A Christian Directory, Part 1: Christian Ethics

by Richard Baxter

Rule VI. Where I am in an equal degree uncertain of the duty to be omitted, and of the sin to be committed, it is a greater sin to venture doubtfully upon the committing of a positive sin that is great, (in case it prove a sin,) than upon the omitting a duty which (in case it prove a duty) is less; and on the contrary, it is worse to venture on the omitting of a great duty, than on the committing of a small, positive sin. As, suppose my own or my neighbour's house be on fire, and I am in doubt whether I may take another man's water to quench it against his will; or if my own, or my child's, or neighbour's life be in danger by famine, and I doubt whether I may take another man's apples, or pears, or ears of corn, or his bread, against his will, to save my own life or another's. Really, the thing is already made lawful or unlawful (which I now determine not) by the law of God; but in my unavoidable uncertainty, (if I be equally doubtful on both sides,) it is a far greater sin (if it prove a sin) to omit the saving of the house or life, than to take another man's water, or fruit, or bread, that hath plenty (if this prove the sin). So if king and nobles were in a ship, which would be taken and all destroyed by pirates, unless I told a lie, and said, they are other persons; if I were equally in doubt which course to take, to lie or not, (though sin have more evil than all our lives have good,) yet a sinful omitting to save all their lives is a greater sin than a sinful telling of such a lie. Suppose I am in doubt, whether I may lawfully save an ox, or ass, or a man's life, by labour on the sabbath day? or David had doubted, whether he might eat the consecrated shew-bread in his necessity? it is clear, that the sinful neglect of a man's life is worse than the sinful violation of a sabbath, or the sinful use of the consecrated bread. If I equally doubt, whether I may use a ceremony, or disorderly, defective form of prayer, and whether I should preach the gospel to save men's souls, where there are not others enough to do it; it is clear, that sinfully to use a ceremony, or disorderly form of prayer, is, cæteris paribus, a lesser sin than sinfully to neglect to preach the gospel and to save men's souls. On the other side, suppose I dwelt in Italy, and could not have leave to preach the gospel there, unless I would subscribe to the Trent Confession, or the canon 3d of Concil. Lateran sub Innocent III.; one of which requireth men to swear for transubstantiation, and to interpret the Scriptures only according to the unanimous consent of the fathers (who never unanimously consented in any exposition of the greatest part of the Scriptures at all); the other decreeth the pope's deposing temporal lords, and disobliging their subjects from their allegiance. On the one side, I doubt, whether by subscribing I become not guilty of justifying idolatry, perjury, and rebellion, and making myself guilty of the perjury of many thousand others: on the other side, I doubt, whether I may disobey my superiors who command me this subscription, and may forbear preaching the gospel, when yet I apprehend that there are others to preach it, and that my worth is not so considerable as that there should be any great loss in putting me out and putting in another; and God needeth not me to do him service, but hath instruments at command; and that I know not how soon he may restore my liberty, or that I may serve him in another country, or else in sufferings at home; in such a case the sinful justifying of perjury or rebellion in whole countries is a far greater sin than the sinful omission of my preaching: for he that justifieth perjury destroyeth the bonds of all societies, and turneth loose the subjects against their sovereigns. Or if I, being a minister, were forbidden to preach the gospel where there is necessity, unless I will commit some sin; if I doubt on one side whether I should disobey my superiors, and on the other whether I should forbear my calling, and neglect the souls of sinners; it is a lesser sin, cæteris paribus, to disobey a man sinfully, than to disobey God, and to be cruel to the souls of men to their perdition sinfully. Or if I have made a vow, and sworn that I will cast away a penny or a shilling, and I am in doubt on one side whether I be not bound to keep it as a vow, and on the other whether it be not a sin to keep it, because to cast away any of my talents is a sin; in this case, the sinful casting away of a penny or a shilling is not so great a sin as sinful perjury. If Daniel and the three witnesses had been in equal doubt, whether they should obey the king or pray to God, (as Dan. vi.) and renounce the bowing to his idol, (Dan. iii.) the sinful forbearance of prayer as then commanded, and the sinful bowing to the idol had been a greater sin than a sinful disobeying the king's command in such a case, if they had mistaken.

Rule VII. If I cannot discern whether the duty to be omitted, or the sin to be committed, be materially and in other respects the greater, then that will be to me the greater of the sins which my doubting conscience doth most strongly suspect to be sin, in its most impartial deliberation. For if other things be equal, certainly the sinning against more or less conviction or doubting must make an inequality. As, if I could not discern whether my subscription to the Trent Confession, or my forbearing to preach, or my preaching though prohibited, were the greater sin, in case they were all sinful; but yet I am most strongly suspicious of sinfulness in the subscription, and less suspicious of sinfulness in my forbearing in such a case to preach, and least of all suspicious of sinfulness in my preaching though prohibited: in this case to subscribe sinfully is the greatest sin, and to forbear sinfully to exercise my office is the next, and to preach unwarrantably is the least.

Rule VIII. If I could perceive no difference in the degrees of evil in the omission and the commission, nor yet in the degrees of my suspicion or doubting, then that is the greater sin which I had greater helps and evidence to have known, and did not.

