A Christian Directory, Part 1: Christian Ethics

by Richard Baxter

What truth is.

That you may know what lying is, we must first know what truth is, and what is the use of speech. Truth is considerable, 1. As it is in the things known and spoken of. 2. As it is in the conception or knowledge of the mind. 3. As it is in the expressions of the tongue. 1. Truth in the things known is nothing but their reality; that indeed they are that which their names import, or the mind apprehendeth them to be: this is that which is called both physical and metaphysical truth.[497] 2. Truth in the conception or knowledge of the mind, is nothing else but the agreement or conformity of the knowledge to the thing known; to conceive of it truly, is to conceive of it as it is; mistake or error is contrary to this truth. 3. Truth as it is in the expressions is indeed a twofold relation. (1.) The primary relation is of our words or writings to the matter expressed. And so truth of speech is nothing but the agreeableness of our words to the things expressed; when we speak of them as they are. (2.) The secondary relation of our words is to the mind of the speaker; for the natural use of the tongue is to express the mind as well as the matter: and thus truth of speech is nothing but the agreeableness of our words to our thoughts or judgments. Truth as it is the agreement of thoughts or words to the matter, may be called logical truth. And this is but the common matter of moral or ethical truth, which may be found partly in a clock, or watch, or weathercock, or a seaman's chart. The agreement of our words to our minds, is the more proper or special matter of moral truth; the form of it as a moral virtue is its agreement to the law of the God of truth. And as the terminus entereth the definition of relations, so our words have respect to the mind of the hearer or reader, as their proper terminus; their use being to acquaint him, 1. With the matter expressed; 2. With our minds concerning it. Therefore it is necessary to the logical truth of speech, that it have an aptitude rightly to inform the hearer; and to the ethical truth, that it be intended by the speaker really to inform him, and not to deceive him. (Supposing that it is another that we speak to.)

You see then that to a moral truth all these things are necessary: 1. That it be an agreement of the words with the matter expressed (as far as we are obliged to know the matter). 2. That it be an agreement of the words with the speaker's mind or judgment. 3. That the expressions have an aptitude to inform the hearer of both the former truths. 4. That we really intend them to inform him of the truth, so far as we speak it. 5. That it be agreeable to the law of God; which is the rule of duty, and discoverer of sin.

In some speeches the truth of our words as agreeing to the matter and to the mind is all one, viz. when our own conception or judgment of a thing is all that we assert. As when we say, I think, or I believe, or I judge that such a thing is so. Here it is no whit necessary to the truth of my words, that the thing be so as I think it to be, (for I affirm it not to be so,) but that indeed I think as I say I think. But that our words and minds agree, is always and inseparably necessary to all moral truth.

How far we are bound to speak the truth.

We are not bound to make known all that is true, (for then no man must keep a secret,) much less to every man that asketh us. Therefore we are not bound to endeavour the cure of every man's error or ignorance in every matter; for we are not bound to talk at all to every man. And if I be not bound to make known the truth at all, or my mind at all, I am not bound to make known all the truth, or all that is in my mind; no, not to all those to whom I am bound to make known part of both. If I find a man in an ignorance or error which I am not bound to cure, (nay, possibly it were my sin to cure it; as to open the secrets of the king's counsels or armies to his enemies, &c.) I may and must so fit my speech to that man, even about those matters, as not to make him know what he should not know either of the matter or of my mind; I may either be silent, or speak darkly, or speak words which he understandeth not, (through his own imperfection,) or which I know his weakness will misunderstand; but I must speak no falsehood to him. Also there is a great difference between speaking so as not to cure the ignorance or error of the hearer, which I found him in, and so speaking as to lead him into some new error; I may do the former in many cases, in which I may not do the latter. And there is great difference between speaking such words, as in the common use of men are apt to inform the hearers of the truth, though I may know, that through some weakness of their own they will misunderstand them, and be deceived by them; and the speaking of words which in common use of men, have another signification than that which I use them to. By the former way, the hearer sometimes is the deceiver of himself, and not the speaker, when the speaker is not bound to reveal any more to him; but by the latter way the speaker is the deceiver. Also there is great difference to be made between my speaking to one to whom it is my duty to reveal the truth, and my speaking to a man to whom I am not bound to reveal it; yea, from whom my duty to God, and my king or country, bind me to conceal it. By these grounds and distinctions you may know what a lie is, and may resolve the ordinary doubts that are used to be raised about our speaking truth or falsehood. As,

Quest. I. Am I bound to speak the truth to every one that asketh me? Answ. You are not bound to speak at all in every case to every one that asketh you; and he that is silent, speaketh not the truth.

Quest. II. Am I bound to speak the truth to every one that I answer to? Answ. Your answer may sometimes be such as signifieth but a denying to answer, or to reveal what is demanded of you.

Quest. III. Am I bound to speak all the truth, whenever I speak part of it? Answ. No: it is God's word that must tell you when, and how much you must reveal to others[498] and if you go as far as God alloweth you, it followeth not, that therefore you must go further. A soldier taken by the enemy may tell the truth when he is asked in things that will do no harm to his king and country; but he must conceal the rest, which would advantage the enemy against them.

Quest. IV. Is it always a sin to speak a logical falsehood; that is, to speak disagreeably to the thing which I speak of? Answ. Not always: for you may sometimes believe an untruth without sin. For you are to believe things according to their evidence and appearance. Therefore if the deceit be unavoidably caused by a false appearance or evidence, without any fault of yours, it is not then your fault to be mistaken. But then your expressions must signify no more certainty than you have, nor any more confidence than the evidence will warrant. When you say, such a thing is so; the meaning must be but, I am persuaded it is so; for if you say, I am certain it is so, when you are not certain, you offend.