Machine-Gun Tactics

by R. V. K. Applin

The operations in Somaliland in 1901-4 are an excellent example of one of our typical small wars, and will serve to illustrate the use of machine guns against a savage enemy in a bush country.

The camel is the transport animal of the country and riding camels were used to carry the machine guns with the infantry of the force. In the first expedition, under Lieut.-Colonel Swayne, there were three Maxim guns—two of which were ·450 bore and one a ·303. On June 2nd, 1901, Captain McNeil, who was left in zareba at Smala to guard the live stock, was attacked by about 3,000 Somalis, who increased to about 5,000 on the 3rd. His force consisted of three British officers and 500 native troops, many of whom were native levies and only 370 of whom were armed with rifles. There were about 3,500 camels, 100 horses, and some cattle and goats in a separate zareba from the men who were above and able to command it. The Maxim, under Lieutenant Younghusband and served by Somalis, was placed on a cairn of stones at the top of the men’s zareba and commanded a good field of fire all round. The ground was fairly open all round, and clear of bushes for about 150 yards from the zareba. Before the camels could be driven in, the enemy’s horsemen appeared and threatened to capture a large head of camels, to prevent which a section under a Jemada was sent out to try to keep off the enemy until these camels could be driven in. Captain McNeil says: “I supported him by turning the Maxim on the nearest horseman.... Some of the horsemen had got round by now a good way out, but by keeping the Maxim on them, supported by long-range volleys from the Punjabis, we did much to check them.”[53]

On June 3rd at about 9 a.m. a very large force of footmen attacked in one long line several ranks deep and enveloped the south and west sides of both zarebas. They came on at a steady pace and opened fire at about 400 yards. Fire was reserved until the enemy were at about 500 yards range, when heavy fire was opened by both rifles and Maxim, with the result that no one got within 150 yards of the zareba, though they advanced most pluckily. 180 dead were found around the zareba, and the enemy’s loss was estimated at 500.

The danger of rushing machine guns up to the front while still mounted is shown in an incident that occurred on June 17th during a successful attack on the Mullah’s villages near Feriddin. During the reconnaissance the mounted corps became somewhat heavily engaged, and Colonel Swayne sent forward the reserve company and the Maxims to bring fire to bear from a commanding spur about two miles to the front. On reaching the spur they came under a heavy fire, and the Maxim camels and some ponies were shot down. The Somalis, however, were able to disentangle the Maxims from the dead camels and bring them into action on commanding ground.[54] Colonel Swayne, in his official report, said: “Mekometers were badly wanted for the Maxims.... The Maxims had a trick of jamming at critical moments, but were quickly set right again. The fault may have been due to the belts.”

When the Maxim gun jams without a breakage of the mechanism, the fault is usually want of experience on the part of the gunner.

During the third expedition the machine guns were increased to eleven and were carried by porters with the infantry.

The disaster to Colonel Plunkett’s force at Gumburu on April 17th was due to ammunition running short. The force, consisting of about 200 men with two machine guns, was attacked by a large force of horse and foot. They at once formed square, and took up a position in an open spot surrounded by dense bush at from 300 to 600 yards’ distance. For some two hours they were able to hold off the enemy, but on the ammunition being exhausted they were overwhelmed.

On April 22nd, 1903, Major Gough’s force of about 200 men with one machine gun was attacked in thick bush by a large force under very similar conditions to Colonel Plunkett. The attack began at 10.30 a.m. from all sides, and was continued with great determination until 2 p.m. Square was formed, and fire opened at very close range (20 to 50 yards), owing to the dense bush. “The Maxim, under Sergeant Gibb, was moved from place to place as occasion arose, the enemy always giving way when it opened fire.”[55]

In the fourth expedition, under General Egerton, the ammunition per machine gun was 30,200 rounds in garrison, 10,400 rounds with the brigade, and 2,200 rounds in second-line transport; 6,000 rounds with each gun was carried ready in belts.

During the action at Jidbali on January 10th, 1904, the force engaged, which consisted of about 2,500, including native levies, the infantry, about 1,299 strong, formed the usual hollow square round the transport. The enemy consisted of the pick of the Mullah’s fighting Dervishes, and were about 6,000 to 8,000 strong. The Dervishes advanced in regular skirmishing order, rushing from cover to cover, and lying down. A few got within 400 yards of the square, but were unable to face the heavy rifle and Maxim fire that met them, and this attack failed. Then two determined rushes were made on the front and right flank of the square, but they were met with such a terrific fire from rifles and Maxims that the charging enemy could not face it. At 10 a.m. the whole mass of the enemy broke and fled, followed by fire till it was masked by the pursuing mounted troops. Six hundred and sixty-eight dead were counted round the position two days later.[56]