On the morning of the 6th of October Sheridan faced about and began moving down the valley, the infantry leading in the inverse order of its advance, and the cavalry bringing up the rear in one long line that reached from mountain to mountain, busied in burning as it marched the mills, the barns, and everything edible by man or beast. From the Blue Ridge to the Shenandoah Mountains, nothing was spared that might be of use to the Confederates in prolonging the war.
When Early discovered this he followed on the morning of the 7th of October, with his whole force, including Kershaw, as well as the cavalry brigade of Rosser, sent by Lee from Petersburg. The command of all the cavalry being given to Rosser, he at once began treading on the heels of Torbert. On the 9th, at Tom's Brook, Torbert, under the energetic orders of Sheridan to whip the Confederate cavalry or get whipped himself, turned on Rosser, and, after a sharp fight, completely overwhelmed him and hotly pursued his flying columns more than twenty miles up the valley. Several hundred prisoners, eleven guns with their caissons, and many wagons —tersely described by Sheridan "as almost everything on wheels"—fell into the hands of the captors. But more important even than these trophies, confidence in Rosser's cavalry was destroyed at a blow, and its early prestige wiped out forever.
On the 10th of October Sheridan once more crossed Cedar Creek and went into camp, Emory holding the right or west of the valley road, Crook on the left or east of the road, and the cavalry covering the flanks. Wright took up the line of march by Front Royal on Washington.
The first intention of the government was that he should take advantage of the Manassas Gap railway, which was again being restored under the protection of Augur's troops; but this work was not yet completed, and while Wright waited at Front Royal, Grant once more fell back on his first and favorite plan of a movement on Charlottesville and Gordonsville. To effect this he wished Sheridan to take up an advanced position toward the head of the valley, and to this the government added its favorite notion of rebuilding the railways in the rear. Halleck even went so far as to instruct Sheridan to fortify and provision heavily the position Grant had directed him to occupy. All these ideas Sheridan combated with such earnestness that he was summoned to Washington for consultation. Grant at the same time reduced his call on Sheridan for troops for service on the James to the Sixth Corps, and Sheridan, having on his own motion stopped the work on the Manassas Gap railway, ordered Wright to march on Alexandria by Ashby's Gap. Wright set out on the 12th.
Sheridan having lost touch with the main body of the Confederates in returning down the valley, he, in common with Grant and with the government, now thought that Early had quitted the region for good. Sheridan's information placed Early variously at Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and in the neighborhood of Brown's Gap; but in truth, though nothing had been seen of Early's troops for some days, they had never gone out of the valley, but had slowly and at a long and safe interval been following Sheridan's footsteps, so that on the 13th, while Wright was well on his way towards Alexandria, and Sheridan himself was getting ready to go to Washington, Early once more took post at Fisher's Hill, and sent his advance guard directly on to Hupp's Hill to look down into the Union camps on the farther bank of Cedar Creek and see what was going on there. The first news of Early's presence, within two miles of the Union camp, at the very moment when he was thought to be sixty miles away on the line of the Virginia Central railway, was brought by the shells his artillery suddenly dropped among the tents of Crook. Thoburn at once moved out to capture the battery whose missiles had presented themselves as uninvited guests at his dinner-table, but was met by Kershaw and driven back after a sharp fight. Custer, who was covering the right flank of the army, was assailed at the same time by the Confederate cavalry, but easily threw off the attack. At the first sound Torbert sent Merritt from the left to the support of Custer, and afterward Sheridan kept him there.
When on the 12th of October Sheridan received Grant's definite instructions for the movement on Gordonsville and Charlottesville, he ceased to offer any further opposition, yet, realizing that he would need his whole force, he withdrew the order for Wright's movement to Alexandria and sent him word to come back to Cedar Creek. The head of Wright's column was wading the Shenandoah when these orders overtook it. Wright at once faced about, and on the next day, the 14th of October, went into camp behind the lines of Cedar Creek on the right and rear of Emory. No change was made in the positions of the other troops, because, until Sheridan's return from Washington, the policy and plan of the campaign must remain unsettled, and Wright might at any moment be called upon to resume his march.
On the 15th of October Sheridan received formal instructions from Grant, limiting the proposed movement on Charlottesville and Gordonsville to a serious menace, instead of an occupation, and again reducing the call for troops to a single division of cavalry. Sheridan at once sent Merritt in motion toward Chester Gap, directing Powell to follow, and he himself rode with Merritt to Front Royal, meaning to pay his postponed visit to the Secretary of War at Washington; but on the 16th, before quitting Front Royal, he was overtaken by an officer from Wright bringing the words of the strange message read off by our signal officers from the waving flags of the Confederates in plain sight on the crest of Three Top Mountain.(2) This message purported to have been sent by Longstreet to Early. "Be ready," it said, "to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan." The true story of this despatch has not until now been made public,(3) and many are the surmises, clever or stupid, that have been wasted upon the mystery. In fact, the message was, as both Sheridan and Wright naturally inferred, a trick intended to deceive them; Early thought to induce them to move back without waiting for the attack which, with his reduced strength, he wished to avoid. The effect was to put the Union commanders on their guard against what was actually about to happen. Therefore Sheridan instantly turned back all the cavalry save one regiment, which he kept for an escort, and rode on to Rectortown, and so went by rail to Washington—first, however, taking the precaution to warn Wright to strengthen his position, to close in Powell from Front Royal, to look well to the ground, and to be prepared. In his official report of the campaign, Sheridan, speaking of the events now to be related, said:
"This surprise was owing probably to not closing in Powell or that the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Custer were placed at the right of our line, where it had always occurred to me there was but little danger of attack."
But it is important to observe and remember that although Wright, in sending Longstreet's message, had remarked—
"If the enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry he might, by turning my right, give us a great deal of trouble. . . . I shall only fear an attack on my right,"