Again, this principle either, as above said, denies magistracy to be God's ordinance instituted in his word; or then says, that he hath instituted ordinances in his revealed will, without prescribing any qualifications as essential to their being, but entirely left the constitution of them to the will of man. But how absurd is this, and derogatory to the glory of God, in all his perfections, who is a God of order, once to imagine, that he hath set any of his ordinances, either as to matter or manner, upon the precarious footing of the pure will of wicked and ungodly men? The smallest acquaintance with divine revelation will readily convince, that he hath not. It may as well, and with the same parity of reason, be refused, that there are any qualifications requisite, as essential to the being and validity of the office of the ministry, but only necessary to its well-being and usefulness; and therefore, is as lawful (in its exercise) in the want of these qualifications, as the ordinance of magistracy is accounted to be. But how contrary is this to scripture, Tit. i, 7, 8; 1 Tim. iii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, &c. Now, comparing these with the above-cited texts, respecting the qualifications of magistrates, it appears, that the qualifications of the magistrate are required in the same express and as strong terms (if not also somewhat more clearly,) as the qualifications of the minister; and seeing a holy God hath made no difference, as to the essentiality of the qualifications pertaining to these distinct ordinances, it is too much presumption for any creature to attempt doing it. Both magistrate and minister are, in their different and distinct spheres, clothed with an equal authority from the law of God,—have subjection and obedience equally, under the same pains, required to them respectively, (as Deut. xvii. 9 to 13; 2 Chron. xix, 5 to 11; Heb. xiii, 17, &c.)—and the qualifications of both, as above, stated and determined with equal peremptoriness, making them no less essential to the being and validity of the one than the other. And this being the case, it is not easy to understand how Seceders will reconcile their principles anent civil government, with their principle and practice, in separating from an established church or ministry, whose constitution they acknowledge to be good; and who being presbyterially ordained, are also still countenanced by the body of the people. Sure, had they dealt fairly, honestly and impartially in the matters of God, they would have acted in this case agreeably to their declared principle, page 79th of their pamphlet, viz.: "The passages holding forth these qualifications and duties of magistrates, do not by the remotest hint imply, that, if in any wise they be deficient in, or make defection from the same, their authority and commands, even in matters lawful, must not be subjected unto and obeyed," &c. Certainly, according to this, all the deficiencies, defections, and mal-administrations in the church, could never have been a warrantable ground (which yet they make the only ground) of their separation from her. "But on the contrary," they should still have continued in communion with her, and subjection to her in matters lawful, in a way of testifying "against the same, and essaying their reformation, by all means that were habile for them." Seceders must either grant, that such was their duty, and so of themselves condemn their separation as unwarrantable; or else deny, that the qualifications of the magistrate and minister are required in the same express terms in scripture; that both are clothed with an equal (though distinct) authority; and that subjection and obedience are under the same pains enjoined to both, and consequently say, that it is less dangerous to cast off, contemn and disregard the authority of a church, than that of the state; while yet (according to their scheme) civil authority is entirely resolved into, and depends purely upon the changeable will of civil society. But, it is presumed, they will allow, that ecclesiastical authority is derived, and flows from, and depends entirely upon the Lord Jesus Christ alone, the glorious Judge, Lawgiver, and King of his church; so that (according to them) this being of a far more noble extract and original, it must be of far more dangerous consequence, to contemn and cast off it, than the other.
