Quest. XII. What if both parties commit adultery? may either of them put away the other, or depart; or rather must they forgive each other?
Answ. If they do it both at once, they do both forfeit the liberty of seeking any compensation for the injury; because the injury is equal (however some would give the advantage to the man): but if one commit adultery first, and the other after; then either the last offender knew of the first, or not. If not, then it seemeth all one as if it had been done at once. But if yea, then they did it either on a supposition of the dissolution of the matrimonial obligation, as being loosed from the first adulterer, or else upon a purpose of continuing in the first relation: in the latter case, it is still all one as if it had been done by them at once, and it is a forfeiture of any satisfaction: but in the former case, though the last adulterer did sin, yet being before set at liberty, it doth not renew the matrimonial obligation: but yet, if the first offender desire the continuance of it, and the return of the first injured party; shame and conscience of their own sin, will much rebuke them, if they plead that injury for continuance of the separation.
Quest. XIII. But what if one do purposely commit adultery, to be separated from the other?
Answ. It is in the other's power and choice, whether to be divorced and depart, or not, as they find the good or evil consequents preponderate.
Quest. XIV. Doth not infidelity dissolve the relation or obligation; seeing there is no communion between light and darkness, a believer and an infidel?
Answ. It maketh it unlawful for a believer to marry an infidel (except in case of true necessity); because they can have no communion in religion. But it nullifieth not a marriage already made, nor maketh it lawful to depart or divorce; because they may have mere conjugal communion still. As the apostle purposely determineth the case, in 1 Cor. vii.
Quest. XV. Doth not the desertion of one party disoblige the other?
Answ. 1. It must be considered what is true desertion. 2. Whether it be a desertion of the relation itself for continuance, or only a temporary desertion of cohabitation, or congress. 3. What the temper and state of the deserted party is. 1. It is sometimes easy, and sometimes hard to discern which is the deserting party. If the wife go away from the husband unwarrantably, though she require him to follow her, and say that she doth not desert him, yet it may be taken for a desertion, because it is the man who is to rule and choose the habitation. But if the man go away, and the woman refuse to follow him, it is not he that is therefore the deserter.
Quest. But what if the man have not sufficient cause to go away, and the woman hath great and urgent reasons not to go? As suppose that the man will go away in hatred of an able preacher, and good company, and the woman if she follow him, must leave all those helps, and go among ignorant, profane, heretical persons, or infidels; which is the deserter then?
Answ. If she be one that is either like to do good to the infidels, heretics, or bad persons whom they must converse with, she may suppose that God calleth her to receive good by doing good; or if she be a confirmed, well-settled christian, and not very like, either by infection, or by want of helps, to be unsettled and miscarry, it seemeth to me the safest way to follow her husband. She must lose indeed God's public ordinances by following him: but it is not imputable to her, as being out of her choice; and she must lose the benefits and neglect the duties of the conjugal ordinance, if she do not follow him. But if she be a person under such weaknesses, as make her removal apparently dangerous as to her perseverance and salvation, and her husband will by no means be prevailed with to change his mind, the case then is very difficult, what is her duty, and who is the deserter. Nay, if he did but lead her into a country where her life were like to be taken away, (as under the Spanish Inquisition,) unless her suffering were like to be as serviceable to Christ as her life. Indeed these cases are so difficult, that I will not decide them; the inconveniencies (or mischiefs rather) are great which way soever she take: but I most incline to judge as followeth: viz. It is considerable first, what marriage obligeth her to, simply of its own nature; and what it may do next, by any superadded contract, or by the law or custom of the land, or any other accident. As to the first, it seemeth to me, that every one's obligation is so much first to God, and then to their own souls and lives; that marriage as such, which is for mutual help, as a means to higher ends, doth not oblige her to forsake all the communion of saints, and the place or country where God is lawfully worshipped, and to lose all the helps of public worship, and to expose her soul both to spiritual famine and infection, to the apparent hazard of her salvation (and perhaps bring her children into the same misery); nor hath God given her husband any power to do her so much wrong, nor is the marriage covenant to be interpreted to intend it. But what any human law or contract, or other accident which is of greater public consequence, may do more than marriage of itself, is a distinct case which must have a particular discussion.