9. Sometimes particular duties are commanded with this express exception, "Unless they have just and reasonable impediment." As for coming every Lord's day to church, &c.; which seemeth to imply, that (though in cases where the public good is concerned, the person himself shall not be judge, nor at all as to the penalty, yet that) in actions of an indifferent nature in themselves, this exception is still supposed to be implied, "unless we have just and reasonable impediments," of which in private cases, as to the crime, we may judge.
10. I need not mention the common, natural exceptions: as that laws bind not to a thing when it becometh naturally impossible; or cessante materia, rel capacitate subjecti obligati, &c.
11. Laws may change their sense in part by the change of the lawgiver; for the law is not formally to us his law that is dead and was once our ruler, but his that is alive and is now our ruler. If Henry the Eighth make a law about the outward acts of religion, (as for coming to church, &c.) and this remain unrepealed in King Edward's, Queen Mary's, Queen Elizabeth's, King James's days, &c., even till now; as we are not to think that the lawgivers had the same sense and will, so neither that the law hath the same sense and obligation; for if the general words be capable of several senses, we must not take it as binding to us in the sense it was made in, but in the sense of our present lawgivers or rulers, because it is their law.
12. Therefore if a law had a special reason for it at the first making, (as the law for using bows and arrows,) that reason ceasing, we are to suppose the will of the lawgiver to remit the obligation, if he urge not the execution, and renew not the law.
13. By these plain principles many particular difficulties may be easily resolved, which cannot be foreseen and named, e. g. the law against relieving a beggar bindeth not, when he is like to die if he be not relieved; or in such a case as after the burning of London, when there was no parish to bring him to. A law that is but for the ordering of men's charity, (to soul or body, by preaching or alms,) will not disoblige me from the duties of charity themselves, in cases where Scripture or nature proveth them to be imposed by God. A law for fasting will not bind me, when it would be destructive to my body; even on God's sabbaths duties of mercy were to be preferred to rest and sacrifices.
14. If God's own laws must be thus expounded, that When two duties come together, and both cannot be done, the lesser ceaseth at that time to be a duty, and the greater is to be preferred, man's laws must also be necessarily so expounded: and the rather, because man's laws may be contradictory, when God's never are so, rightly understood.
15. Where the subject is to obey, so far he must discern which of the laws inconsistent is to be preferred; but in the magistratical execution, the magistrate or judge must determine.
E. g. One law commandeth that all the needy poor be kept on the parish where they were born or last lived. Another law saith, that nonconformable ministers of the gospel, who take not the Oxford oath, shall not come within five miles of city or corporation, (though they were born there,) or any place where they have been preachers. In case of necessity what shall they do? Answ. Whither they shall go for relief, they must discern as well as they can; but whither they shall be carried or sent, the magistrate or constable must discern and judge.
Also whether he shall go with a constable that by one law bringeth him to a place, which by the other law he is forbid on pain of six months' imprisonment in the common gaol to come to? Answ. If he be not voluntary in it, it is not his fault: and if one bring him thither by force, and another imprison him for being there, he must patiently suffer it.
16. But out of such excepted cases, the laws of our rulers (as the commands of parents) do bind us as is afore explained; and it is a sin against God to violate them.