Note.—The organisation during the war was as follows:
Each cavalry brigade had a battery of 6 guns (Hotchkiss pattern made in Japan). These were mounted on a heavy limbered carriage with pole draught and 4 horses; these carriages were clumsy, heavy, and conspicuous, and weighed 15 hundredweight. There was a fixed shield on each carriage and a rough tripod was also carried.
Tactical
The Japanese have issued a well-illustrated drill book for the use of machine-gun batteries, with cavalry and with infantry respectively, with a view to enable them to manœuvre accurately and easily in all situations. Their tactics are at present (1909) under revision, and it is understood that there are likely to be many changes introduced owing to the lessons of the late war.
The following is the most recent summary of the principles of their tactics:
Machine guns are used as batteries, but may be broken up into sections or even single guns. It is thought wrong to employ “slow” fire, and 800 yards is considered the most useful range. Well-hidden lines of skirmishers and other machine guns are unsuitable targets, and they are never to be used to replace artillery or to fire at artillery at long range, though they may do so at close range or from the flanks or rear. Concealed positions are recommended, and the use of alternative positions advocated, and change of position should be made on the initiative of the commander. Wide intervals between the guns should be used, but the battery front should not exceed 110 yards. The guns should be used on the flanks or rear of the enemy when possible. All ranges should be measured.
Machine guns should be used in the attack just before the final assault, and in the defence when repelling the assault or to reinforce a threatened flank. In both attack and defence they are to be held back, and fire reserved for the crisis of the action.
Use with the advance guard is not desirable as a rule. It is strongly advocated with a rear guard, owing to their intense fire, rapidity in ceasing fire (breaking off action), and mobility. The officer commanding machine guns must be accurately acquainted with the plans of the G.O.C., but must act on his own initiative in forwarding the general scheme according to the situation. Communication with the G.O.C. is considered vital. The guns are considered especially valuable in covering the retreat of infantry. Concealment from the enemy while manœuvring and surprise by sudden fire are considered essential to their success.
Regulations with the Infantry, 1907
Art. 67.—In the offensive the battery is at first kept in reserve; but when its intervention becomes necessary during the general engagement, to prepare the assault on a point in the enemy’s position, they will be given orders to come into action.