Whether that “alarming vigor” was due entirely to war exigencies of recruiting its Navy, or whether the British Government designed it as a provocation to the young western Republic, to take the onus of declaring war, under guise of which the coveted floating title to Louisiana could be appropriated, is a matter for deduction, not appearing of record.
At any rate, the impressment practice re-aroused resentment in the young republic, and that resentment found chief expression in the then Southwest, resulting under the leadership of that section and over the opposition of the New England States, or rather of that of the assertive Federalists therein, in a declaration of war against England, on the ground of the degradation of our sovereignty.
It is not the purpose of the writer to discuss the War of 1812, except as its events may relate to his mission, that of correcting falsehood and error in the historical books adopted as textbooks for the school children of America.
The War of 1812 was heralded as a mistake by the Federalists, opponents of the then administration. While the incipient Navy gave a brilliant account of itself, justifying the proud boast that man for man and gun for gun, the U. S. Navy was the equal of anything afloat, for two and a half years the record shows that land events in the main were untoward, climaxed by the capture, and sacking and burning of the public buildings, of the National Capital in August, 1814, and thus the Federal Press offensively took the “I-told-you-so” attitude.
Early in the war the Emperor of Russia extended his good offices as mediator. The United States Government accepted the offer, being earnestly desirous of honorable peace, and having nothing to conceal from neutral investigation. But the English government declined the Russian offer, indicating that it preferred to treat direct. Later as a result of British invitation, a Peace Commission met at Ghent, Belgium.
CHAPTER VII.
Negotiations at Ghent.
A separate chapter is devoted to the joint conference at Ghent because therein is shown the subtle, diplomatically concealed, purpose of the then English Government. The record of the proceedings of the conference, in order to be fully understood, should be read in the light of the afterwards revealed fact that, at the same time these negotiations were being conducted, the expedition against Louisiana was secretly planned and dispatched. Things that are puzzling in the making often become clear in the aftermath. And so it is in this case.
The defeat and resultant abdication of Napoleon (April 4, 1814) released England’s European troops for pursuing the American war with greater vigor, and to punish the United States for having declared war at England’s most embarrassing moment. It would not be a violent assumption to say that at least some members of the British Government felt that the time was opportune at last to take Louisiana and thus redress a grievance nurtured since 1803, when Bonaparte snatched that great domain from England’s outstretched hands.
The exact date on which the Louisiana expedition was determined upon is not material. Plain evidence discloses that during the joint peace negotiation its details were arranged and the army sent forward to take New Orleans. We now know that after the capture of Washington by the British and the burning and sacking of the public buildings there (August 24, 1814), the British invading forces, after being later repulsed in an attack upon Baltimore, repaired under orders to Nigril Bay, Jamaica, to await recruits for the expedition against New Orleans. With the time then required for ocean travel, these orders must have been given prior to, or about the time of the meeting of the Peace Commissioners at Ghent, August 4, 1814.
Let us visualize the two groups assembled at Ghent. First, consider the five Americans. They were earnestly desirous of a quick and honorable peace. Their country was riven with dissatisfaction produced by a powerful anti-administration and anti-war party, seemingly in control of the northeastern states, making dire threats, unless hostilities were soon ended.