Battle of New Orleans: Its Real Meaning

by Reau E. Folk

“All territory, places and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the War, or which may be taken after the signing of this Treaty, excepting only the Islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay and without causing any destruction or carrying away of any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratification of this Treaty, or any slaves or other private property; and all archives, records, deeds, and papers, either of a public nature or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of the War, may have fallen into the hands of the officers, of either party shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratification of this Treaty until the decision respecting the title to said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this Treaty. No disposition made by this Treaty as to such possession of such islands and territories claimed by both parties shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.”

The Treaty, from which the clause above is quoted, can of course be found in Washington, but copy may be seen at almost any general public library, in the volume herebefore referred to containing various Treaties of the United States.

The reader, who has been following us in our showing of the various stages of the development of the British design to protect, by diplomacy, the Louisiana expedition, will recognize the significance of the word “possessions.” By reason of that word, the British were in position to maintain, after capturing Louisiana, that it was not subject to return under the mutual restoration clause adopted, not being, under English construction, a legal “possession” of the United States, formal notice of that construction having been given in the treaty negotiations. The subtly accomplished insertion of the word in the treaty represented a triumph of ulterior British diplomatic design over the very able, hard-headed, but open and candid American commissioners, who were entirely in the dark as to the Expedition dispatched to seize Louisiana.

That word was of course not as exclusive of argument as the Uti Possidetis principle first proposed, and insisted upon almost as a sine qua non; nor was it as clear as the wording subsequently urged, “belonging to either party and taken by the other”; but it was all sufficient, backed by the British conviction that Louisiana was not a legal possession of the United States, and supported by the mighty British martial power, then unleashed from European war.

It is obvious to the writer that but for the word “possessions,” or wording of similar import, the treaty would not have been agreed to by the British; in fact, such indication was given by the British ministers at the joint conference December 12th, under the guise of the principle pertaining to the Passamaquoddy Islands.

Any presumption that Great Britain, after planning the great expedition against Louisiana, would have, within a few weeks following the final dispatch of the military forces, signed a peace treaty, recalling those forces from an attained, long-dreamed-of conquest, is a reflection upon the intelligence of the British Government of 1814-15.

With the treaty agreed to, the English Government became anxious about its ratification by President Madison. Significant evidence of this is furnished by Doctor Updyke, in his work from which we have already made a number of quotations. On page 355, Updyke says, “The British ministry had hoped that their last communication would enable the commissioners to close the negotiations for the treaty of peace. They were, however, suspicious of President Madison, and feared he would not sign the treaty. For this reason it was stipulated that the war should not cease until after the exchange of ratifications at Washington. They counted upon having a strong English fleet in the Chesapeake and the Delaware at the time that Baker, the bearer of the British copy of the treaty, should reach Washington; and they also counted upon the disposition of the Eastern states to secede from the Union, as likely to ‘frighten Madison.’ It was suggested that if Madison should refuse to ratify the treaty the British Government should immediately propose to make a separate treaty with the New England States, which it was believed could be accomplished.”

Dr. Updyke gives as authority for the foregoing paragraph: “Liverpool to Castlereagh, December 23, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, IX, 495.”

Lord Liverpool was prime minister and Lord Castlereagh was secretary for foreign affairs.

The digest given of correspondence between these high English Government officials makes it plain that the English Government was anxious for ratification of the Peace Treaty and that they were fearful that Madison would not sign.