Convoy arrive Ambrose Channel Lightship at 7.30 A.M., 14 June.
Group One will, on arrival at Ambrose Channel Lightship, assume following formation:
| Terry O | . | O Wilkes | ||||
| . | ||||||
| DeKalb O | . | O Seattle (2 points starboard bow of leading transport, distance 2000 yards) | ||||
| . | ||||||
| . | ||||||
| . | ||||||
| O Tenadores | ||||||
| Havana | O | |||||
| Roe O | O Saratoga | O Corsair (On beam 3rd transport, distance 2000 yards) | ||||
| Pastores | O | |||||
Distance between transports 600 yards.
(Signed) Albert Gleaves
FITTING THE CORSAIR FOR THE WAR ZONE
The instructions for warding off submarine attack have more than a passing interest. They signified a new chapter in the work of the American Navy, with no doctrine as precedent—the task of transporting an army across three thousand miles of ocean and protecting it against an enemy which was supremely confident that its undersea warfare could not be thwarted, which had boasted that it could prevent the landing of an American army in France. In a way, this was a momentous experiment. How thoroughly and intelligently the Navy had studied the problem may be discerned in these extracts from its confidential orders to the Corsair and the other ships of the escort:
Reports of enemy submarine activity indicate that the area of greatest activity is east of Longitude Twenty West, and within a circle radius five hundred miles from Fayal, Azores. Submarines may be operating on the Atlantic coast of the United States and Canada. Every effort has been made to hold secret the sailing of the convoy but it may be assumed that the departure of convoy from the United States and the hour of departure will be communicated to the enemy. It is possible that particular effort will be made by the enemy to accomplish the destruction of the convoy, and no part of the water traversed may be assumed to be free from submarines.