A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics

by Richard Baxter

Quest. I. Is it a sin for a man to steal in absolute necessity, when it is merely to save his life?

Answ. The case is very hard. I shall, I. Tell you so much as is past controversy, and then speak to the controverted part. 1. If all other unquestionable means be not first used, it is undoubtedly a sin. If either labouring or begging will save our lives, it is unlawful to steal. Yea, or if any others may be used to intercede for us. Otherwise it is not stealing to save a man's life, but stealing to save his labour, or to gratify his pride and save his honour. 2. It is undoubtedly a sin if the saving of our lives by it, do bring a greater hurt to the commonwealth or other men, than our lives are worth. 3. And it is a sin if it deprive the owner of his life, he being a person more worthy and useful to the common good. These cases are no matter of controversy.

4. And it is agreed of, that no man may steal beforehand out of a distrustful fear of want. 5. Or if he take more than is of necessity to save his life. These cases also are put as out of controversy.

But whether in an innocent, absolute necessity it be lawful to steal so much as is merely sufficient to save one's life, is a thing that casuists are not agreed on. They that think it lawful, say that the preservation of life is a natural duty, and preservation of propriety is but a subservient thing which must give place to it. So Amesius de Conscient. lib. v. cap. 50, maketh it one case of lawful taking that which is another's, Si irrationabiliter censeatur dominus invitus: ut in eis quæ accipit aliquis ex alieno ad extremam et præsentem suam necessitatem sublevandam, cui alia ratione succurrere non potest. Hoc enim videtur esse ex jure naturali, divisione rerum antiquiore et superiore; quod jure humano quo facta est divisio rerum non potuit abrogari: Quo sensu non male dicitur, omnia fieri communia in extrema necessitate.

On the other side, those that deny it say, that the same God that hath bid us preserve our lives, hath appointed propriety, and forbidden us to steal, without excepting a case of necessity, and therefore hath made it simply evil, which we may not do for the procurement of any good: and the saving of a man's life will not prove so great a good, as the breaking of God's law will be an evil.

For the true determining of this case, we must distinguish of persons, places, and occasions. 1. Between those whose lives are needful to the public good and safety, and those that are not of any such concernment. 2. Between those that are in an enemy's or a strange country, and those that are in their own. 3. Between those that are in a commonwealth, and those that are either in a community, or among people not embodied or conjoined. 4. Between those that take but that which the refuser was bound to give them, and those that take that which he was not bound to give them. And so I answer,

1. Whensoever the preservation of the life of the taker is not, in open probability, like to be more serviceable to the common good, than the violation of the right of propriety will be hurtful, the taking of another man's goods is sinful, though it be only to save the taker's life. For the common good is to be preferred before the good of any individual.

2. In ordinary cases, the saving of a man's life will not do so much good as his stealing will do hurt. Because the lives of ordinary persons are of no great concernment to the common good; and the violation of the laws may encourage the poor to turn thieves, to the loss of the estates and lives of others, and the overthrow of peace and order. Therefore ordinarily it is a duty, rather to die, than take another man's goods against his will, or without his consent.

3. But in case that the common good doth apparently more require the preservation of the person's life, than the preservation of propriety and the keeping of the law in that instance, it is then no sin (as I conceive): which may fall out in many instances.

As, (1.) In case the king and his army should march through a neighbour prince's country, in a necessary war against their enemies; if food be denied them in their march, they may take it rather than perish. (2.) In case the king's army in his own dominions have no pay, and must either disband or die, if they have not provision, they may rather take free quarter, in case that their obedience to the king, and the preservation of the country, forbiddeth them to disband. (3.) When it is a person of so great honour, dignity, and desert, as that his worth and serviceableness will do more than recompense the hurt: as if Alexander or Aristotle were on ship-board with a covetous ship-master, who would let them die rather than relieve them. (4.) When a child taketh meat from a cruel parent that would famish him, or a wife from such a cruel husband! Or any man taketh his own by stealth from another who unjustly detaineth it, when it is to save his life. For here is a fundamental right ad rem, and the heinousness of his crime that would famish another, rather than give him his own, or his due, doth take off the scandal and evil consequents of the manner of taking it. (5.) But the greatest difficulty is, in case that only the common law of humanity and charity bind another to give to one that else must die, and he that needeth may take it so secretly that it shall in likelihood never be known, and so never be scandalous, nor encourage any other to steal! May not the needy then steal to save his life? This case is so hard, that I shall not venture to determine it; but only say that he that doth so in such a case, must resolve when he hath done, to repay the owner if ever he be able (though it be but a piece of bread); or to repay him by his labour and service, if he have no other way, and be thus able; or if not so, to confess it to him that he took it from, and acknowledge himself his debtor (unless it be to one whose cruelty would abuse his confession).