History of the Nineteenth Army Corps

by Richard B. Irwin

There were no roads along the front or rear of the investing army, and the only means by which communication was maintained between the left, the centre, and the right was either by wide detours or through dense and unknown woods and thickets. It was impossible to see the troops in front or rear or on either flank. On no part of the line was either division in sight of the other.

The forest approached within 250 yards at the nearest point on Weitzel's front, within 450 yards on Grover's, within 500 yards on Augur's, and within 1,200 yards on Sherman's front. The field to be passed over was partly the cleared land of the plantations, crossed by fences and hedges, but in many places, especially on Augur's approach, the timber had been recently felled, and, lying thick upon the ground, made a truly formidable obstacle.

The morning of the 27th of May broke bright and beautiful. As the early twilight began to open out along the entire front the artillery began a furious cannonade. At first the Confederate guns replied with spirit, but it soon became apparent that they were overweighted, and, moreover, the necessity of husbanding their scanty store of ammunition no doubt impressed itself upon the minds of the Confederate commanders.

About six o'clock, when Weitzel judged that the movement on the left must be well advanced, he put his columns in motion through the dense forest in his front, forming his command, as far as the nature of the ground admitted, in column of brigades, Dwight's brigade under Van Zandt leading, followed by Weitzel's brigade under Thomas. Paine formed his division in two lines in support, his own brigade under Fearing in front, and Gooding's in reserve. The Confederate skirmishers and outposts continued to occupy the forest and the ravines on this part of their front, and the first hour was spent in pressing them back behind their entrenchments. Then Thomas moved forward through Van Zandt's intervals, and deploying from right to left the 160th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Van Petter; 8th Vermont, Lieutenant-Colonel Dillingham; 12th Connecticut, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck; and 75th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock, advanced to the attack. Van Zandt, owing to the inequalities of the ground and the difficulty of finding the way, drifted somewhat toward the right. Thereupon Paine, finding his front uncovered, moved forward into the interval. Then began what has been aptly termed a "huge bushwack."

Until within three days a part of the Confederate lines in front of Weitzel had not been fortified at all, the defence resting on the great natural difficulties of the approaches no less than of the ground to be held; but in the interval Gardner had taken notice of the indications that pointed to an advance in this quarter, and had caused light breastworks to be constructed in all haste. This the great trees that covered the hill rendered an easy task. On the morning of the 27th of May, therefore, the works that Weitzel was called upon to attack consisted mainly of big logs on the crest and following the contour of the hill, rendered almost unapproachable by the felled timber that choked the ravines. Thus, while Weitzel's men could not even see their enemy, they were themselves unable to move beyond the cover of the hollows and the timber without offering an easy mark for a destructive fire of small-arms, as well as of grape, shell, shrapnel, and canister. When finally, after climbing over hills, logs, and fallen trees, and forcing the ravines filled with tangled brush and branches, Weitzel had driven the Confederates into their works, he held the ridge about two hundred yards distant from the position to be attacked.

Paine's position at this time was to the right and rear of battery No. 6, as shown on the map; Weitzel and Dwight were on the same crest near batteries 3, 4, and 5. The pioneers worked like beavers to open the roads as fast as the infantry advanced, and with such skill and zeal that hardly had the infantry formed upon the crest than the guns of Duryea, Bainbridge, Nims, Haley, and Carruth unlimbered and opened fire by their side.

At length Thomas succeeded in making his way across the rivulet known as Little Sandy Creek, and, working gradually forward, began to fortify with logs the hill on the right, afterward known as Fort Babcock, in honor of the Lieutenant-Colonel of the 75th New York.

To support Weitzel's movement, Grover sent the 159th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Burt, and the 25th Connecticut by a wide detour to the right to make their way in on Paine's left. Taking advantage of the protection afforded by the ravine, at the bottom of which ran or rather trickled Sandy Creek, these regiments, after the most difficult and exhausting scramble through the brush and over the fallen timber, came to the base of a steep bluff, near the position afterward occupied by siege battery No. 6. This, although the works directly opposite were as yet light, was naturally one of the ugliest approaches on the whole front. In spite of every exertion, it took the 159th an hour to move half a mile. Just before reaching the foot of the hill over which they were to charge, they captured a Confederate captain and six skirmishers, who lay concealed in the ravine, cut off by the advance and unable to retire. So crooked and obscure was the path and so difficult was it to see any thing, even a few feet ahead, that the officers had to stand at every little turning to tell the men which way to go. At last the regiment formed, and, with a rush, began the assault of the bluff, but they could get no farther than the crest, where they were met by a destructive flank fire from the Confederate riflemen. There, within thirty yards of the works, the men sought shelter.

To try the effect of a diversion, Grover put in the 12th Maine, supported by the remaining fragment of his division, reduced to the 13th and 25th Connecticut, against the partly exposed west face of the bastion that formed the left of the finished portion of the Confederate earthworks. The point of attack is shown at X. and XI., and the position whence Grover moved at 1 and 7.

After the first attack on the right had wellnigh spent itself, and when its renewal, in conjunction with an advance on the centre and left, was momentarily expected, Dwight thought to create a diversion and at the same time to develop the strength and position of the Confederates toward their extreme left, where their lines bent back to rest on the river, and to this end he ordered Nelson to put in his two colored regiments. This portion of the Confederate line occupied the nearly level crest of a steep bluff that completely dominates the low ground by the sugar-house, where the telegraph road crosses Foster's Creek. Over this ground the colored troops had to advance unsupported to receive their first fire. The bridge had been burned when the Confederates retired to their works. Directly in front of the crest, and somewhat below it, a rugged bluff stands a little apart, projecting boldly from the main height with a sharp return to the right, so as to form a natural outwork of great strength, practically inaccessible save by the road that winds along the bottom of the little rivulet at the foot of the almost perpendicular flank. This detached ridge is about four hundred yards in length. It was held by six companies of the 39th Mississippi regiment, under Colonel W. B. Shelby, while behind, in the positions of land batteries III. and IV., were planted six field pieces, and still farther back on the water front the columbiads of Whitfield and Seawell, mounted on traversing carriages, stood ready to rake the road with their 8-inch and 10-inch shell and shrapnel.