Again, as this doctrine gives unto men a negative over the Holy One of Israel, it also opens a wide door for introducing and enforcing the cause of deism, already too prevalent: for, if all who are set up by civil society, however wicked, and void of the qualifications God has required, while they are acknowledged and submitted to by their constituents, must be equally regarded as God's ordinance, with those who have those qualifications; then it will follow, that the corrupt will of wicked men legitimates the magistrate's office and authority, not only without, but in contradiction to the preceptive will of God; and what is this (absit blasphemia), but to exalt man above God, in giving unto the universal Sovereign and Supreme Lawgiver, only a consultative power in the constitution of magistracy, while it ascribes unto man an absolute and definitive power, whereby they have power to receive or reject the law of God (at least respecting magistracy) at pleasure, and their deed of constitution be equally valid, when opposite, as when agreeable unto, and founded upon his righteous law. And sure, by the same reason, that man may take a liberty to dispense with the authority of God, in one point of his commanding will; he may also in another, until at last every part of it is rejected. It is but a contempt of the same authority, and he that offends in one point, is guilty of all. Such are the absurdities that this their scheme leads to, though it is hoped the authors do not intend so. It may here be only necessary further to observe, that among the other desperate shifts Seceders are driven to in defense of their favorite notion, they say, that scriptural qualifications cannot be essential to God's ordinance of magistracy, or necessarily required as a condition of it sine qua non; for then it would be the same thing with magistracy; nor can these qualifications be the condition (sine qua non, or), without which one could not be a magistrate; for then it would be necessary, that every one were possessed of them faultlessly, before he could be owned as a lawful magistrate; either of which they allege would be grossly absurd. But this plausible and fair-set argument of theirs, if it prove any thing, will prove more than it is supposed they themselves will grant, and consequently proves nothing at all. For the same gross absurdity may, with equal reason, be inferred from a maintaining, that a due measure and performance of scripture qualifications and duties are essential to any other of God's ordinances, and so that these are the ordinance itself. For instance, they might as well reason (as some have justly observed already), that scriptural qualifications are not essential to a lawful gospel minister, for then it would be the same thing with the ministry, itself; nor can it be a condition, without which one is not really a minister, unless he were so faultlessly. And thus they have at once stripped, not only all of the race of Adam, that ever exercised that office, but themselves also, of any real mission, as ministers, unless they have assumed the Pope's infallibility, and are advanced to the Moravian perfection. So, although the scripture declares it essential to the true church, that she hold the head, yet by their childish reasoning, this would infer a conclusion big with absurdities, even that this qualification of a true church, is the church itself. And, in like manner, it can no longer be admitted, that faith in Christ, and holiness, are essential to the being of a true Christian; for that would be to make faith the same thing with a Christian, and would infer, that as in heaven only holiness is in perfection, so there alone Christians are to be found. Upon the whole, as the Lord has given an indispensable law, respecting the constitution of kings, showing what conditions and qualifications are required of them; it undeniably follows, as an established truth, that Christianized nations must invest none with that office, but in a way agreeable to that law, and those alone according to scripture, are magistrates of God's institution, who are in some measure possessed of these qualifications. It is therefore an anti-scriptural tenet, that nothing is requisite to constitute a lawful magistrate, but the inclinations and choice of the civil society.
3. The Presbytery testify against this system of principles, because it has a direct tendency to destroy the just and necessary distinction that ought to be maintained between the perceptive and providential will of God, and necessarily jumbles and confounds these together, in such a manner, as a man is left at an utter uncertainty to know when he is accepted and approven of God in his conduct, and when not. That this is the scope of their principles, is confessed, p. 87, of their book of principles: "Nothing needs be added [say they] for the clearing of this, but the overthrow of a distinction that has been made of those who are acknowledged as magistrates by civil society, into such as are so by the preceptive will of God, and such are so by his providential will only; which distinction is altogether groundless and absurd. It will not be refused, that all such preceptive magistrates are also providential. But, moreover, all such providential magistrates are also preceptive. The office and authority of them all, in itself considered, does equally arise from, and agrees to the preceptive will of God." A doctrine most shocking in itself! How strange! that Christians, from any consideration, will obstinately maintain a favorite opinion, which is confessedly built upon, and cannot be established but at the expense of blending and confounding the preceptive and providential will of God, while the distinction thereof is clearly and inviolably established in the word of God! Although divine providence, which is an unsearchable depth, does many times, and, in many cases, serve as a commentary to open up the hidden mysteries of scripture revelation; yet, where the law of God in the scriptures of truth is silent, there providence regulates not, is neither institutive, nor declarative of God's will to be done by us; and where the said divine law does ordain or deliver a rule to us in any case, there providence gives no relaxation, allowance or countermand to the contrary. (See Gee on magistracy, in his excellent discourse on providence.) That an overthrow of this necessary distinction, for the sake of the above dangerous scheme, cannot be admitted of, in a consistency with a due regard to the authority of revealed religion, and that therefore the right and lawfulness of magistracy is not founded upon the providential will of God, though they are countenanced and supported by the majority of a nation, will partly appear from the following considerations:
1. If there is no distinction to be made between the preceptive and providential will of God, then is providence equally in all respects the rule of duty, as much as the precept is, and so man should be left at an utter uncertainty, what is duty, in regard of the opposition that is many times between providential dispensations and the precept. Nay, then it is impossible that man can be guilty of sin, in transgressing the divine will, because God infallibly brings to pass, by his holy and over-ruling providence, whatever he has decreed by his eternal purpose. Rom. ix, 17. And thus the Jews, in murdering the Son of God, should be acquitted from the charge of guilt, and could not be said to transgress the divine will.
