[[135]] Bibliography of Maximilian—"Die Bücher die Kaeyser Max selbst macht—Grab, Ehren, Weise Künig, Teuerdanck, Freydanck, Triumph Wagen, Stamm Cronick, der Stamm, Artalerey; die sieben Lust-Gezirck, Wappen-Buch, Stall-Buch, Joegerey, Valcknerey, Kücherey, Kellnerey, Fischerey, Goertnerey, Baumeisterey, Moralitoet, Andacht St. Jürgen. Nec ullus eorum hactenus impressus est, praeterquam is qui inscribitur der Theuerdanck." Quoted in "Notice sur Max. I."; in Le Glay, Correspondence, vol. ii.
[[136]] Janssen, i. 592.
[[137]] See a most interesting article in the Monthly Review, February 1901, "An Emperor's Sporting Chronicle," by W. Baillie Grohman. Perhaps even more extraordinary than these instances is the letter to his daughter Margaret (Dec. 22, 1510). He desires her to make three requests of Henry VIII.—first, for 2,000 archers for Maximilian's expedition to Rome; second, for pardon for the Duke of Suffolk; and third, for "deux beaux doghes femelles et ung masle," for the Duke of Würtemberg—Le Glay, i., letter 269. Earlier in the same year (February 1510), he expresses his delight at the eager way in which his young grandson Charles is taking to the chase, and adds, "otherwise one might deem him a bastard."
V
The wideness of Maximilian's interests, and the variety of spheres in which those interests led him to take a part, enhance the difficulty of estimating or defining his character as a whole, and each different attitude demands discussion before any general conclusion can be drawn. His political career, however, despite all its intrigues and complications, is comparatively easy to estimate; for his persistence in controlling his own policy and his dislike of associates and confidants throw the entire responsibility of any given action upon the Emperor's own shoulders. His retentive memory and tireless energy aided him in what would otherwise have been a hopeless effort. "He seldom or never," writes the Venetian ambassador in 1496, "discusses with any one what he has in hand or does, especially in important matters."[[138]] He was in the habit of dictating to his secretaries late into the night, and often drew up important documents with his own hands; while even during his meals, and in the midst of his hunting expeditions, he dictated dispatches or gave instructions to his councillors. For his credit as a politician this monopolizing spirit was most unfortunate. His secrecy kept his councillors and ambassadors ever in the dark, and rendered a firm attitude on their part almost impossible. His over-confidence, both in his own capacity and in the honesty of others, received many a rude shock, and often made him the dupe of his intellectual inferiors. Machiavelli tells us the opinion of an intimate friend of the Emperor, "that anyone could cheat him without his knowing it."[[139]] His condemnation as a bungler by the Florentine statesman has been used as an argument in Maximilian's favour; but the only possible inference is that in affairs of state the Emperor's morals had not suffered so complete an eclipse as those of his rivals, while his statecraft was based upon a neglect of sound political principles. But even more prominent than the self-centred nature of his policy are two fatal weaknesses in his character, which account for most of his failures and disappointments—his want of perseverance and his open-handedness. The whole history of his reign is an illustration of the inconstancy with which he flitted from scheme to scheme, never allowing the time necessary for a successful issue; and the disastrous consequences of this habit were only accentuated by the fact that he remained a law unto himself, self-deprived of all moderating influences. It was this fickle and over-sanguine disposition which caused Louis XII. to exclaim, "What this King says at night, he does not hold to the next morning."[[140]] The criticism of Ferdinand V. is perhaps even more apposite—"If Maximilian thinks of a thing, he also believes that it is already done."[[141]] Without duly considering the means at his disposal, he stormed impetuously towards an end which was obviously unattainable under the circumstances, and, to make matters worse, he had already lost all interest in the project before there was even a prospect of its being crowned with success. In other cases, his inventive intellect showed him two or three ways towards the same goal, with the result that he either pursued all at once, or, confining himself to one only, soon changed his mind and adopted a course which he regarded as safer. "And so," writes Quirini, "he springs from one decision to another, till time and opportunity are past ... and thus he wins from all men a light enough reputation."[[142]] But perhaps the greatest weakness of Maximilian's administration was faulty finance. It is true that the resources at his disposal were wholly inadequate, whether in the Empire or in his own dominions. Yet his own unpractical and visionary nature prevented him from making the best of such means as he possessed, and drew him into quite a needless amount of money difficulties. He had absolutely no conception of the meaning of economy, and, deeming it an unkingly trait, gave with both hands to his servants and his friends, and laid no proper check upon his household expenses. The fact that he spent but little upon himself, and that his personal requirements were frugal in the extreme, while it speaks well for the generosity of his nature, cannot affect our estimate of his financial incapacity. Indeed, such were his extravagance and his penury, that the Venetian ambassador was induced to exclaim: "For a ducat he can be won for anything."[[143]] And truly, the fact that he actually served Venice and Milan, and in later years England, for hire, after the manner of an Italian condottiere, justifies the severe exaggeration of this remark. His liberal patronage of Art and Science, and the magnificence of the Court entertainments, must have contributed in some degree to his popularity among contemporaries; but his ruinous method of raising supplies in his own dominions really transferred the burden of his endless undertakings to the shoulders of the next generation.[[144]]
