunt of the work throughout will fall upon the outposts.... They must therefore have greater power of resistance than outposts in field warfare in order to prevent the troops in rear from being disturbed by every skirmish. The outposts of a section which is maintaining a close investment should be about one quarter of the total infantry allotted to the section, together with a proportion of artillery, machine guns, and engineers.”[48]