outlines and suggestive comments.
Even deserved punishment to the righteous does not seem good when designed to chasten the willing with a view to holiness. “Even.” This seems to have been treated as a word de trop. King James’ men made it also; as though Solomon grew tired of sameness, and broke the monotone by a new opening vocable. But with the above rendering it takes its usual sense. “Righteous.” This word and “punishment” bear the weight of the word “even.” Even the righteous, who ought to know better; and “even punishment,” which the righteous, at last, ought to be willing to bear.—Miller.
Often is the wise man’s meaning much beyond his words. To punish the just not only is not good, but it is “the abomination” (verse 15)—“an evident token of perdition” (Philip. i. 28). If rulers are “a terror to good works,” they are ministers of God in authority, but ministers of Satan in administration. And how will such injustice “abide the day of His coming,” when He shall “lay judgment to the line, and righteousness to the plummet!”—Bridges.
The word prince signifies noble, and is differently understood. It may be applied to the nobility of station, or to that of mind. Some give preference to the latter; and by interpreting it of the noble-minded, and the “just” in the former clause, of the righteous or the people of God, make the two clauses thus to correspond, and to have much the same import. It seems, however, both more natural and more comprehensive to consider two ideas to be expressed; the one relating to the duty of the ruler, and the other to that of the ruled. It is the incumbent duty of the ruler, on the one part, to administer justice with strict impartiality. It is the duty, on the other part, of subjects to countenance, encourage, and support the ruler in the equitable administration of his trust. To “strike” is evidently to be understood, not literally alone of actual striking, but of “smiting with the tongue” as well as with the fist or the rod,—of all kinds of vituperation and abuse, and attempts to bring the throne into disrepute and odium, and unsettle its stability, by shaking the confidence and attachment of the community. There are many occasions in which a man may be tempted to this. He may, in particular cases, have his mind biassed by pride, by self-interest, by partiality towards a friend, by political predilections; so that even when all has been done with impartial investigation, and the judgment pronounced according to legitimate rules of evidence and demands of equity, there may be unfair, unreasonable and angry dissatisfaction; and the prince may be smitten for justice. Every man ought to be on his guard against this. The higher the responsibility,—the more burdensome and difficult the trust,—and the more serious the results of bringing authorities and the laws into disesteem, and unsettling public confidence in them,—ought to be the amount of our reluctant caution in pronouncing censure. Another remark may be ventured. One of the great difficulties with which governments of great nations have to contend, arises from the variety of crossing and contending interests with which they have to deal. How anxious soever they may honestly be, to allow no undue bias to draw them from the line of impartial justice, yet there is hardly a measure they can adopt that does not affect differently different classes of the community; so that, from their various predisposing circumstances, that shall appear to one class—to those in one particular department of trade or commerce—the very essence of injustice, which by another is lauded as a most unexceptionable exemplification of impartial equity. This ought surely to have the effect—I do not by any means say of forbidding the most vigilant observance and the freest and most searching scrutiny and discussion of every measure, and the exposure of its evil or questionable character and tendency—but assuredly of procuring some allowance for the difficulty of the task of pleasing all parties, and some moderation in the tone of censure even where to us the grounds for it are clear and palpable. No man who knows himself will affirm, in almost any case, that, placed, in other circumstances, he might not see with other eyes. I speak in general. There are cases in which the interests of a suffering country are, to a vast extent, involved, in which it becomes every man’s paramount duty to speak out and to speak plainly, and to make the ears of the rulers to tingle with the outcry of humanity and justice. I would further apply the spirit of this verse to the case of arbitrators. We have ourselves, it may be, consented to submit a litigated point to arbitration. We do so with a full persuasion of our being in the right—of our claim being the just one. But the arbiters unite in giving it against us. It would be most unreasonable on our part to retain a grudge, especially at the one appointed by ourselves, on this account. Our reference implied confidence in his impartiality and honour, and implied a pledge of cheerful acquiescence. To grumble, to censure, and to withdraw our friendship, would be indeed to “strike him for equity.” He would have proved himself unworthy of his trust, if his disposition to please and serve us had been too strong for principle, conscience, and oath. There is one government, in which “the just” are never “punished”—all whose laws and all whose sanctions are the perfection of equity. But alas! it is under that very government that the spirit expressed by the phrase “striking princes for equity” is most fearfully manifested. All the murmurings of sinners against either the law of God or its revealed and threatened penalty, are the very essence, in its deepest malignity, of this spirit.—Wardlaw.
Righteous men are princes in all lands (Psa. xlv. 16); yea, they are kings in righteousness as Melchisedec. Indeed they are somewhat obscure kings as he was, but kings they appear to be, by comparing Matt. xiii. 17 with Luke x. 24; “many righteous,” saith Matthew, “many kings,” saith Luke. Now, to strike a king is high treason; and although princes have put up blows, as when one struck our Henry VI., he only said, “Forsooth, you do wrong yourself more than me, to strike the Lord’s anointed.”—Trapp.
main homiletics of verses 27, 28.
Two Badges of a Wise Man.
I. Reticence of speech. This subject has been dwelt on before. See on chap. [x. 19–21]. The verses before us suggest further that a man who is sparing of words is not necessarily a man of abundant wisdom, for even a fool may hold his peace sometimes. Solomon elsewhere tells us that “a fool uttereth all his mind” (Prov. xxix. 11); but the fool of this text is not so foolish as to do that. It has been remarked that “by silence a fool abates something of his senselessness, and since he gets the opportunity to collect himself and to reflect, a beginning of wisdom is developed in him” (Von Gerlach). It argues some amount of wisdom in a man if he is silent when he has nothing to say which is worth the saying. But the false conclusion must not be drawn, that every man who is not given to much speech is a man of great understanding and of vast mental resources. It is much better that the stone should remain upon the mouth of a well of impure water, but it must not be taken for granted, because the well is kept closed, that there is a supply of life-giving water within.
II. Calmness of temper. It is a mark of wisdom to strive after a “cool” (excellent) “spirit.” 1. It makes life more pleasant. A man who allows himself to be vexed and irritated by all the annoyances of every-day life has no enjoyment of his existence. A fretful and hasty temper makes every bitter draught more bitter, and takes the sweetness out of the cup that would otherwise be a pleasant one. 2. It makes a man more respected and more useful. A man who cannot curb his temper is a despicable object, and will certainly be despised. A passionate man may be pitied and excused, but he cannot be respected. Hence he cannot have much influence for good upon others. This subject also has been treated before. See Homiletics on chap. [xiv. 17] and [29], pages 363 and 386.
outlines and suggestive comments.