Object. II. But, saith he, lib. viii. p. 192, "Unto me it seemeth almost out of doubt and controversy, that every independent multitude before any certain form of regimen established, hath under God supreme authority, full dominion over itself,"—
Answ. If by dominion were meant propriety, every individual hath it; but for governing power, it seemeth as clear to me, that your independent multitude hath no civil power of government at all; but only a power to choose them governors; while they have no governors, they have no governing power, for that maketh a governor.
Object. III. Ibid. "A man who is lord of himself, may be made another's servant," &c.
Answ. 1. He may hire out himself to labour for another; because he hath so far the power of himself, and his labour is his own, which he may sell for wages; but in a family, that the master be the governor to see God's laws obeyed by his servants, is of divine appointment, and this governing power the servant giveth not to his master, but only maketh himself the object of it. 2. The power that nature giveth a man over himself, is tota specie distinct from civil government; (as Dr. Hammond hath well showed against I. G.) An individual person hath not that power of his own life as the king hath. He may not put himself to death, for that which the king may put him to death for. 3. If this were true, that every individual, by self-resignation, might give a king his power over him; yet a posse ad esse non valet consequentia; and that it is not so is proved, in that God the universal Sovereign hath prevented them, by determining himself, of his own officers, and giving them their power in the same charter by which he enableth the people to choose them. Therefore it is no better reasoning than to say, If all the persons in London subjected themselves to the lord mayor, he would thereby receive his power from them, when the king hath prevented that already, by giving him the power himself in his charter; and leaving only the choice of the person to them; and that under the direction of the rules which he hath given them.[42]
Object. IV. But saith he, lib. viii. p. 193, "In kingdoms of this quality, (as this we live in,) the highest governor hath indeed universal dominion, but with dependency upon that whole entire body over the several parts whereof he hath dominion; so that it standeth for an axiom in this case, The king is major singulis, universis minor."
Answ. If you had included himself, it is certain that he cannot be greater than the whole, because he cannot be greater than himself. But seeing you speak of the whole in contradistinction from him, I answer, that indeed in genere causæ finalis, the sovereign is universis minor, that is, the whole kingdom is naturally more worth than one, and their felicity a greater good; or else the bonum publicum, or salus populi, could not be the end of government; but this is nothing to our case; for we are speaking of governing power as a means to this end; and so in genere causæ efficientis, the sovereign (yea, and his lowest officer) hath more authority or jus regendi than all the people as such (for they all as such have none at all); even as the church is of more worth than the pastor, and yet the pastor alone hath more authority to administer the sacraments, and to govern the people, than all the flock hath; for they have none either to use or give, (whatever some say to the contrary,) but only choose him to whom God will give it.[43]
Object. V. Saith the reverend author, lib. viii. p. 194, "Neither can any man with reason think, but that the first institution of kings, (a sufficient consideration wherefore their power should always depend on that from which it did always flow,) by original influence of power from the body into the king, is the cause of kings' dependency in power upon the body: by dependency we mean subordination and subjection."
Answ. 1. But if their institution in genere was of God, and that give them their power, and it never flowed from the body at all, then all your superstructure falleth with your ground-work. 2. And here you seem plainly to confound all kingdoms by turning the pars imperans into the pars subdita, and vice versa; if the king be subject, how are they his subjects? I will not infer what this will lead them to do, when they are taught that kings are in subordination and subjection to them. Sad experience hath showed us what this very principle would effect.
Object. VI. Ibid.[44] "A manifest token of which dependency may be this; as there is no more certain argument, that lands are held under any as lords, than if we see that such lands in defect of heirs fall unto them by escheat; in like manner it doth follow rightly that seeing dominion when there is none to inherit it, returneth unto the body, therefore they which before were inheritors of it, did hold it in dependence on the body; so that by comparing the body with the head as touching power, it seemeth always to reside in both; fundamentally and radically in one, in the other derivatively; in one the habit, in the other the act of power."
Answ. Power no more falleth to the multitude by escheat, than the power of the pastor falls to the church, or the power of the physician to the hospital, or the power of the schoolmaster to the scholars; that is, not at all. When all the heirs are dead, they are an ungoverned community, that have power to choose a governor, but no power to govern, neither (as you distinguish it) in habit nor in act, originally nor derivatively. As it is with a corporation when the mayor is dead, the power falleth not to the people.