A Christian Directory, Part 1: Christian Ethics

by Richard Baxter

Answ. It is answered already. Moreover, 1. God willed that holiness should be the duty of all men and devils, though he willed not insuperably and absolutely to effect it. 2. The word "without" meaneth either an exclusion or a mere non-inclusion. God willeth not the person excluding the holiness: for he excludeth it not by will or work; but only he willeth the person, not including the holiness as to any absolute will. And so God loveth the person without the holiness; but not so much as he would love him if he were holy.

Object. But you intimate, that it is best as to the beauty of the universe, that there be sin, and unholiness, and damnation; and God loveth that which is good as to the universe, yea, that is a higher good than personal good, as the subject is more noble, and therefore more to be loved of us as it is of God.

Answ. 1. I know Augustin is oft alleged as saying, Bonum est ut malum fiat. But sin and punishment must be distinguished: it is true of punishment presupposing sin, that it is good and lovely, in respect to public ends, though hurtful to the person suffering; and therefore as God willeth it as good, so should we not only be patient, but be pleased in it as it is the demonstration of the justice and holiness of God, and as it is good, though not as it is our hurt. But sin (or unholiness privative) is not good in itself, nor to the universe: nor is it a true saying, that It is good that there be sin; nor is it willed of God, (though not nilled with an absolute, effective nolition,) as hath been elsewhere opened at large. Sin is not good to the universe, nor any part of the beauty of the creature: God neither willeth it, causeth it, nor loveth it.

Object. At least he hath no great love to holiness in those persons, that he never giveth it to; otherwise he would work it in them.

Answ. He cannot love that existent which existeth not. Nor doth he any further will to give it them than to command it, and give them all necessary means and persuasions to it. But what if God make but one sun, will you say that he hath no great love to a sun, that will make no more? What if he make no more worlds? doth that prove that he hath no great love to a world? He loveth the world, the sun, and so the saints, which he hath made: and he doth not so far love suns, or worlds, or saints, as to make as many suns, or worlds, or saints, as foolish wits would prescribe unto him. Our question is, What being God loveth, and we should most love, as being best and likest him, and not what he should give a being to that is not.

Object. VI. Holiness is but an accident, and the person is the substance, and better than the accident; and Dr. Twiss oppugneth, on such accounts, the saying of Arminius, That God loveth justice better than just men, because it is for justice that he loveth them.

Answ. Aristotle and Porphyry have not so clearly made known to us the nature of those things or modes which they are pleased to call accidents, as that we should lay any great stress upon their sayings about them. Another will say that goodness itself is but an accident, and most will call it a mode; and they will say that the substance is better than the mode or accident, and therefore better than goodness itself. And would this, think you, be good arguing? Distinguish then between physical goodness of being, in the soul, both as a substance, and as a formal virtue; and the perfective, or modal, qualitative or gradual goodness; and then consider, that the latter always presupposeth the former: where there is holiness, there is the substance, with its physical goodness, and the perfective, modal, or moral goodness too; but where there is no holiness, there is only a substance deprived of its modal, moral goodness. And is not both better than one, and a perfect being than an imperfect?

And as to Arminius's saying, He cannot mean that God loveth righteousness with a subject or substance, better than a subject without righteousness; for there is no such thing to love, as righteousness without a subject (though there maybe an abstracted, distinct conception of it). If therefore the question be only, Whether God love the same man better, as he is a man, or as he is a saint, I answer, he hath a love to each which is suitable to its kind. He hath such complacency in the substance of a serpent, a man, a devil, as is agreeable to their being; that is, as they bear the natural impressions of his creating perfections, yet such as may stand with their pain, death, and misery. But he hath such a complacency in the actual holiness, love, and obedience of men and angels, as that he taketh the person that hath them to be meet for his service, and glory, and everlasting felicity, and delight in him, as being qualified for it. So that God's love must be denominatively distinguished from the object; and so it is a love of nature, and a love of the moral perfections of nature: the first love is that by which he loveth a man because he is a man, and so all other creatures; the second love is that by which he loveth a good man, because he is good or holy. And if it will comfort you, that God loveth your being without your perfections or virtue, let it comfort you in pain, and death, and hell, that he continueth your being without your well-being or felicity.

Object. VII. All goodness or holiness is some one's goodness or holiness (as health is). And as it is the person's welfare and perfection, so it is given for the person's sake: therefore the person, as the finis cui, and utmost end, is better than the thing given him, and so more amiable.

Answ. That all goodness is some one's goodness, proveth but that some one is the subject or being that is good, but not that to be is better than to be good, as such. And as he is in some respect the finis cui, for whom it is, and so it is good to him; yet he and his goodness are for a higher end, which is the pleasing of God in the demonstration of his goodness: that therefore is best which most demonstrateth God's goodness. And there is no subject or substance without its accidents or modes; and that person that is not good and holy, is bad and unholy. Therefore the question should be, Whether a person bad and unholy, be more amiable than a person good and holy, that hath both physical and moral goodness. And for all that the name of an accident maketh action seem below the person: yet it must be also said, that the person and his faculties are for action, as being but the substance in a perfect mode, and that action is for higher ends than the person's being or felicity.