Rule IX. If both greater material evil be on one side than on the other, and greater suspicion or evidence of the sinfulness also, then that must needs be the greater sin.

Rule X. If the greatness of the material evil be on one side, and the greatness of the suspicion and evidence be on the other, then the former (if sin) will be materially and in itself considered the worst; but the latter will be formally the greater disobedience to God. But the comparison will be very difficult. As, suppose that I swear to God that I will cast away a shilling, or that I will forbear to pray for a week together; here I take perjury to be a greater sin than my casting away a shilling, or forbearing to pray a week: but when I question whether the oath should be kept or not, I have greater suspicion that it should not than that it should, because no oath must be the bond of the least iniquity. Here, if the not keeping it prove a sin, I shall do that which is the greater sin in itself if I keep it not; but I shall show more disobedience in keeping it, if it be not to be kept.

Rule XI. If it be a double sin that I suspect on one side, and but a single one on the other, it maketh an inequality in the case. As, suppose that in my father's family there are heretics and drunkards, and I swear that in my place and calling I will endeavour to cast them out. My mother approveth my vow; my father is against it, and dischargeth me of it because I did it not by his advice. On one side, I doubt whether I am bound, or may act against my father's will: on the other side, I as much doubt whether I am not perjured, and disobedient to my mother, if I do it not, and whether I disobey not God, that made it my duty to endeavour the thing in my place and calling before I vowed it.

Rule XII. There is a great deal of difference between omitting the substance of a duty for ever, and the delaying it, or altering the time, and place, and manner. For instance, that which will justify or excuse me for shortening my prayer, or for praying but once a day, or at noon rather than in the morning, or for defect in method, or fervency, or expressions, may not justify or excuse me for denying, renouncing, or long forbearing prayer. And that which may excuse an apostle for not preaching in the temple or synagogues, or not having the emperor's or the high priest's allowance or consent, or for not continuing in one city or country; would not excuse them if they had renounced their callings, or totally, as to all times, and places, and manner of performance, have ceased their work for fear of men.

Rule XIII. If the duty to be omitted and the sin to be committed seem equal in greatness, and our doubt be equal as to both, it is commonly held safer to avoid the commission more studiously than the omission. For which there are many reasons given.

Rule XIV. There is usually much more matter for fear and suspicion, cæteris paribus, of sins to be committed, than of duties to be omitted, when the commission is made necessary to the doing of the duty. Both because it is there that the fear beginneth: for I am certain that the good work is no duty to me, if the act be a sin which is its necessary condition. Therefore, so far as I suspect the act to be sinful, I must needs suspect the duty to be no duty to me at that time: it is not possible I should be rationally more persuaded that the duty is my duty, than that the condition is no sin. If it were the saving of the lives of all men in the country, I could no further take it to be my duty, than I take that to be no sin by which it must be done, it being a thing past controversy, that we must not sin for the accomplishment of any good whatsoever. And also because the sin is supposed to be always sin, but few duties are at all times duties: and the sin is a sin to every man, but the duty may be another man's duty, and not mine. For instance: Charles V. imposeth the Interim upon Germany: some pastors yielded to it; others refused it, and were cast out. Those that yielded pleaded the good of the churches, and the prevention of their utter desolation, but yet confessed that if the thing imposed were sinful, it was not their duty to do it for any good whatsoever, but to seek the good of the church as well as they could without it. The other that were cast out argued, that so far as they were confident the Interim was sinful, they must be confident that nothing was their duty that could not be done without it, and that God knew best what is good for his church, and there is no accomplishing its good by sin and God's displeasure; and that they did not therefore forsake their ministry, but only lose the ruler's licence; for they resolved to preach in one place or other till they were imprisoned, and God can serve himself by their imprisonment or death, as well as by their preaching. And while others took their places that thought the Interim lawful, the churches were not wholly destitute; and if God saw it meet, he could restore their fuller liberties again: in the mean time, to serve him, as all pastors did for three hundred years after Christ, without the licence of the civil magistrate, was not to cast away their office. Another instance: the zealous papists in the reign of Henry III. in France, thought that there was a necessity of entering the League, and warring against the king, because religion was in danger, the preservation whereof is an unquestionable duty. The learned and moderate lawyers that were against them said, that there being no question but the king had the total sovereignty over them, they were sure it was a sin to resist the higher powers, and therefore no preservation of religion could be a duty or lawful to them which must be done by such a certain sin: sin is not the means to save religion or the commonwealth.

Rule XV. When a thing is not prohibited and sinful simply in itself, but because of some accidental or consequential evil that it tendeth to, there a greater accidental or consequential good may preponderate the evil, and make the thing become no sin, but a duty. It is a matter of exceeding difficulty to discern ofttimes whether a thing be simply and absolutely forbidden, or only by accident and alterably, and to discern which accident doth preponderate. There are so many observations that should here be taken in, and so much of a man's life and peace is concerned in it, that it deserveth a treatise by itself. And therefore I shall not meddle with it any further here, lest an insufficient tractate be worse than none, in a case where error is so easy and perilous.