* * * * * * * *
From the mass of evidence, available to any earnest historian, the writer has selected one more witness, whose testimony is compressed, in an incidental paragraph. At the meeting of the American Historical Association in New Orleans in 1903, Dr. W. M. Sloane read a paper entitled, “The World Aspects of the Louisiana Purchase.” It is published in Volume I of the “Proceedings of the American Historical Association of 1903.” In that paper (page 102 of Proceedings above cited) appears this sentence: “But for Jefferson’s wisdom in explorating it (Louisiana) might have remained a wilderness long after settlement began; Great Britain coveted it in 1815 when Jackson saved it.” There is a sentence compact with fact. Dr. William M. Sloane (now dead) was at the time of the address, and for many years professor of history at Princeton University, and a recognized authority on history.
In all literature there cannot be found a more concrete, comprehensive line: “Great Britain coveted it in 1815 when Jackson saved it.” Pro-English historians may deftly turn and twist this and other facts to their purpose; but let me give a tocsin call: PRO-ENGLISH HISTORIANS SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF OUR SCHOOLS, AND YOUNG AMERICA TAUGHT ONLY THE UNGARBLED, UNVARNISHED TRUTH.
CHAPTER XIII.
Recapitulation.
The writer, in these pages, has shown by what must be conceded on all sides, irrefragable evidence that school histories are in error in saying the Battle of New Orleans was fought after peace, and was therefore a needless battle.
The writer has also shown by evidence he considers conclusive, that England held as invalid the title of the United States to Louisiana, acquired by sale from Bonaparte to the United States in 1803; that England deliberately planned the conquest of Louisiana (with the resultant development, if successful, of a great dominion to the west of the United States, like Canada on the North). That evidence is mainly furnished by the British themselves. First in the British note to the United States Peace Commissioners, criticizing the title of the United States to Louisiana; and, second, in the fitting out and dispatching of the expedition against New Orleans during the peace negotiations; in the complete Civil Government staff, for Louisiana, carried by the expedition; in the record of the peace negotiations, first in the insistence by the British upon the Uti Possidetis principle, and, second, when that failed, in the proposal of words to be inserted in the Mutual Restoration clause, which proposal finally resulted in the word, “Possessions” in that clause, under which England could hold that Louisiana, having been taken, was not subject to return, not being a possession of the United States; further in the letter of Prime Minister Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh, assuming British occupation of New Orleans, outlining purpose to “frighten Madison” into signing the Treaty (thus leaving England in possession of Louisiana).
After close and careful study, the writer presents as a summary of his conclusion as to the value of the Battle of New Orleans:
First, that it was a highly necessary battle on the part of the United States, rendered so by British aggression;
Second, that the statement in school and other histories that it was fought after peace is entirely false, the Peace Treaty itself being evidence. (All historians, past, present, and to come, cannot change the text of that Treaty);
Third, that it saved the Louisiana Purchase to the United States or averted another war with England;