(3) The power to issue ordinances. In Germany there is no organ that has general authority to make all ordinances. A particular organ can only prescribe ordinances within its own limits and to the end assigned to it by the Constitution or ordinary laws. We have seen that such is the case for the President; and such is also the case for the Cabinet. The Cabinet of the Reich may prescribe regulations of three kinds:
(a) Sometimes the Cabinet of the Reich has authority to prescribe only a regulation. This is particularly the case when it has to prescribe administrative measures of the general character necessary for the execution of a law. ([Article 77].)
(b) Sometimes the Cabinet cannot prescribe a regulation except with the approval of the Reichsrat. This is particularly the case in the circumstances aimed at in Articles [88], [91], [77], par. 2 of the Constitution.
(c) Finally, the law of April 17, 1919, “On a simplified form of legislation relative to economy during the period of transition,” gives to the Cabinet of the Reich the power under certain conditions to enact by means of decrees what amount to veritable laws. According to this law, the Cabinet may prescribe regulations having the force of law, and consequently may even modify laws previously made on condition that it has the consent of the Reichsrat and of a committee of twenty-eight members named by the National Assembly. The Ministers finally have powers which they exercise individually. They are in theory purely administrative powers.
(3) The distinction established by the Constitution between the Chancellor and the Ministers recurs in the matter of their political responsibility. Their rôles being different, it is logical that their responsibility operate under different conditions.
The Chancellor and the Ministers are equally responsible before the Reichstag. They “require for the administration of their offices the confidence of the National Assembly. Each of them must resign if the National Assembly by formal resolution withdraws its confidence,” says [Article 54]. To follow the letter of this article it may be believed that there is not a collective responsibility and that only those Ministers must resign against whom a vote of want of confidence is passed. However, that does not seem to be the real meaning of [Article 54]. This becomes more clear when one compares it with [Article 56]. These two articles together indicate the following. The Chancellor and the Ministers are responsible to the Reichstag in the same way, but the provinces of their responsibilities are different. The Chancellor is responsible for the general course of policies, that is to say, for principles and plans of great scope, to the exclusion of administrative measures. On the other hand, the Ministers are responsible not for the general course of policies but for the manner in which they direct their departments. In addition the political responsibility of all the Ministers is involved in decisions taken by them in the Council.
As for criminal and civil responsibility the Chancellor and the Minister are placed on the same footing, and are answerable for criminal and civil offences under the same conditions as the President of the Reich.
2.—THE WORKING OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULES; HOW A MINISTRY IS FORMED, WORKS, AND IS DISSOLVED.
It is observed that the Constitution has attempted a kind of codification of rules for a parliamentary régime, such as its authors have conceived it. It attempts to give thus a guarantee that this régime, new in Germany, will develop along the fixed course it has traced for it. It is interesting to inquire how up to now German statesmen have observed these rules. To this end it seems that the best thing to do is to describe how a Ministry actually is formed, works and is dissolved.