Promulgated by President Madison February 18th; thus ending the period of hostilities.
Would the United States Senate have advised ratification, or would the President have ratified, if the British on January 8th, had swept aside that defensive army and had carried into effect the design to capture and occupy Louisiana?
Probably no more grave or serious situation has ever confronted an American President than that which would have been presented. By ratifying the treaty, the President would have satisfied the New England malcontents, who had given veiled threats of disunion. But by the ratification with England in possession of Louisiana, and holding that it was not a legal possession of the United States, the President would have faced a desperate alternative of giving up Louisiana, and the trans-Mississippi territory; or referring it to the issue of a future war, or future negotiations.
It is the belief of the writer that President Madison would have declined to ratify the Treaty, as long as the British remained in occupation of Louisiana; thus prolonging the war with its uncertainties, and taking the risk of the disruption of the Union, through a separate peace with England by the New England States; a proposition which, as we have seen, was in contemplation by the English Government.
All of these questions, so momentous, to the American Union, were happily and gloriously averted by the marvelous defensive victory at New Orleans.
And yet, American historians teach our children that that battle was a needless one!
Oh, ignorance! Oh, prejudice! Oh, pro-English!!
CHAPTER XI.
Testimony From General Jackson Himself.
In presenting this case against the school historians, which he feels has already been made, to the satisfaction of any impartial reader, the writer has refrained from using much confirmatory material in order to be as brief as possible. But in the history of Andrew Jackson, written by A. C. Buell, and published in 1904, there occurs illuminating data highly apropos in this connection. It may be remarked that Buell is not a favorite of some historians. Buell was distinctly not pro-English.
In chapter 3 of the second volume of Buell’s history, entitled “British Designs on Louisiana,” the author reiterates a statement before made, that Jackson’s Army of New Orleans saved the Louisiana Purchase, and adds that few people of the millions who were celebrating in 1904 the centenary of the colossal transaction between Napoleon Bonaparte and Thomas Jefferson, realized the significance of these words. Buell later says: “Viewed in the light of its actual influence on the map of North America, and the fortunes of this Republic, it was the most important battle ever fought between Great Britain and the United States.... The real, vast, enduring value of the Battle of New Orleans, lay in the fact that it prevented another war.”