This agreement concluded, the regular government came back to Berlin. But then came its turn to negotiate with the trade unions and to attempt to satisfy their new claims.[21] These new engagements secured, the union leaders ordered the end of the general strike and the resumption of work.
Meanwhile in accordance with the “Eight Points” the cabinet of Bauer was formed. The crisis seemed ended on March 24 by the simple replacement of some ministers; but the unions raised difficulties over the new composition of the cabinet. They no longer wanted as Minister of Finance, Kuno, director-general of the Hamburg-American Line; and demanded the resignations of two former ministers, Schlicke and Schiffer, whom they accused of having treated with Kapp and Lüttwitz. After long negotiations, the unions withdrew their opposition to the retention of Schlicke in the Ministry, but kept up their objection against Kuno and Schiffer. These two, therefore, gave up their attempt to enter or to remain in the ministry; but the Democrats took the part of Schiffer and the whole cabinet was compelled to resign. It was replaced with the consent of the unions by the ministry organized by Hermann Müller.
Meanwhile work far from being resumed, a new kind of civil war developed in the Ruhr. On the one hand armed workers, who had first organized to fight against Kapp and Lüttwitz, remained united and under arms for fear that even after the conclusion of the coup d’état of Kapp and Lüttwitz, there would remain under another mantle a disguised military dictatorship. On the other hand, troops of the Reichswehr, some of whom were accused by the workers of having the support of the counter-revolutionary government and whose powers seemed to be unlimited, alarmed the labouring population. On March 21, there was held at Bielefeld a conference in which met members of the constitutional government, delegates of the parties of the majority, and representatives of the Independents and of Labour organizations. An “armistice” was at first concluded, then an accord was achieved—known in Germany as the “Bielefeld Agreement”—in which to the “Eight Points” of Berlin was added a “Ninth.” This would, at least it was so hoped, bring about the dissolution of the revolutionary organizations and the re-establishment of the regular administrative authorities.[22]
In spite of this agreement, however, fighting continued and on April 6 the unions, to whom the two socialist parties rallied, addressed another ultimatum to the government. But it was precisely the moment at which Franco-Belgian troops occupied German cities on the right bank of the Rhine and attention was thereafter diverted entirely to foreign politics.
Such are the facts. The parties of the coalition have attempted to justify them and to prove that the imperative injunctions addressed by the unions to a government which had to yield almost at every point did not constitute a violation of the constitutional principle of national sovereignty. They pointed out that the first of the “Eight Points” recognizes expressly the rights of national representation; that the decisive influence accorded to the unions in matters of social and economic legislation had to be exercised through the intermediacy of representatives speaking for the unions in the ministries charged with the preparation of law; and that the last word belonged, therefore, always to the popular representation; that, although it is true that the unions protested against the nomination or the retention of Kuno and Schiffer in the ministry, yet in reality the cabinet of Hermann Müller had been constituted according to the customary forms after an accord with the parties of the majority.
Other members of the governmental parties, on the contrary, pleaded extenuating circumstances. The Minister of Post and Telegraph, Giesbert, after having participated in the “Bielefeld Agreement,” declared that he did not want to examine whether this accord was contrary to or in conformity with the Constitution; for, “extraordinary epochs and extraordinary circumstances compel extraordinary measures. The conviction of those who participated in the conference (of Bielefeld) is that this agreement was the only possibility of avoiding chaos and devastation in the territory of the Ruhr.”[23]
But the opposition parties unanimously insisted that the Government’s attitude was really contrary to the principle of national sovereignty. In a democracy only the parliament elected by the whole people should decide; only it could appoint the Government and it was responsible for its decisions and nominations only to the people of the nation themselves. As for vocational associations, their function is to defend only the corporate interests of their members and they had no right to encroach on the political domain. In the events of March-April, 1920, the unions, leaving their vocational domain, revealed themselves the real masters of Parliament and of the Cabinet, which had to submit to their injunctions. The Independents congratulated themselves and proclaimed that thereafter the Government was placed under a certain surveillance of the organized proletariat. The parties of the Right indignantly refused to acknowledge a “side government” (Nebenregierung) over the regular government. “Henceforth,” said one of the opposition journals, “workingmen’s organizations can say that their orders are always carried out. It is true that the Democrats seem troubled by the state of affairs. But what difference does that make? There are only three parties that govern Germany—workingmen, employés, and civil servants.”[24]
These statements are undoubtedly exaggerations in two respects. One fact meanwhile must be noted of importance here. While the government was discussing with the unions the formation of the ministry the newspapers printed vehement protests from vocational associations and from other labour unions and groups of clerks and civil servants, which demanded that they, too, be allowed to participate in the negotiations. For they did not understand why the labour unions should alone have the privilege of participating, for example, in the choice of Ministers—and it is impossible from the democratic point of view to deny the force of their position.
Without deducing from these facts any premature conclusions one may ask if the supporters of an Economic Parliament are not right in saying that formal democracy no longer is able to meet the actual needs of the people.