3. Their definition of love is therefore inept, and but from an effect, who say it is, Alicui bene velle, ut ipst bene sit.
4. Love is either merely sensitive and passionate, which is the sensible act and passion of the sensitive and fantastical appetite; or it is rational, which is the act of the rational appetite or will. The first is called sensitive in a double respect; 1. Because it followeth the apprehension of the senses, or fantasy, loving that which they apprehend as good; 2. And because it is exercised passionately and feelingly by the sensitive appetite. And the other is called rational, 1. Because it is the love of that which reason apprehendeth as good; and, 2. Because it is the complacency of that will which is a higher faculty than the sensitive appetite.
5. Sensitive love is oft without rational, (always in brutes,) but rational love is never totally without sensitive, at least in this life; whether it be because that the sensitive and rational are faculties of the same soul, or because they are so nearly connexed as that one cannot here move or act without the other?
6. But yet one is predominant in some persons, and the other in others.
7. Love is the complacency of the appetite in apprehended good. Good is the formal object of love. Sensitive love is the complacency of the sensitive appetite in sensible good (or in that which the sense and imagination apprehendeth as good). Rational love is the complacency of the rational appetite in that which reason apprehendeth good: the same thing with primary volition.
8. Good is not only a man's own felicity and the means thereto, called mihi bonum, good to me; either as profitable, pleasant, or honourable (as some think that have unmanned themselves): but there is extrinsic good, which is such in itself, in others, or for others, which yet is the natural object of man's love (so far as nature is sound). As the learning, and wisdom, and justice, and charity, and all other perfections of a man at the antipodes, whom I never saw, nor hope to see, or to receive any benefit by, is yet amiable to every man that hath not unmanned himself. So also is the good of posterity, of countries, of kingdoms, of the church, of the world, apprehended as future when we are dead and gone; yea, if we should be annihilated, desirable, and therefore amiable to us; when yet it could be no benefit to us.
9. Self-love is sensitive or rational. Sensitive, as such, is necessary and not free; and it is purposely by the most wise and blessed Creator planted in man and brutes, as a principle useful to preserve the world, and to engage the creature in the use of the means of its own preservation, and so to bring it to perfection, and to endue it with those fears and hopes which make us subjects capable of moral government.
10. The rational or higher appetite also hath a natural inclination to self-preservation, perfection, and felicity; but as ordinable and ordinate to higher ends.
11. The rational powers cannot nullify the sensitive, nor directly or totally hinder the action of them; but they may and must indirectly hinder the act, by avoiding the objects and temptations, by diverting the thoughts to higher things, &c.; and may hinder the effects by governing the locomotive power.
12. Sensitive self-love containeth in it, 1. A love of life, and that is, of individual self-existence; 2. And a love of all sensitive pleasures of life; and, 3. Consequently, a love of the means of life and pleasure.