As Emperor, Maximilian has been severely censured for subordinating the Imperial to the territorial ideal, and for furthering Hapsburg ambitions at the expense of Germany as a whole. But a survey of his youth and early training at once helps to explain this policy and proves it to have been inevitable. Such a path had been mapped out for him by his father's motto, A.E.I.O.U., and Frederick's own impotence to achieve its aspirations only served to impress it more firmly upon the youthful Maximilian. And indeed there is much truth in his idea, that the building up of a strong hereditary State was the surest road towards an imposing position in the Empire. While the personal defects of Maximilian, which have already been discussed, are largely responsible for the comparative ineffectiveness of his Imperial policy, yet the chief cause of all was inherent in the constitution of the Empire. It can hardly be doubted but that an Emperor far more powerful than Maximilian ever was would have failed to combine the many conflicting elements into a central Government capable of strong and united action. "Constitution, Law, order in the State were everywhere forcing themselves out of the perverted forms of the Middle Ages into more perfect models." But as yet confusion and impotence held sway, and the broad principles of reform were obscured from Maximilian's eyes by a perplexing array of minor questions. Feudalism had long been in decay, and the efforts of rulers in every State were directed towards extending their authority and bringing the nobles and the towns into greater dependence upon the throne. But the permanent taxation and the standing army which made the attainment of this end possible to the French kings, and through which France became for a number of years the first military power of Europe, were denied to Maximilian by the peculiar circumstances of the Empire. Not even in his hereditary lands, still less elsewhere, was there any regular system of "aids" for the sovereign's support; and Maximilian had to wage his wars, either with militia, who were ever slow to assemble and prompt to disband, whose discipline was not beyond reproach, and who were not liable to serve outside their own territory, or with mercenaries, whose maintenance involved an expense which the absence of regular taxation made it difficult to meet. Apart from the revenues of Crown lands and the deeply mortgaged mines and tolls, he could raise no contributions without the Diet's consent; and as a rule each Estate vied with the others in resolutely setting aside all considerations of patriotism and maintaining the tightest hold upon their purse-strings. They showed no sympathy with Maximilian's aims and interests; while the Emperor lacked the power to enforce his wishes upon them. Such circumstances would almost justify his policy of retaliation by obstructing the Diet's efforts towards reform. But in any case he can hardly be blamed for falling back upon a strictly Austrian policy and using his Imperial office to further Hapsburg interests.
Whenever the Emperor's political action is deserving of praise, the House of Hapsburg rather than the Empire will be found to have reaped the benefit. His enthusiastic belief in the future greatness of his House was the guiding star of his whole life, and encouraged him to consolidate his dominions internally, and thus, as he hoped, to fit them to become the central point of a world-wide empire. Besides the introduction of Roman law, for which he was mainly responsible, he thoroughly reorganized the administration of the Austrian Duchies. The revenues had become insufficient for the execution of his princely duties, especially in time of war; and Maximilian set himself to introduce into the country the same methods of Government which he employed in the Netherlands. He replaced the old feudal survivals in the State by a modern officialdom, which gradually paralyzed the opposition of the Estates, and from which certain individuals exercised a permanent control over the government during his own absence. Meanwhile it was his Hapsburg and territorial ambitions which prompted him to reassert the Imperial authority in Italy, and which were partly responsible for his eagerness to recover Croatia and Southern Hungary from the hands of the Turks. Above all, it was these ambitions that inspired him in his endless projects of alliances and marriages—projects which secured for his descendants the glorious inheritance of Spain, the two Sicilies and the New World, and the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary.
Passing from his public to his private life, we may reasonably assert that Maximilian, while far from spotless, compares favourably with the Princes of his time. The excesses of Charles VIII., the luxurious vice of Louis XII., the barbaric licentiousness of Francis I., and again the unrestrained passions of Henry VIII., and Ferdinand V.'s frank disavowal of morality—all these traits are happily wanting in Maximilian's life. He seems to have loved the gracious Mary faithfully and tenderly, and it is said that, to the day of his death, any mention of her name drew from him a deep sigh of remembrance. But for her untimely death he might have resisted the fierce temptations of his royal position. He had at least eight natural children, of whom two only are known to history—George, Bishop of Brixen, who eventually became Prince Bishop of Liège, and a daughter, who perished with her husband, the Count of Helfenstein, in the Peasants' Revolt of 1525. It cannot be maintained that Maximilian's second marriage was a love-match; yet there is reason to believe that, though he paid little attention to the unfortunate Bianca Maria, he at least remained faithful to her.