2. If no distinction is to be made between the preceptive and providential will of God, but providence is declarative of the precept, then is providence a complete rule without the written word. And this at once supersedes the necessity of divine revelation, and derogates from the sufficiency and perfection of the scriptures of truth. The written word is affirmed to be perfect: Psal. xix, 7. Sinners are reproved for doing that which the word gave no command for, Jer. vii, 31, and xix, 5; and challenged for following the promising appearances: Isa. xxx. 1, 2, 3, 11. It is therefore daring presumption to set up providence for a rule in opposition to the written law of God. Hence it must be concluded, either that the preceptive will of God in the scriptures is imperfect, or the laws therein repealable by providence; or then that providence cannot be the rule of human actions.
3. If the distinction between the preceptive and providential will of God is to be overthrown, then providence must be expressive of God's approbative ordination, equally as his revealed will is. For, without this (viz. the divine approbation), there can be no lawful title to what is possessed. But this is what providence of itself cannot do; it cannot without the precept discover either God's allowance or disallowance. If then this distinction is denied, and the providential will of God asserted to be declarative of his preceptive, and so of his approbative will; it remains to be manifested, where and how it has been appointed of God for such an end, an end that is by the Spirit of God denied unto it: Eccl. ix, 1, 2, 4. If this distinction is to be overthrown, then either the providential will of God, without any regard to the precept, in every case, and in every sort of tenure, gives a just and lawful right and title; or God has declared in his word that it shall be so in the matter of civil government only, viz. that whosoever gains the ascendancy in the inclinations of the people, by whatever sinful methods this is obtained, it matters not, and so is by the hand of providence raised up above all his rivals to the regal dignity, he is the lawful magistrate, God's ordinance according to his precept. The first cannot be said; it were impious to suppose it; for that would justify all robberies and violences, and legitimate every fraud; not the latter, for where is it to be found in all the book of divine revelation, that God hath made such a law touching magistracy? But how big with absurdities, to say, that a holy God has given to man a plain and positive law to be his governing rule in every particular that concerns him, this of magistracy only excepted. In this great ordinance he hath wholly left him to be guided, or rather misled and bewildered by his own corrupt inclinations: but the contrary of this has been in part discovered, and may further. 5. If, in order to establish their anti-government scheme, the foresaid distinction is to be destroyed, and all such as are providential powers, and acknowledged by man, are also preceptive, and therefore to be submitted to for conscience sake, then are the kingdoms of men necessarily obliged to own and submit unto the dominion of the devil. The devil not only claims to himself the possession of the power of all the kingdoms of this world, but it is certain that of the most of them he still retains an actual predominancy, hence styled the god of this world. Now, it cannot be refused, but that the power he exercises is providential (or a power of permission); and it is most certain, that it is with the consent and good will of all the children of men, while in a natural state. But are men therefore obliged to acknowledge his authority, or submit to that providential power he maintains over them? If every providential power is also preceptive, the answer must be given in the affirmative. The like may be said of the Pope of Rome, the devil's captain-general, to display his hellish banner against the King of kings, and Lord of lords, with respect to those nations where he is acknowledged in his diabolical pretensions. It can be to no purpose for Seceders to allege that the Pope claims a power unlawful in itself, and therefore cannot be owned, in regard the person whom they make a pretended acknowledgment of, as their lawful sovereign, is by the act of his constitution invested with a similar power, a power both civil and ecclesiastical, and declared to be head of the church, as well as the state. Nothing, therefore, remains for them, but either to acknowledge this clear distinction between the providential and preceptive will of God, or then profess the lawfulness of both the above mentioned powers. 6. If the foresaid distinction is too big with absurdities to be received, and if the authority of all providential magistrates does equally arise from, and agree unto the precept, then it would be no sin to resist the powers ordained of God, provided that providence proves auspicious and favorable to the rebel, and advances him to the throne, with the good will of his fellow rebellious subjects, by expelling the lawful sovereign; at least such resistance could not be determined to be sinful, until once the event declared, whether providence would countenance the treasonable attempt or not. Thus what the apostle declares a damnable sin, Rom. xiii, 2, must be justified and made the foundation of subsequent duty, if patronized by a multitude. This they evidently maintain, as appears from their declaration of principles, page 82, where, pretending to obviate some difficulties anent their principles, arising from the people of God's disowning anti-scriptural magistrates: "The whole nature of any simple revolt [say they] lies in breaking off immediately from the civil body, by withdrawing from, or withdrawing part of their territories; and then it necessarily follows at the same time, that these revolters break off from the head of the civil body, without ever denying