“But suppose the result at New Orleans had been different, would President Madison have signed the Treaty?
“That is a real question for college debate. It is a question calculated to bring sharply to the student the picture of the distracted condition of our country at the time. By signing the treaty Madison would have appeased the New England section, then in hostile and threatening attitude, but at the same time would have faced the surrender of the territory west of the Mississippi for all time, or faced future negotiation or war. By refusing to sign, the President would have prolonged the war with its uncertainties. At the same time he would have confronted possible disunion through the open disaffection of the northeastern states. The English government construed the disaffection as a threat of secession.
“It was planned by that calculating government, as evidence shows, to inveigle New England into a separate treaty in case after British capture and occupation of New Orleans, Madison should refuse to ratify the Ghent treaty. Thus, if the issue in that New Orleans affair had been different, President Madison would have faced danger of disunion, on one side or the other.
“It would be hard to conceive of a graver situation. All this was averted, and gloriously averted, by the victory at New Orleans, the news of which caused the treaty to be joyfully ratified.”
“Haven’t you overdrawn the picture?” asked the young man. “Isn’t it a fact that the treaty provided for the return of all territory taken during the war, so that, if the English had captured New Orleans they would have given it up?”
“My dear young friend,” I replied, “I have not overdrawn the picture. The mutual restoration clause provided that all territory, places and possessions, taken by either, were to be returned at effective peace. Bear in mind that England had never conceded the validity of our title to the Louisiana Domain, and so if the carefully planned design to capture it had been successful, England was in position to hold that she did not regard it as a legal possession of the United States, and as not subject to return under the Peace Treaty. It is a violence to credibility to suppose that England, after finally dispatching the big expedition against Louisiana, would within a few weeks thereafter, agree to a peace treaty, recalling her troops from an anticipated successful conquest. In the light of present knowledge, the peace proceedings show a studied purpose to protect the expedition sent out to capture New Orleans. The supposition, advanced by many historians, that if England had captured New Orleans, she would have given it up, is a reflection upon the intelligence of the English government of that period, and really, ascribes to that government egregious asininity. Now, with all of her blunders, England has never been asinine.”
The young man listened intently, gave an inhaled “Oh,” and then added:
“I begin to see; but there are some questions I want to ask. First, when and why and how did this error get in history?”
“A natural inquiry,” I responded. “I cannot definitely answer, nor is a definite answer vital. However, I will give one conjecture; Jackson became a national figure as a result of the Battle of New Orleans. While acclaimed by the masses, Jackson had many bitter enemies, some of them in the history writing class. Prejudice may have caused disparagement of the importance of the event upon which his national fame is founded. But all that is of small importance beside the establishment of the actual truth, that the battle was not fought after peace, but that it was necessary to prevent England’s conquest of Louisiana. Thus, as I have said before, the Battle was the second most important military event in the life of the Republic.”
“Now my other questions,” said the young man; “why has such an error been allowed to go unchallenged all these generations?”