Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a Will larger then my Understanding: for seeing the Will Consists in one thing only, and as it were in an Indivisible (viz. to Will, or not to Will) it seems contrary to its nature that it should be less then ’tis; and certainly by how much the Greater it is, so much the more Thankful I ought to be to him; that Gave it me.
Neither can I Complain that God concurrs with me in the Production of those Voluntary Actions or Judgements in which I am deceived: for those Acts as they depend on God are altogether True and Good; and I am in some measure more perfect in that I can so Act, then if I could not: for that Privation, in which the Ratio Formalis of Falshood and Sin consists, wants not the Concourse of God; For it is not A Thing, and having respect to him as its Cause, ought not to be called Privation, but Negation; for certainly ’tis no Imperfection in God, that he has given me a freedome of Assenting or not Assenting to some things, the clear and distinct Knowledge whereof he has not Imparted to my Understanding; but certainly ’tis an Imperfection in me, that I abuse this liberty, and pass my Judgement on those things which I do not Rightly Understand.
Yet I see that ’tis Possible with God to effect that (tho I should remain Free, and of a Finite Knowledge) I should never Err, that is, if he had endowed my Understanding with a clear and distinct Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an Occasion of deliberating; or if he had only so firmly fix’d in my Mind, that I should never forget, this, That I must never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand; Either of which things had God done, I easily perceive that I (as consider’d in my self) should be more perfect then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there may be a greater perfection in the whole Universe of Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxious to Errors, and some not, then if they were all alike. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I should Act on the Stage of this World a Part not the chief and most perfect of all; Or that I should not be able to abstain from Error in the first way above specifi’d, which depends upon the Evident Knowledge of those things whereof I deliberate; Yet that I may abstain from Error by the other means abovemention’d, which depends only on this, That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident. For tho I have experienced in my self this Infirmity, that I cannot always be intent upon one and the same Knowledge, yet I may by a continued and often repeated Meditation bring this to pass, that as often as I have use of this Rule I may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an habit of not erring.
In which thing seeing, the greatest and chief perfection of Man consists, I repute my self to have gain’d much by this days Meditation, for that therein I have discover’d the Cause of Error, and Falshood; which certainly can be no other then what I have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, I bridle my Will so that it extend it self only to those things which I clearly and distinctly perceive, it is impossible that I can Err. For doubtless All clear and distinct Perception is something, and therefore cannot proceed from Nothing, but must necessarily have God for its Author (God, I say, Who is infinitely Perfect, and who cannot Deceive) and therefore it Must be True.
Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must beware off that I be not deceived, but also what I must Do to Discover Truth, for That I shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things only, which I perfectly understand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but confusedly and obscurely; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour.
Meditat. V.
Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.
There are yet remaining many Things concerning Gods Attributes, and many things concerning the nature of my self or of my Mind, which ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite (feeling I have discover’d what I must avoid, and what I must Do for the Attaining of Truth) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.
But before I enquire whether there be any such things Really Existent without Me, I ought to consider the Ideas of those things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are Distinct, which confused.
In which search I find that I distinctly imagine Quantity, that which Philosophers commonly call continued, that is to say, the Extension of that Quantity or thing continued into Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I can count in it divers Parts, to which parts I can assign Bigness, Figure, Position, and Local Motion, to which Local Motion I can assign Duration. Neither are only these Generals plainly discover’d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerable particulars concerning the Shapes, Number, and Motion of These Bodies; The Truth whereof is so evident, and agreeable to my Nature, that when I first discover’d them, I seemed not so much to have Learnt any thing that is new, as to have only remembred what I have known before, or only to have thought on those things which were in me before, tho this be the first time that I have examin’d them so diligently.
One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable Ideas of certain things, which tho perhaps they exist no where without Me, yet they cannot Be said to be Nothing; and tho they are Thought upon by me at my will and pleasure, yet they are not made by Me, but have their own True and Immutable Natures. As when, for example, [*] I Imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure Exists no where out of my Thoughts, nor ever will Exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is Immutable and Eternal, which is neither made by me, nor depends on my mind, as appears for that many properties may be demonstrated of this Triangle, viz. That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now clearly know whether I will or not, tho before I never thought on them, when I imagine a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this Idea of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of sense, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a Triangular Shape; for I can think of Innumerable other Figures, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my senses, and yet I can Demonstrate various properties of them, as well as of a Triangle, which certainly are all true, seeing I know them clearly, and therefore they are something, and not a meer Nothing, for ’tis Evident that what is true is something.