his authority over the members who still cleave unto the same." This, in connection with their grand foundation principle, and the scope of their discourse at the above citation, discovers that they grant, that if the whole civil society should reject the authority they had set up (however agreeable it should have been to the preceptive will of God, and should again set up another, though never so opposite thereto), their doing so would be lawful; but it is not lawful for a few to disown any authority (however wicked and anti-scriptural), unless they can at the same time withdraw from, or withdraw part of his territories. Nothing can be more absurd than to say, that a people are bound by the laws of God to give subjection for conscience sake, and yet at the same time are at liberty to cast off and reject the same authority at pleasure. If the magistrate be lawful, it is utterly unlawful to reject him; an attempt to divest him of his office, power and authority, though carried on by the primores regni, is rebellion against God. It is most ridiculous to allege, that a people considered as a body politic, are not under the same obligation to their rightful sovereign, as when they are considered as individuals, but may lawfully reject him, and set up another, if they please; so that he who one day is God's minister, next day hath no title to that office, but if he claim it, must be treated as a traitor, whereby all security that can possibly be given to the most lawful magistrate, is at once destroyed. Thus, if the Chevalier had succeeded in his late attempt, had gained the favor of the primores regni, and thereby mounted the British throne; Seceders must then, of necessity, either have quit their present principles, or then have subjected to his yoke for conscience sake, under the pain of eternal damnation. His being a professed Papist, and enslaved vassal of Rome, could not have warranted them to leave their place of subjection to him while owned by the civil society, and so they must have treated the present powers as usurpers and enemies to government, though they now flatter them with the pretensions of an ill-grounded loyalty. Again, how absurd and self contradictory to grant, that a minor part may not only revolt, but also withdraw part of a prince's territories; and yet that the same party may not, when residing in the nation, refuse to acknowledge the lawfulness of an anti-scriptural power. This is to say, that people are no longer obliged to submit to authority, than they are in capacity to withdraw from, or withdraw part of their prince's territories from him, and so to justify their rebellion, by that which can only be a terrible aggravation of their sin. These, with a number of other absurdities, natively flow from a denial of the distinction between the providential and preceptive will of God, making the title of the lawful magistrate depend solely upon the will of the people. Nothing is more evident than this, that if the inclinations of the people, exclusive of all other qualifications, constitute a lawful magistrate, then (though he rules ever so agreeable to God's preceptive will), so soon as this body (though in a most unjust and tyrannical manner) casts him off, he that moment for ever loses all title and claim to the office, and can no longer be regarded as a lawful magistrate. A principle that in its nature and tendency is introductive of all anarchy and confusion, and with the greatest propriety deserves the encomium of the anti-government scheme.
7. This anarchical system of principles, which destroys the above just and necessary distinction, is directly in opposition to the laudable and almost universal practice of all nations, in ordaining and enacting certain fundamental laws, constitutions and provisos, whereby the throne is fenced, the way to it limited, and the property thereof predisposed. The Scripture sufficiently discovers those restrictions and rules, which God himself has prescribed and laid down, for directing and determining of his people's procedure about the erection of magistrates. And profane history abounds in discovering certain fundamental laws and conditions to take place, almost in every nation, without conforming to which, none can be admitted to that dignity over them. But to what purpose are any such laws and constitutions, if this vague principle is once admitted, which cancels and disannuls all such provisos and acts? Why should Moses have been so solicitous about his successor in the government of Israel, Numb. xxvii, 15-17, if God had ordained the inclinations of the people alone should determine? Or to what purpose did Israel, after the death of Joshua, ask of God, who should be their leader, if their own inclinations alone were sufficient to determine it? If God has declared, that the corrupt will of the people is the alone basis of civil power, then, not only are all state constitutions and fundamental laws useless, because, on every vacancy of the throne, they not only must all give place to the superior obligation, the incontrollable law, of the uncertain inclinations of the body politic, but they are in their nature unlawful; their proper use in every nation being to prevent all invasion upon the government by unqualified persons, and to illegitimate it, if at any time done. So that, if the consent of civil society is the only essential condition of government which God has authorized, not only are all scriptural conditions and qualifications useless and unlawful, but also all human securities, either from intruders or for lawful governors, are unlawful, in regard the very design of them all is to oppose this grand foundation principle, the jure-divinity of which Seceders have found out, and do confidently maintain. And thus, by the seceding scheme, is condemned, not only the practice of almost all other nations, determining by law, some indispensable qualifications that their rulers must have; but particularly the