The first attempt to upset him was a so-called “military demonstration” in front of the offices of the Ejercito Español, a military paper which had been confiscated for publishing an article written by a Carlist, accusing the Premier of unjust favouritism in the distribution of rewards for good service in Melilla. The demonstration was described by the Conservative papers as of “overwhelming importance,” and the number of demonstrators was placed by some of them at two thousand. The truth is that it was confined to a few officers well known for their Carlist leanings, and the rank and file of their regiments stood resolutely aloof. Moret and his Minister of War, General Luque, retired the Captain-General of Madrid and the colonels of the regiments in question for failure to maintain discipline, and ordered the actual participants a couple of months’ arrest—a proceeding which called forth general applause from all except the reactionaries. The small significance of the affair was made manifest when it came out that these arrests did not exceed half a dozen, including the editor (also an officer) responsible for the publication of the seditious article.
The result of this fiasco was still more to strengthen Moret’s influence with the nation, and it became evident that he would sweep the country should he obtain the long-deferred decree of dissolution. All the ingenuity of the Church was therefore exercised to secure his fall before this could take place, and the cupidity of a cabal of disappointed candidates for place was skilfully used to bring about—the catastrophe, I was going to say, but the triumph of morality would be a truer expression.
At the municipal elections in December, 1909, an endeavour had been made by Moret to secure something in the direction of freedom of voting for the working classes, and the result, as I have shown, was a triumph for the Liberal-Monarchists. The Republicans—to their honour be it said, for they did not do as well in these elections as they had expected—worked harder than ever after this to secure to the electors the free exercise of their legal privileges, and Moret accepted their programme, so far as it was designed to help in cleansing the Augean stable of corruption by limiting the powers of the local Caciques. This gave an opportunity to those who live by political immorality, and the intrigue which followed is typical of Spanish politics.
In the December elections Madrid returned a Republican majority to the Town Council. The Alcalde, Señor Aguilera, an old and staunch ally of Señor Moret’s, although himself a Monarchist, ranged himself on the side of the Republicans by supporting their demand for the limitation of the Alcalde’s power to appoint and thus control the votes of the very numerous municipal employees. It was proposed that the Alcalde, instead of being, as now, nominated by the Government, should be elected by the Councillors, who in their turn have been elected by the popular vote, and that the posts under the Council should be filled by open competition.
Most of the Alcaldes, even in the small towns, enter office poor and leave rich. But it is admitted even by his opponents that Señor Aguilera, a man with but small private means, who has twice been Alcalde of Madrid under Moret, has each time gone out of office as poor as when he came in.
A crisis was deliberately provoked by the President of the so-called “Liberal” election committees of Madrid, Count Romanones, a man who held office under Moret in a former Cabinet, and has long been suspected of aspiring to the Premiership of the party to which he belongs. The election committees, represented by Count Romanones, although nominally Liberal, objected to the proposed limitation of the power of the Alcalde, and finding Moret firm on the point, went so far as to hand him an ultimatum. Briefly, their terms were, “Leave to the Alcaldes” (often the Caciques) “throughout Spain the appointment of the municipal employees, or we will refuse to act, and leave you without any electoral organisation at all when the Cortes are dissolved.” It is not denied that this resolution was handed to the Premier by Count Romanones a day or two before his resignation. Meanwhile other opponents took advantage of Aguilera’s temporary alliance with the Republicans, and represented that if a programme of electoral reform supported by that party were carried out, the Throne would be endangered by a Republican majority in the new Cortes. This danger was imaginary, for there is no doubt that both the numerical strength of the Republicans and their hostility to the reigning House have always been greatly exaggerated by all the various factions desirous of clogging the wheels of reform.
Señor Moret of course declined to compromise with Count Romanones on any terms, which in a man of his recognised probity was a certainty, doubtless counted upon by the “Liberal” cabal and by the Ultramontanes. He then once more asked the King for the decree of dissolution, that he might place his programme of reform before those whom it most concerned. Exactly what passed at this interview was not divulged, but at its conclusion he placed his resignation in Don Alfonso’s hands. It was accepted, and the veteran Liberal-Monarchist, after forty years’ service to the Throne and the country, found himself dismissed at a moment’s notice, through the machinations of the opponents of electoral reform.
No plausible reason was given for the dismissal of Moret. It was reported that “the representative men of the party,” when applied to by the King for advice, recommended the appointment of Canalejas, on the ground that Moret had lost their confidence. But it was not stated who these representative men were. The Daily Mail gave half a dozen names, which had been telegraphed by its correspondent in Madrid, but that list was obviously untrustworthy because Montero Rios figured in it, and it is well known that the leader of the Radical group sets the unity of the party above every other consideration, and has always urged loyalty to Moret upon Liberals of all shades.
The circumstances were calculated to embitter the most even temper; nevertheless Moret’s first thought was for the welfare of the nation, whose whole governmental machinery was thrown out of gear. Some of his followers wanted to make a complete split with Canalejas, and one or two articles were published in the heat of the moment, expressed in terms tending to a final division in the Liberal camp. But in his own utterances for the Press Moret showed himself true to his ideal—the good of the country before personal ambition.
“The most serious feature in this crisis,” he said, “is that both the event and its solution were foretold by the reactionary newspapers, proving the intervention of the reactionary party in the intrigue. They interfered because they wish to prevent my conducting the elections in accordance with my programme of electoral reform.”