I kept on shooting. I sank twelve of the submarines myself. The battle lasted a good while and I heard that fifty of the submarines had been destroyed. None of us was killed. The submarines, what was left, finally quit us. We haven’t seen any more of them. Give this to the newspapers.
Love to all the folks, from your soldier boy
Bill
At this early period of the naval war, the employment of the depth charge as the most efficient weapon against the submarine had not been fully developed. The traditions of accurate gunfire as the best offensive were not easily set aside. It was true of the destroyers at Queenstown, as of these yachts bound to France, that their crews felt sublimely certain of smashing Fritz with the batteries at which they drilled like so many skilled football teams. Soon they came to realize, however, that the chance of catching the enemy napping on the surface was extremely remote and that shooting at periscopes, even when they were not imaginary, was futile business.
The Corsair was armed with four three-inch rifles, and their crews were very capably trained under the direction of Ensign Schanze. This armament was not heavy enough to match the guns of a U-boat if the latter had been plucky enough to stand up to a duel, but it served to drive him under and to inspire a wholesome respect. The superior speed of the yacht made her particularly well fitted for using depth charges, but at the outset she was equipped with no more than ten of the small and rather crude “Sperry mine” loaded with from thirty to fifty pounds of TNT. This device was exploded by means of a buoy and wire cable which unwound as the steel canister plunged through the water, releasing the detonator at the proper depth. These mines frequently failed to function and the destructive effect was feeble.
The Navy Department later perfected a terrific “ash can” packed with three hundred pounds of high explosive which was set off by means of a hydrostatic valve and could be relied upon to devastate a submarine a hundred feet below the surface of the sea. These great bombs were dropped, not one or two in an attack, but fairly dumped overboard by the dozen or the score in a cataclysmic barrage, after listening devices had located and “fixed” the enemy. The “Y gun,” or twin mortar, was also invented to hurl these metal kegs a considerable distance from the ship. Such were the perfected tactics learned from experience, which would surely have doomed the U-boat to extinction if the armistice had not intervened. The Corsair was fitted out in this manner later in her service, but she blithely sailed for the war zone with her four small guns and a few “Sperry pills” and could have felt no more pride in her task if she had been a first-class battleship.
Concerning the voyage, Commander Kittinger reported as follows, in the War Diary of the yacht:
Got under way at 4 A.M., June 14th, and stood down the river, anchoring at 6 A.M. off Governor’s Island on account of fog. Got under way again at 9.40 A.M. Laid to off Ambrose Light Vessel at 1.20 P.M. Joined Group No. 1 at 1.50 P.M. and took departure from Ambrose Light Vessel at 2.09 P.M., standard speed 12 knots. At 2.30 P.M. weather became misty again which necessitated closing in to keep the convoy in sight. The 4 to 8 P.M. watch had difficulty in keeping steam for 12 knots. Blowers were used to assist. Ship lost distance which was recovered in the next watch and position maintained.
At 11.40 P.M. the fog set in thick and lasted until about 1.25 A.M., June 15th. At 3.20 A.M. the convoy was sighted on the port bow, distance four miles. During the watch the ship logged over 12 knots by revolutions of main engines, but due to deep draft was unable to keep up. The blowers were run continually to assist. The forward boiler could not be lighted off as it was banked in with reserve coal supply. Between 4 and 5 A.M. while cleaning fires the speed by revolutions dropped to 11 knots. A moderate sea was running which caused seasickness among the firemen. The firemen were drafted from the U.S.S. Delaware through the receiving ship at New York and were unfamiliar with firing Scotch boilers and not accustomed to the quick and deep roll of small ships. Most of them became useless during the cleaning fire period and their places were taken by petty officers of the engine and fire-room watch. The ship continued to lose distance astern of convoy, a logged speed of 10½ knots being maintained. I gave this matter my personal attention and every effort was made to rejoin the convoy. From noon to midnight an average speed of 11¾ knots was logged. At 4.45 P.M. the Wilkes came within hail and made inquiries as to the cause of the Corsair’s inability to keep in position.
June 16th. An average speed of 10½ knots was logged for the day. I found that the seasoned men, most of them petty officers, were showing fatigue due to the hard steaming qualities of the ship. A number of volunteers from the deck force went below and passed coal and handled ashes to assist. The reserve coal from the dead fire-room was removed to allow the forward boiler to be lighted off. Group No. 1 was not seen this day. Group No. 2 was sighted astern at 3.40 A.M. Lighted fires in boiler No. 1 at 6 P.M.