practice of these once reformed lands, when reformation had the sanction, not only of ecclesiastic, but also of civil, authority, is hereby condemned. Scripture and covenant qualifications were then made essential to the being of a lawful magistrate, by the fundamental laws and constitutions of the nations; so that however the inclinations of the people might run (as it soon appeared they were turned in opposition to these), yet, by these laws, and in a consistency with that constitution, none could be admitted to the place or places of civil authority, but such as professed, and outwardly practiced, according to reformation principles. See Act 15th, Sess. 2d, Parl. 1649. And how happy we had been, if we had constantly acted in conformity to these agreeable laws, experience, both former and latter, will bear witness. How much better had it been for us to have walked in God's statutes, and executed his judgments, than by our abhorrence of them, and apostasy from them, to provoke him to give us statutes that are not good, and judgments whereby we cannot live (Ezek. xx, 25), or have any comfortable enjoyment and possession of the blessings and privileges of his everlasting gospel, as it is with us at this day. And yet, this is what Seceders would have us caressing, embracing and (with them) blessing God for, under the notion of a present good; and so bless God for permitting his enemies (in anger against an ungrateful and guilty people) to overturn his work and interest, and establish themselves upon the ruins thereof; to bless him for making our own iniquities to correct us, and our backslidings to reprove us, until we know what an evil and bitter thing it is to depart from the LORD GOD of our fathers; to bless him (for what is matter of lamentation) that the adversaries of Zion are the chief, and her enemies prosper, Lam. i, 5: and all this abstractly, under the notion, of good, which comes very near the borders of blasphemy.
But, moreover, the civil settlement at the revolution is also condemned by this principle of theirs; not because of its opposition to a covenanted reformation, but in regard it includes some essential qualifications required in the supreme civil ruler. The nations are, by that deed of constitution, bound up in their election of a magistrate; and all Papists, such as marry with Papists, or do not publicly profess the Protestant religion, are declared incapable of the throne. So that we see the present law makes some other qualifications, besides the consent of the body politic, essential to the constitution of a lawful sovereign in Britain. From all which it is plain, that this principle of Seceders is neither a reformation nor a revolution principle; let then the impartial world judge whence it came.
Seceders, in consequence of their contradictory and self-inconsistent system of principles, declare they cannot swear allegiance to a lawful government. They maintain the present to be lawful, yet (in Dec. of their principles, page 55th) they say, "The question is not whether it be lawful for us to swear the present allegiance to the civil government, which the Presbytery acknowledge they cannot do, seeing there are no oaths to the government in being, but what exclude the oath of our covenants, and homologate the united constitution." But seeing they acknowledge that every constitution of government, that comprehends the will and consent of civil society, were it as wicked and diabolical as can be imagined, is lawful—yea, as lawful as any that is most consonant to the preceptive will of God, having all the essentials of his ordinance; and seeing, because of the will and consent of the people, they own the present to be lawful, it is most surprising why they cannot swear allegiance to it; their reasons cannot, in a consistency with their principle, be sustained as valid. That the present oaths of allegiance and the oath of the covenants are inconsistent, is readily granted; but seeing the oaths of allegiance bind to nothing more than what they confess they are bound to for conscience sake, namely, to own the lawfulness of the government, and to maintain it according to the constitution thereof (which is a duty owed by subjects to every lawful sovereign); and seeing that whatever is in the oaths of allegiance contrary to the covenants, does not flow from them, abstractly considered, but from the constitution to which they bind (which constitution is sanctified by the people's acknowledgement of it). If, therefore, the covenants forbid a duty, to which they are bound for conscience sake, their authority in that ought not to be regarded.
But certainly Seceders, who have found it duty to alter and model the covenants, according to the circumstances of the times they live in, might have found it easy work to reconcile the oath of the covenants with allegiance to a lawful government. The other part of their reason is no less ridiculous and self-contradictory, viz., "They cannot swear allegiance to the present government, because it homologates the united constitution." But is not this constitution according to the will, and by consent of, the body politic? and is it not ordained by the providential will of God? therefore, according to them, has all the essentials of a lawful constitution, which claims their protection, under pain of damnation. How great the paradox! they cannot swear allegiance, because they would bind them to acknowledge and defend a lawful constitution. Is not active obedience, is not professed subjection for conscience sake, an homologation of the constitution? Certainly they are, and that not in word only, but in deed and in truth. And what is the allegiance, but a promise to persevere in what they do daily, and what they hold as their indispensable duty to do? To grant the one, then, and refuse the other, is, in effect, to homologate or acknowledge the constitution, and not to acknowledge it, at the same time, which is a glaring absurdity.