Prudence as elementary, 43. Interest, action, and
goodness, 43. The alleged relativity of goodness, 43.
The conflict of interests solved by conciliation, 48.
The limits of prudence, 49.
III. THE LOGIC OF PREFERENCE AND PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . 50
The adoption of new interests and the problem of preference, 50. A hypothetical solution of the problem, 51. Solution in the concrete case through the organization of a purpose, 53. The principle of the objective validity of interests, 54. The principle of the quantitative basis of preference, 55.
IV. THE LOGIC OF IMPARTIALITY AND JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . 57
The private interest, 57. The personal factor negligible in counting interests, 58. The refutation of egoism. The first proposition of egoism, 59. The second proposition of egoism, 61. Impartiality as a part of justice, 63. Justice as imputing finality to the individual, 64. The equality of rational beings as organs of truth, 64. Summary of justice, 66.
V. THE LOGIC OF GOOD-WILL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
All interests are entitled to consideration, 67.
Goodwill and the growth of new interests, 67.
VI. DUTY AND THE IMAGINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
The logical imagination, 69. Rationalism and incentive to action, 70. Rationalism and faith, 71.